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1 | Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Not long after World War Two ended, a small number of European countries started
to work together to bring down the barriers to trade between them. While the Eu-
ropean Union started out as a very specific cooperation agreement, it grew over a
period of 50 years into true economic union covering the bulk of the European con-
tinent. During this time, countries all over the world followed suit. This gave rise
to a large number of Regional Integration Agreements (RIA) differing in size (the
number of countries covered), breadth (the different policy domains covered) and
depth (the extent to which each of these domains is harmonized). Throughout this
book, the term Regional Integration Agreement will be used to refer to this amal-
gamated group of intra- and inter-regional free trade agreements, customs unions,
common markets and economic unions.
By way of illustration, figure 1.1 plots the proliferation of RIAs over the last 45
years. Bilateral agreements (between two countries) are indicated by black ar-
rows and multilateral agreements (involving more than two partner countries) are
represented by connecting those countries to a central node using a colored line.
The powerful upswing in the number of agreements over the last 15 years shows
that even though the first agreements are more than 60 years old, RIAs are still a
present-day tool of modern trade policy. This increase is due in part to the failure of
the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development round of negotiations to break
down barriers to trade. Because of their preferential nature, RIAs make it easier to
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Figure 1.1: The growth of bilateral and multilateral integration agreements over time.
Bilateral agreements are indicated by the curved black arrows, while countries that are members of
a multilateral ageements are connected to a central node using a colored line.
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come to an agreement on a wide range of topics. This enables countries to address
issues beyond reductions in tariffs such as removing non-tariff barriers to trade as
well as ensure cooperation in other policy domains such as migration, security and
environmental policy.
The chapters in this book are bound together by three common threads: they share
a common theme, address common methodological issues and/or use similar tech-
niques. After explaining each underlying thread, the remainder of the introduction
briefly outlines the contents and contributions of each individual chapter.
The causes and consequences of trade agreements
The overarching theme is an empirical study of the causes and consequences of
signing a regional integration agreement.
The theoretical literature on RIAs usually does not discern between causes and con-
sequences since the motives for signing an integration agreement are the expected
benefits. Initially, the analysis of the economic effects of trade agreements focused
on the static, short term welfare effects caused by the change in relative tariff rates
(Viner, 1950). Trade agreements would only positively affect welfare to the extent
that they didn’t divert too much trade from the rest of the world. However, if the
trade agreement’s main effect was to benefit the partner countries’ companies over
those in the rest of the world, an increase in bilateral trade could nevertheless cause
a decrease in overall welfare. As a result, many of the ex-ante indicators of the
welfare effects of a trade agreement compared the compatibility of both countries’
economies with their compatibility with the rest of the world.
The dynamic effects of trade agreements focussed on the small, but cumulative
changes a trade agreement could have on growth. By bringing the local markets
closer together, RIAs could bring about economies of scale that could lead to a
cascade of positive effects on welfare. Even though it pertained African integra-
tion, the following quote from Foroutan and Pritchett (1993, p.234) sums up the
underlying argument behind dynamic effects: “Imagine subdividing Belgium into
forty-something independent countries, each with its own isolated goods and factor
4 1. Introduction
markets, a different public administration, currency, language, fiscal and mone-
tary authorities, army, plus a very inefficient inter-country transportation network.
Economists would contend that the welfare of individuals would surely be reduced.”
Because of their breadth, RIAs are a particularly well-suited tool to start tackling
these barriers to trade and as a result carry huge potential welfare benefits.
Finally, the new regionalism theories were concerned with the political process be-
hind the negotiations of RIAs and looked at the effects beyond those on trade. The
assumption of a monolithic, welfare-maximizing government was abandoned, al-
lowing for various political motives to drive the formation of RTAs. Examples
include using trade agreements to enhance regional cooperation or lock in domes-
tic reform programs (Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 1998; Mansfield et al., 2002).
Other authors argued that trade agreements could also be used for more nefari-
ous purposes. Think of situations where private firms bribe politicians into closing
agreements that are not in the common interest (Grossman and Helpman, 1995) or
where politicians themselves use the agreements to strengthen their tenuous domes-
tic political position (Söderbaum, 2004).
Unlike the theoretical literature, the empirical studies of trade agreements can for
the most part be separated into studies explaining the formation of trade agreements
and those studying its effects. Broadly speaking, the former rely on (ordered) probit
models to explain ex post which factors enticed countries to sign trade agreements.
An important finding has been that while economic welfare is what matters in the
long run, political variables are the deciding factor when it comes to the timing of
the agreements (Baier et al., 2007). We link up with this literature in the second
chapter where we look at the influence of corruption on the formation of African
RIAs.
The main mechanism used to study the effects of trade agreements has been to
include various types of RIA dummies into gravity models explaining bilateral trade
flows. However, due to various methodological problems the results have been
strongly divergent. To date there is no overall agreed upon way of estimating the
effects of trade agreements on trade (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). We address
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this in chapter 6 where we try to merge the empirical literature on the causes and
consequences by estimating the probit model and gravity equation simultaneously.
Methodological issues
The two recurring methodological issues that are centered on in this thesis are si-
multaneity (or endogeneity) and data quality. Simultaneity is a situation were one
of the explanatory variables affects, but is also affected by the to-be-explained vari-
able. For example in the last chapter we look at the effect of integration agreements
on trade while taking into account that these agreements are more likely to occur be-
tween countries that already trade intensively. Ignoring this source of endogeneity
has been found to significantly bias the estimated effect of RIAs downwards (e.g.
Magee, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 2002, 2004b, 2007, 2009; Egger et al., 2011).
A similar simultaneity problem is addressed in chapter 2. There are a number of
theories that find that (under certain conditions) an increase in the level of corrup-
tion will raise the likelihood of a RIA. Either because the more corrupt government
would try to use the agreements to extract rents (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1995)
or because the increase in corruption would motivate the government to fight cor-
ruption using an integration agreement (e.g. Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 1998). In
the first case, this would lead to a subsequent increase in corruption, while the op-
posite would happen in the second case. Regardless of the direction of the effect
this simultaneity has to be addressed, especially because not all indicators of the
level of corruption predate the signing of the agreement.
The second econometric issue central to this thesis is that of data quality. As Mor-
genstern (1962) emphasized, many of the variables used in economic analyses are
only estimates with a certain and at times significant measurement error. Ravallion
(2010, p.2) focuses specifically on the correct construction and use of ‘mashup’
indices: indexes that combine a set of variables that reflect various dimensions of
some unobserved concept, but whose construction does not rely on any theoretical
literature. The indicators of corruption perception used in the second chapter are
an example of a mashup index. Incautious use of these indicators can lead to the
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wrong conclusion, which becomes evident in chapter 2 where the different indica-
tors of corruption can sometimes come to strongly different conclusions.
While often overlooked, the same problem afflicts data on trade flows and indicators
of regional integration. Chapters 3 to 5 deal with the creation of a (mashup) index
of the level of corruption and integration from a number of imprecise indicators. In
the construction of these indicators, we pay specific attention to the issues brought
forward by Ravallion (2010): i.e. conceptual clarity, transparency, robustness and
policy relevance. We start with a very clear definition of what we are trying to mea-
sure and what we aim to use it for. The weight of each component of the indexes
is determined statistically, moving any trade-off between different components out-
side of our direct control. However, to make the interpretation of the index as clear
as possible, we subsequently discuss the weight each component was assigned.
The statistical weights notwithstanding, there remain certain modeling choices in
each index. For example, do you allow cross-correlation between the measurement
errors of the different components? Can the level of persistence in corruption or
integration differ in each country? etc. We test the robustness of our results for these
choices and employ Bayesian model selection techniques to see which option is best
supported by the data. The way in which we deal with missing data also negates
the need to impute any of the underlying data series ex ante. Instead, information
can simply be entered incompletely and the index will reflect the completeness and
reliability of the underlying dataset.
An important question that needs to be resolved is how these indexes can be used in
such a way that their underlying uncertainty is fully taken into account. Firstly, we
make sure that we do not simply report the values of the index, but each time also
give an estimate of its reliability. Moreover, we produce a dataset that contains hun-
dreds of random draws from the distribution of the index such that any subsequent
analysis can correctly take its uncertainty into account. In the analyses in this thesis
we do this using Bayesian Gibbs sampling, but other possibilities include multiple
imputation (cf. Desbordes and Koop, 2014).
In terms of (policy) relevance, one of the main advantages of the indexes is the fact
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that the significance of changes over time and differences between countries can be
statistically determined. This enables for example the creation of ‘significant’ rank-
ings that reflect only the robust differences between countries (cf. Høyland et al.,
2012). This ensures that any change in the ranking of countries carries actual mean-
ing and is distinct from ‘noise’ in the measurement errors.
The state-space model
The state-space model is the methodological foundation of the estimation models
used in chapters 3 to 6. Originally designed to track the flightpath of rockets, the
state-space model is essentially a method to compute the distribution of one or more
unknown state variables from various (imprecise) measurement variables. It relies
on two equations, named the state and measurement equations. Using the original
example, the first equation predicts the position of the rocket (the unknown state)
using the information on where it was previously. The second equation explains
how the various measurements are related to the actual position of the rocket. For
example, the measurements from a satellite dish might be more accurate than those
of a radar, or might be better at gauging latitude and longitude but score worse at
measuring the height, etc.
To get the best estimate of where the rocket is now, the information on the pre-
vious and future position should be used. Because these are also unknown, the
optimal estimate would require the entire model to be solved at once. However,
Rudolf Kalman (1960) showed that under certain assumptions the state-space could
be solved iteratively. Iterating forward, the Kalman filter would update the esti-
mate of the state variable using all information available in the past. The Kalman
smoother would then iterate backwards to update these estimates using all informa-
tion available in the entire sample (Kim and Nelson, 1999; Durbin and Koopman,
2012).
This way of solving a complex dynamic system iteratively can be used on many
problems, provided that they can be written as a state-space model. These range
from composing an index of corruption or regional integration (chapters 3 to 5) to
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estimating the willingness to sign trade agreements in chapter 6. Additional advan-
tages are that any subsequent computation or estimation can take the uncertainty of
this estimate into account. Moreover, the state-space model has an elegant solution
to the problem of missing data points that does not require any imputations or other
manipulations to the data.
1.2 Contributions and results
The chapters in this book are listed in chronological order. On the one hand, orga-
nizing them this way shows how the original research question evolved over time.
It also explains why for example the new corruption index of chapter 3 is not used
when analyzing the link between corruption and RIAs in the preceding chapter.
The research question analyzed in the second chapter stems from the apparent con-
tradiction in intra-African integration agreements. Even though all African coun-
tries are a member of one or more multilateral RIAs, intra-African trade is surpris-
ingly low. In most cases, these agreements failed to produce a positive effect on
trade or welfare, which is what most ex ante economic indicators also predicted.
The failure of the more traditional economic motives to explain African RIAs opened
up the opportunity to test more political motives identified in the theory, specifically
the importance of rent-seeking behavior. Interestingly, the theories on rent-seeking
and RIAs find that the level of corruption is posited to have a positive effect on
the willingness to enter into RIAs, regardless of whether it was meant to foster
corruption or prevent it. In addition, most theoretical models found a strong non-
monotonic effect of corruption. At intermediate values an increase in corruption
would raise the probability of a RIA, but if corruption became too high this effect
would be inverted.
In our study we found that corruption has a significant effect on the willingness
to join trade agreements. While small, the effect of corruption outperformed most
economic variables such as the difference in the capital-labor ratio or GDPs. This
finding was robust for different indicators of corruption, correcting for endogene-
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ity and the fact that most African trade agreements involve more than two partner
countries. That being said, we failed to observe the non-monotonic effect predicted
by some of the theoretical models and the economic relevance of corruption was
small. Distance and other geographical factors remained the strongest explanatory
forces of African integration.
Except for a few indicators in favor of the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995),
the analysis of African RIAs was not able to discern between the different rent-
seeking motives of RIAs. The natural follow-up question would be to find out
under which circumstances trade agreements fostered or hindered corruption. How-
ever, it became clear that the indicators of corruption used in chapter 2 would not
suffice. The Worldwide Governance Indicators index of corruption (WGI), while
strong methodologically, was only available from 2002 onwards on a yearly basis.
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) started in 1995 but
had serious selection bias issues and could not be used to make comparisons over
time. The International Country Risk Guide’s index of corruption on the other hand
started in 1984, but covered fewer countries. In addition, ICRG came from a single
source, while CPI and WGI combined many different indicators of corruption.
One of the principle problems when combining different indicators of corruption
is that of missing observations. The group of available indicators differs in each
year as do the countries covered by each indicator. Ignoring this in the construction
of the index makes it impossible to know whether a change in the index is caused
by a change in corruption or by differences in the availability. The CPI solved this
problem at the cost of losing the ability to compare the index over time as well as
introducing a strong selection bias in each individual year. WGI on the other hand
combined information of several years, lowering the frequency of the index in the
initial years.
Instead, in chapter 3 we turned to a source of information that was not being used
in the creation other indexes: the strong time-dependence in the level of corrup-
tion. Adding this time-dependence to the methodology of the WGI resulted in a
state-space model. To estimate it, we used a Bayesian Gibbs sampling algorithm
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that allowed us to split up a complex probability into several much easier to solve
subcomponents. The new Bayesian Corruption Indicator was able to significantly
increase coverage, while producing more stable estimates with smaller confidence
intervals.
The methodology of the state-space model proved applicable to a wider range of
problems. Specifically, in the fourth chapter we argue that it can be used to mea-
sure the level of economic integration. The state-space model weighs each indi-
cator’s influence statistically, allowing us capture the overall evolution of such a
multidimensional concept as integration. Furthermore, the model can easily be ex-
tended to combine for example dichotomous with continuous indicators without
having to impose strong assumptions. This would for example allow the addition of
indicators of institutional integration in a straightforward and objective manner.
As an example, we used the state-space model to build an index of Actual Economic
Integration that captures integration in terms of trade in goods and services, migra-
tion and financial flows. Starting in the mid 1980s, the index looks at integration
from the perspective of OECD member countries. Using this index in a weighted
directed network, Germany was identified as the most central country in the OECD
network with the USA as a close second. It also shows the gradual rise in impor-
tance of two non-OECD members during the last two decades, namely China and
Russia. Using this index as the dependent variable in a structural gravity model
revealed that the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (Nafta) were closed between countries that were already highly integrated.
Nevertheless, these agreements succeeded in further raising the level of economic
integration both in the short and long term.
The fifth chapter limited the index to measure only trade integration, which al-
lowed us to expand analysis to the entire world, starting in the 1880s. The state-
space model’s solution to incomplete information played a key role in extending the
coverage before 1950 compared to other indicators of trade integration. For exam-
ple, the number of country-pairs covered in each year before 1950 was quadrupled
relative to the Head-Ries index. The increased coverage enabled the comparison
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of the change in the importance of distance during the pre- and post-World War
globalization waves.
The concept of geographic neutrality predicts that the influence of distance on the
global trade pattern would diminish as the world is becoming more globalized.
However, over the last three decades a wide range of studies has found an increase
in the importance of distance during the second half of the twentieth century (the
distance puzzle). In line with the theories of O’Rourke (2009) and Jacks et al.
(2011), we found that this increase is not caused by methodological issues, but is
an actual feature of the changing world trade network. The first globalization wave
(1880-1914) was driven by decreasing trade costs, significantly lowering the impor-
tance of distance over time. In contrast, the second wave (during the second half
of the 20th century) was induced by increased production capacity and geopolitical
changes centered on Western Europe and North America. While we confirm the
increase in the effect of distance on trade during this period, we found that it is
dominated by the strong decrease during the first globalization wave.
Finally, the last chapter returns to the analysis of integration agreements, specifi-
cally we look for a way in which the simultaneity of trade and trade agreements can
be modeled. Initial attempts to use instrumental variables proved unreliable, caus-
ing many to look for alternative solutions to address this issue. In the last chapter,
we bring together the gravity equations explaining trade and the probit regressions
explaining RIAs by modeling them simultaneously.
Estimation once again relied on Gibbs sampling techniques, where in a first step a
state-space model was used to generate the willingness to sign a trade agreement.
The latter was subsequently modeled endogenously with trade and its parameters
are estimated in a vector autoregression model (VAR). This qualitative VAR model
allowed us to capture the interdependence of trade and trade agreements without
having to resort to instrumental variables. Moreover, it enabled us to take the en-
dogenous nature of other control variables like GDPs and the capital labor ratio into
account. Our preliminary findings confirmed the simultaneity of trade and trade
agreements: an increase in trade raised the probability of an agreement and vice
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versa, although the response differed over specific continents. Both variables dis-
played strong dynamic behavior and overall the parameters on the control variables
followed expectations.
Using the estimated parameters, it is possible to calculate what trade and GDP
would have been if no agreement had been signed. By comparing the actual flows
with these counterfactuals, we can compute the average treatment effect of signing
a trade agreement. Preliminary results indicate that the effects are relatively small
compared to what is typically found in the literature. Trade increases with 10%
after one year and 40% after 5 years, after which its rate of growth drops off. GDP
initially does not seem to be strongly affected by the agreement. After 35 years,
trade flows have increased with about 80% while GDP increased with only 10%.
However, these findings are very preliminary. Before estimates can be stated with
any confidence, the theoretical foundations of the estimation model should be more
firmly secured.
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2 | Multilateral trade agreements in
Africa - Exploring the role of
rent-seeking behavior1
Abstract
This chapter explores the motives behind the formation of intra-African regional
integration agreements (RIAs). We focus specifically on rents because they can ex-
plain the drive for integration even in the absence of a positive effect on welfare.
Whether they are meant to foster rent-seeking or to suppress it, the level of cor-
ruption is posited to have a positive effect on the willingness to enter into RIAs.
However, previous empirical studies have come to contradictory conclusions. We
find that corruption has a significant effect on the willingness to join trade agree-
ments. While small, the effect of corruption outperforms most economic variables.
Nevertheless, distance and other geographical factors remain the strongest explana-
tory forces of African integration.
Keywords: African regional integration; Rent-seeking; Multilateral trade agree-
ments; Corruption.
JEL classification: Q27; D73; F13; F54.
1This chapter is the results of joint work together with Prof. Dr. Glenn Rayp.
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2.1 Introduction
Regional integration has been very popular in Africa over the last 50 years. Every
country is part of at least one regional integration agreement (RIA) and on aver-
age an African country is member of four agreements (The World Bank, 2005).
Yet, it is hard to reconcile this enthusiasm for regional integration with its results.
Most indicators show that African economies are barely integrated. Tariff reduction
schemes are backlogged, rules of origin are extremely restrictive and cross-border
transportation facilities are either inadequate, or missing altogether. As a result, the
level of intra-regional trade of most African RIAs rarely exceeds 10% (relative to
around half of all trade in NAFTA or the EU-27), and in some cases it even fell after
signing the agreements (UNU-CRIS, 2006).
Theoretically, the reasons for African integration have never been very compelling
to begin with. First of all, most African countries do not produce any of the products
that are of interest to neighboring countries. The bulk of African trade is with
developed economies, in particular the European Union. The African trade patterns
are not complementary and static analysis warns that this will most likely result in
trade diversion and hence lower welfare. Similarly, the long term dynamic effects
are unlikely to be strong and many of the new regionalism theories are conditional
on strong economic integration.
Rent-seeking behavior on the other hand can provide a valid alternative explanation
for the interest in African integration in the form of the rent-seizing, rent-shielding
and rent-destruction hypotheses. They can account for the strong interest in inte-
gration in the absence of a positive effect on welfare, as well as for the lack of
progress in breaking down the barriers to trade. The rent-seizure hypothesis states
that RIAs are used to set up rent-extracting mechanisms. The agreements bestow
extensive powers on the negotiating parties, which combined with the absence of
an increase in welfare creates an ideal environment for lobbying and in the worst
case bribery. Conversely, rent-shielding remonstrates that the government can use
RIAs to protect parts of the economy by removing them from the direct control of
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the government. Similarly, rent-destruction claims that RIAs increase competition
which curtails rents. Depending on how benevolent the government is, all three
predict a positive effect of corruption on the formation of trade agreements.
While there exist ample examples of RIAs being misused for rent-seizure purposes,
the evidence remains largely anecdotal. A couple of studies have regressed the de-
sire to enter into a free trade agreement on the level of corruption. Wu (2006) found
that an increase in the level of corruption increases the probability of joining a FTA
in that year, but ignored characteristics of the partner country. In contrast, Endoh
(2006) found that the quality of governance (including the absence of corruption)
and the probability of an agreement are positively related. A possible reason for
the contradictory results is the fact that these models only looked at a monotonic
relation. In contrast, most theoretical models predict that rent-seeking has a non-
linear effect and may interact with relative GDP or other characteristics. Arcand
et al. (2011) found that government’s welfare mindedness has a myriad of signifi-
cant interaction terms, among which its squared value and the bargaining power of
the government.
The goal of this chapter is to see whether the level of corruption can be identified
as a statistically significant factor in the decision to enter a free trade agreement
in Africa. In doing so, we also build on papers by Mansfield et al. (2002), Baier
and Bergstrand (2004a) and Márquez-Ramos et al. (2011) that try to determine the
reasons behind the formation of regional integration agreements.
The approach followed in this chapter differs from that employed in the papers
listed above in a number of ways. Firstly, it is centered on intra-African integration
and as we will show, there is significant regional heterogeneity in the reasons for
entering free trade agreements. The failure of the traditional economic motivations
in explaining African RIAs opens up opportunities to test more political motives.
Secondly, we explicitly take into account that the intra-African trade agreements
involve more than two partner countries. Moreover, many of these agreements are
overlapping, meaning that a country can be in two trade agreements with partner
countries that have not signed an agreement themselves. To this end, the bilateral
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estimation framework is adjusted to deal with the heteroscedasticity caused by the
non-nested multilateral trade agreements. Thirdly, we do not infer the level of rent-
seeking from tariff rates like Arcand et al. (2011), but instead use different indicators
of corruption perception as a proxy for the level of rent-seeking. Finally, we address
the endogeneity of the relationship between corruption and trade integration in a
number of ways: using lagged values, a control function approach as well as an
instrumental variable probit regression model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two gives an overview
of the different reasons for economic integration and their merits and demerits in
explaining African integration. Next, we expand on the idea of rent-seizure, rent-
shielding and rent-destruction as driving forces of integration. Sections four and five
cover the data and econometric method used, after which we discuss our findings.
2.2 Irrational exuberance?
2.2.1 Static and Dynamic effects
In his seminal work, Viner (1950) states that lowering the barriers to trade on an
imported good for a specific group of partner countries will have two conflicting
effects on domestic welfare: trade creation which raises welfare and trade diversion
which lowers it. Whether a RIA will raise or lower welfare depends on the relative
size of these two effects over all sectors covered by the RIA.
The problem with African integration is that intra-African trade often fell after the
agreements were closed (Iapadre and Luchetti, 2010; Yeats, 1998). With the excep-
tion of South Africa and a few other more developed nations, exports are focused
on primary goods, while imports are for the most part manufactured goods. The
non-complementarity in African trade was high and even under the most favorable
assumptions not likely to change rapidly (Yeats, 1998). Export infrastructure was
aimed at the developed world, and local trade infrastructure either missing or inad-
equate, suggesting the opportunity costs of intra-African RIAs was relatively high
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(Yang and Gupta, 2007). Carrere (2004) found that, when controlling for other fac-
tors that adversely affect bilateral trade (e.g. inadequate infrastructure, low GDP,
etc.), the trade agreements did promote intra-African trade. However, in free trade
agreements this effect was mostly driven by trade diversion, as opposed to customs
unions where trade creation prevailed.
The argument of long-term economies of scale (or dynamic effects) also has some
flaws. First of all, even if we were to unite all sub-Saharan markets, the combined
GDP would still be small, especially given the size of the African continent. For
instance, in 2009 the combined GDP of all sub-Saharan countries roughly equaled
that of the state of New York. Secondly, to fully integrate a slew of problems would
have to be conquered: different languages, currencies, rules and regulations, prac-
tically non-existent transnational transportation facilities, etc. Circumventing or
breaking down these barriers to trade is extremely expensive in time, money and
human capital (Foroutan and Pritchett, 1993). In short, the cost of attaining the
level of integration that is needed to produce economies of scale outweighs its ben-
efits in the short and medium-long term.
To exacerbate the problem, the distribution of the benefits of bilateral trade liberal-
ization is highly uneven. Most agreements are dominated by a hegemon: a country
whose GDP is the multiple of that of other members, that is more industrialized,
has higher tariff rates and often is the sole producer (Carrere, 2004). As a result,
trade diversion will be high with most benefits accruing to the hegemon, leaving
the smaller partner countries to pay for its increase in welfare. Furthermore, the
location theory of Krugman and Venables (1989) predicts that removing barriers to
trade in this setting will lead firms to relocate to the biggest market, especially when
those barriers are taken down gradually. Combining distributional effects with the
limited impact on trade and growth means that regional integration in Africa be-
comes a near zero-sum game. That these distributional problems are not without
consequences, was all too clear in the East African Community (EAC) where they
led to its dismantlement in 1977.
In order to exemplify the problem standard economic theory has in explaining
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African trade agreements, columns one to five of table 2.1 replicate the regres-
sions in Baier and Bergstrand (2004a, table 1) for the African continent. Only the
distance-related characteristics (natural and remoteness) have the expected signs
and are significant. While significant the effect of the sum of, and difference in
GDP runs opposite to what Baier and Bergstrand find. DKL and DROWKL are the
difference in capital ratios between the two countries and the difference with the rest
of the world, respectively (cf. infra). They are insignificant and the likelihood ratio
test rejects the joint significance of these non-distance related variables, confirming
the regional heterogeneity in explaining trade integration.
2.2.2 New regionalism theories
The new regionalism theories list other possible reasons for integration that go be-
yond advantages to trade. A first one is that RIAs can help bring peace to the
war-struck African continent. Undoubtedly inspired by the European successes,
this argument nevertheless falls somewhat short. First of all, the pacifying effect
of the European Union is built on the fact that its member countries have strong
economic ties, which would make war “not only unthinkable, but materially impos-
sible” (Schuman, 1950). However, as the previous section showed, this economic
deterrent is largely missing in African integration. Moreover, in sub-Saharan Africa
domestic forces are often a much bigger threat to political stability than interna-
tional ones. Historically speaking, the probability of revolutions, coups and civil
wars is a far greater than an all-out war between nations; A fact illustrated by the
recent splitting up of the Republic of the Sudan (Söderbaum, 2004).
Another often cited effect of regional integration is that it can strengthen policy
credibility and help lock in domestic reform (Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 1998;
Mansfield et al., 2002). By being self-enforcing or allowing compensating action or
punishment, a RIA can raise the perceived legitimacy of domestic reform programs.
However, finding a strong enough enforcement mechanism is not an easy task. Case
in point is the serious backlog in most reform programs and the increasing use
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Table 2.1: Economic and political explanations of RIAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Natural 0.485∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(16.16) (16.05) (16.03) (16.06) (16.03) (14.13) (13.36)
Remote 1.057∗∗∗ 1.220∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 1.275∗∗∗
(7.79) (7.70) (7.81) (7.41) (7.53) (6.71) (7.05)
Adjacent − − − − − 0.316∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗
(3.68) (3.22)
Landlocked − − − − − −0.023 −2.02e−4(−0.63) (−0.01)
GDPav − −0.0443∗ − −0.0443∗ − −0.0626∗∗ −
(-1.75) (−1.75) (−2.40)
GDPdi f f − 0.0388∗∗ − 0.0384∗∗ − 0.0490∗∗ −
(2.08) (2.06) (2.56)
GDPa − − 6.89e−3 − 6.08e−3 − 6.83e−3
(0.46) (0.41) (0.40)
GDPb − − −7.75e−3 − 7.13e−3 − 6.47e−3(−0.56) (−0.51) (0.40)
DKL − − − 0.0493 0.048 9.01e−3 0.021
(0.78) (0.76) (0.44) (0.97)
DKL2 − − − −0.0147 −0.0145 − −(−0.71) (−0.71)
DROWKL − − − −0.015 −0.015 −0.014 −0.020(−1.01) (−1.03) (−0.88) (−1.27)
Colony − − − − − 0.144∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(3.94) (3.49)
Polityav − − − − − −7.08e−3 −(−1.30)
Politya − − − − − − 9.86e−3∗∗(−2.22)
Polityb − − − − − − 3.81e−4
(0.10)
Observations 1378 1128 1128 1128 1128 1127 1035
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
log likelihood −783.7 −602.5 −604.6 −601.7 −603.8 −587.5 −544.3
LR(a) econ/pol 0.107 0.832 0.305 0.857 7.79e−4 252e−3
Probit regression on RIAbi. More information on the dependent and explanatory variables can be
found in section 2.4. Marginal effects reported with t-statistic between brackets. (a)p-value of the
likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of the economic and political variables, i.e. everything
except the geographical variables. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
of (informal) non-tariff barriers aimed at protecting against regional competition
(Khandelwal, 2004). Credibility is not an exogenous characteristic, but depends on
the economic success of the arrangement (Winters, 2001).
Regional integration and cooperation naturally reinforce each other. However, in
the short term, there is a trade-off between cooperation and integration. As the
negotiations of RIAs require time, effort, and expertise, they crowd-out the nego-
tiations of other possible cooperation schemes. Additionally, if for example issues
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of a fair distribution of the profits of the RIA impair the trust between the partner
countries, this could threaten cooperation in the long run (e.g. the dismantlement of
the EAC).
To assess the explanatory power of some of the new regionalism theories, the last
two columns of table 2.1 add a number of political variables also used in Mansfield
et al. (2002). In line with what they find, having been colonized by the same colonial
power significantly increases the probability of being a member of the same trade
agreement. The effect of the level of democracy on the other hand is reversed. While
Mansfield et al. find that an increase in the level of democracy has a positive effect
on the formation of trade agreements, we find a negative coefficient. However,
the coefficients are very small and with the exception of the level of democracy of
country a, they are not significant. The addition of the political variables renders
the non-distance related variables jointly significant, but this is mostly driven by the
addition of one variable: the dummy capturing shared colonial history.
2.3 Rents and RIAs
The difficulties traditional economic motivations have in explaining African RIAs
opens up the possibility to test more political motivations that do not necessarily
depend on strong economic advantages. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the
effect of rent-seeking behavior. The literature proposes three ways in which this
could lead to an increase in the number of trade agreements: rent-seizure, rent-
destruction and rent-shielding.
2.3.1 Rent-seizure
The rent-seizure hypothesis states that RIAs are used to appropriate rents. They
have a big impact on a substantial part of the economy (e.g. influencing market
structure, conditions that have to be met to import or export goods, etc.) and the
negotiations bestow extensive powers to politicians and bureaucrats. Furthermore,
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the complexity of the agreements allows corrupt officials to find exploitable loop-
holes that can easily hide their actions. This combined with the near zero-sum-game
outcome of integration creates an ideal breeding ground for political lobbying, cor-
ruption and bribery.
Take for example the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
where the regional cooperation tax had been set up to compensate countries for
the loss of tariff revenues on intra-regional trade. The system set up turned out to
be highly discriminatory and led to fraudulent behavior because the compensation
computations were based on highly unreliable data (M’Bet, 1997).
A similar situation occurred with the ‘single tax’ (tax unique) in the Central African
Monetary and Customs Union (UDEAC). The official goal of this tax was to foster
and protect intra-regional production by limiting domestic and import taxes relative
to extra-regional goods. Selected goods from membership countries were taxed
once when crossing the border at their respective single tax rate and would then
be exempt from all other indirect taxes and import duties. This set-up resulted in
an extremely discriminatory system, where not only each firm, but also each good
within a firm could be subject to its own tax rate. As a result, the setting of each
tax rate was subject to numerous strategic considerations and had little to do with
economic considerations (Decaluwe et al., 1997). Even in the case were all tariffs
on the goods of the partner country are removed, there are still opportunities for
corruption: e.g. officials could be bribed to treat goods from the rest of the world as
coming from the partner country.
Regional institutions can also be misused in more direct ways. Decaluwe et al.
(1997) provide the example of UDEAC where participants in missions and reunions
were so well compensated that civil servants in the member states started submitting
dossiers on any pretext to guarantee their attendance at these gatherings. Agendas
would be littered with items that allowed the so called experts to attend the head-
of-state summits, even though those studies were often of poor quality. Besides
wasting money that could otherwise have been spent on more productive goals, this
also severely impeded with the workings of the UDEAC institutions.
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A number of authors have modeled the government’s decision to enter into a free
trade agreement, where this choice is determined in part by the effect on overall
welfare but also by contributions from lobby groups of the affected industries. In
one of the most widely cited papers on this subject, Grossman and Helpman (1995)
found that a trade agreement could be possible even in the absence of a positive
effect on welfare. Moreover, in this setting the likelihood of an agreement rises
as the preference for rents (as opposed to overall welfare) increases, but this is
conditional on the relative size of the country.2
In the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995) the industry’s lobby groups di-
rectly offer campaign contributions to those political parties negotiating the trade
agreements. This differs from the examples provided where the trade agreements
themselves could be used by the government to extract rents. Assuming that these
systems were consciously constructed in this way, either other members of the gov-
ernment offered incentives to the negotiators, or the negotiators themselves were
setting up systems in which they, or people they appoint, can benefit.
Söderbaum’s (2004) regime boosting hypothesis can be seen as a special case of
the rent-seizure hypothesis aimed at international rents, rather than domestic rents.
It states that governments in a tenuous political position will use regionalism to
increase their domestic support. By attending regional summits, signing protocols,
etc., the government seeks recognition of its legitimacy abroad, which it then uses to
attract foreign aid. Söderbaum gives the example of SADC where national projects
were often disguised as regional ones and got funded with donor money.
2.3.2 Rent-destruction
Ornelas (2005) expanded the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995) by arguing
that RIAs lead to more competition between countries, reducing the returns to high
external tariffs for the import-competing industries. Because lobbies take this into
2The possibity of a RIA increased as the weight of overall welfare in the government’s objective
function decreased relative to that of political contributions. However, this only took effect in the
case of the larger of the two countries, as the effect of a trade agreement on welfare was positive for
the smaller one (Grossman and Helpman, 1995).
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account when deciding whether or not to support a trade agreement, the viability
of welfare-reducing free trade agreements is severely impaired. He finds that the
higher the government’s preference for rents is, the more rents will be destroyed by
the RIA and the stronger this rent-destruction effect will play. As a result, welfare-
reducing RIAs are only possible at a small subset of intermediate levels of corrup-
tion. If social welfare was the only thing of importance, the government would
never consider welfare-reducing free trade agreements. With high preference for
rents the rent-destruction effect dominates and lobbies would not support the trade
agreement. Only at intermediate levels of corruption can the rent-seizure motive
prevail over the rent-destruction effect. In other words, when both rent-seizure and
rent-destruction effects are in play, the effect of corruption on the probability of an
agreement follows an inverted-U shape.
This model was further augmented by Arcand et al. (2011) who also took the
strength of the bargaining position of the government into account. Their esti-
mations confirmed the theoretical prediction that the government’s preference for
rents significantly affect its decision to enter into a trade agreement. Moreover, they
found strong non-linearities: welfare mindedness and its square value interact both
with the government’s bargaining position as well as the relative GDPs, creating
a complex network of interaction terms. They measured the government’s welfare
mindedness and its bargaining position by substituting real tariff data in a model of
tariff-setting and solving for the relevant parameters.
Endoh (2006) also worked out a theoretical model detailing the effect of changes in
the quality of governance on the formation of RIAs. While his model is based on
Grossman and Helpman (1995), the effect of a change in governance is reversed:
better governance raises the probability of closing a RIA. The main reason for this
is that he uses a different government objective function where import tariffs are
treated the same as contributions for lobbyists.3 The inversion of the effect of
rent-seizure illustrates the cognitive dissonance problem in these particular polit-
3The failure to tax is seen as a measure of weak governance, and is doubly included in the govern-
ment’s objective function: once in the overall welfare and once added to the political contributions.
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ical support models: tariff revenues play a crucial role in the mechanisms driving
the model even though they are not found to matter that much in the actual decisions
of governments of developed countries (Ethier, 2011).
In his empirical analysis, Endoh (2006) composes an index of the quality of gov-
ernance by taking the average of all Worldwide Governance Indicators, including
the level of corruption. In contrast to Arcand et al. (2011) he finds that an im-
provement in governance raises the probability of an agreement. Wu (2006) argues
that an increase in uncertainty will raise the willingness to join a RIA and uses the
Corruption Perception Index as one of the proxies for political uncertainty. Like
Arcand et al. she finds a significant negative relation. A possible reason for these
contradictory findings is that Wu and Endoh do not take into account the inverted-U
relation between corruption and RIAs. Alternatively, it could simply be that good
governance as a whole has a different effect than corruption on its own. The regres-
sions in this chapter will allow for a non-monotonic relation between corruption and
RIAs. However, unlike Arcand et al. we will use indicators of corruption percep-
tion rather than using a measure derived from tariff data. The reason is that the latter
might depend too strongly on the particulars of the tariff-setting model as well as
the quality of the data used. A schematic overview of the methodology and results
of the empirical literature can be found in appendix 2.A.
2.3.3 Rent-shielding
In contrast to the rent-seizing idea, Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998) see RIAs
purely as a way for the government to limit the power of lobbies and eliminate cer-
tain sources of rents. Firstly, the enhanced competition of the rent-destruction effect
eliminates sources of rents. Additionally, by encapsulating policy in international
agreements the direct control of the government is lowered, which also eliminates
potential rent-seeking behavior. In both cases, the effect of an agreement is to lower
corruption.
With respect to the reciprocal effect of corruption on the willingness to join an
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agreement, this model also predicts an inverted U-shape. If the level of corruption
is too high, too many people would lose when an agreement is signed for a majority
to support it. Vice versa, if the government cared only about welfare, lobbies would
not be able to exert any pressure to start with. Only at intermediate levels would
an increase in corruption provide an additional incentive to government officials to
combat corruption using the trade agreement (Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 1998).
2.4 Data
To test the link between corruption and integration, data was collected on the found-
ing of, and accession to regional integration agreements in Africa. This was done
using the Regional Integration Knowledge System (UNU-CRIS, 2006), and the
webpages of the regional trade agreements themselves. Twelve free trade agree-
ments and customs unions were incorporated, which taken together cover 53 African
countries:
Western and Northern Africa:
AMU African Maghreb Union;
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States;
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States;
GAFTA Greater Arab Free Trade Area;
UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union.
Central Africa:
CEPGL Economic Community of the Great Lakes;
UDEAC Central African Economic and Monetary Union;
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States.
Eastern and Southern Africa:
EAC Eastern African Cooperation;
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa;
SACU Southern African Customs Union;
SADC Southern African Development Community.
This dataset was used to create two dependent variables to be used in the unilateral
and bilateral regressions. RIAunix,t indicates whether country x signed an agree-
ment in year t or any of the previous four years. This indicator was constructed in
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five year intervals from 1985 to 2010, for a total of 318 observations. On average,
34% of the countries signed an agreement within a five year interval, more or less
equally divided over the 25 years of the sample.
RIAbiba signals whether countries a and b are members of any of the listed agree-
ments in the year 2010. Because the index is symmetrical, each country-couple is
covered once giving us 53∗52/2 = 1378 observations. Because of the plethora of
African trade agreements, half of the countries-couples covered are members of the
same agreement.
2.4.1 Measuring corruption
(a) ICRG - 1985 (b) WGI - 1998 (c) CPI - 2007
Figure 2.1: Map of the used corruption values, ranging from little (dark) to a lot of corrup-
tion (light).
The two best known subjective indicators of corruption are the Corruption Percep-
tions Index (CPI) created by Transparency International (2008) and the Worldwide
Governance Indicators’ control of corruption index (WGI) constructed by Kauf-
mann et al. (2010) The problem with both composite indices is that they only go
back to the mid-nineties (1996 for the WGI index and 1995 for the CPI index). In
addition, their earliest estimates are based on a limited number of sources and are
therefore much more uncertain than their more recent ones. How much this matters
can be seen from the WGI index that reports an estimate of its measurement error:
the average prediction error for the African continent drops to half its value from
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1996 to 2008 (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
While the WGI index covers every African country from 1998 onwards, the initial
estimates of CPI suffer from a strong selection bias. As Treisman (2007) points
out, the first corruption surveys were aimed at countries that were important to the
international markets. Small and/or highly corrupt countries were less likely to be
surveyed. To avoid this problem, we used the values of the first year where all 53
countries were covered: 1998 (WGI) and 2007 (CPI). Lastly, it should be remarked
that the way the CPI index is constructed does not allow for comparisons over time
(Transparency International, 2012). However, this should not pose a problem in
cross-sectional analyses.
The third indicator of corruption is that of the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG). Its main advantage over CPI and WGI is that it goes back to 1984, allowing
the use of pre-dated values to avoid possible endogeneity problems. However, the
1985 values only cover 34 countries of the 53 countries in our sample.
For all three indices, high values correspond to low levels of corruption. In other
words, the rent-seizure, rent-destruction and rent-shielding hypotheses predict a
negative sign for the coefficient on the corruption variables. To facilitate compa-
rability, all indices are rescaled such that their worldwide values range from zero
(high corruption) to one (no corruption).4 The smallest value for an African coun-
try is zero for all the indicators, while the maximum equals one (ICRG), 0.64 (WGI)
and 0.5 (CPI).
Apart from using predated values (when possible) we also control for endogeneity
using several instruments for corruption and institutional development. A num-
ber of instruments were considered: tropics and primary export intensity (Sachs
and Warner, 1995), slave exports (Nunn, 2009), settler mortality (Acemoglu et al.,
2001), former British colonies (Landes, 1998) and ethnolinguistic fractionalization
(Mauro, 1995).
The only supply-side instrument is the primary export intensity. A high fraction
of primary exports is likely to go hand in hand with high rents which would in
4Corr = (Corr⋆−minworld(Corr⋆))/(maxworld(Corr⋆)−minworld(Corr⋆)).
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turn raise the probability of rent-seeking behavior and corruption. The remaining
variables all affect the demand side of corruption, mostly through weakened institu-
tions. Tropical diseases and a high settler mortality rate would encourage colonists
to set up short term, maximum rent-extracting institutions rather than invest in good
governance. High ethnolinguistic fractionalization and a history of slave exports are
likely to undermine public trust in the government even in the long term. Finally,
it is argued in the literature that British colonizers left behind superior institutions
relative to their French, Portuguese or Spanish counterparts. For an in-depth discus-
sion of how these instruments affect the level of corruption we refer to the papers
listed.
Because the first stage regressions only have 53 observations and there are many
missing data points among the instruments variables, only two best scoring instru-
ments were used for each corruption indicator. Appendix 2.B lists the results of
the first stage regression of the corruption indicators on the two best-scoring in-
struments. The F-statistic of the regression on CPI and WGI is at, or above the
Staiger-Stock rule of thumb of 10. On the other hand, the instruments do a much
worse job capturing the variation in ICRG.
Showing the exogeneity of the instruments is fairly straightforwards. Tropics is
a geographical feature, while settler mortality, former British colonies and slave
exports were all determined (over) a century ago. The most recent variables are the
primary export intensities in the 70s and ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the 60s,
but both still predate the trade agreements by as much as 20 years.
It is unclear how the variables would influence the willingness to form trade agree-
ments other than through their effect on corruption or possibly the control variables.
A high values of tropics might indicate that countries lie close together, but this is
already controlled for by the distance variable. British colonies might be more
likely to form trade agreements, but this is captured by the shared colonial history
variable. Countries that are ethnolinguistically fractionalized are countries whose
actual borders don’t match their ‘natural borders’. It could be argued that they
might seek to address this by closing trade agreements. Nevertheless, this variable
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was not selected as instrument and neither was the primary export intensity. Finally,
it is unclear how the settler mortality rate and slave exports would directly affect the
probability of a trade agreement.
2.4.2 Control variables
Several control variables are taken into consideration, most of them coming from
the aforementioned papers studying the determinants of regional integration. They
can be divided into three groups: geographical, economic or political. Their main
characteristics, including a correlation table, can be found in appendix 2.C. The
geographical variables are:
• Landlocked is expected to have a positive sign, since the countries that are cut
off from the world markets would be more willing to join RIAs.
• The more remote countries are from the rest of the continent, the lower the op-
portunity cost of them signing a RIA. The variable is computed as described
in Baier and Bergstrand (2004a).
• The remaining two geographical variables are indicators of the geographical
distance between countries. For each variable, we expect that the closer the
countries are, the stronger their inclination to form a RIA is. Natural is the
inverse of the distance between capitals and adjacent indicates whether the
two countries neighbor one another.
The economic variables come from the Penn World Tables 8.0 (Feenstra et al.,
2013):
• The first economic variable is the difference in the capital-labor ratios be-
tween countries (DKL). The bigger the difference, the higher the expected
trade creation effects, and the more likely an agreement is. We used total
population as a proxy for labor.
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• Similar to the remoteness variable, the difference in capital-labour ratios with
the rest of the continent (DROWKL) was also included (Baier and Bergstrand,
2004a).
• Following Baier and Bergstrand (2004a), the level of GDP is included to
control for economies of scale. Alternatively, Wu (2006) uses GDP per capita
to control for the level of economic development. However, using per capita
GDP instead of GDP did not alter the results in any way (available upon
request).
• The last economic variable measures the difference in GDP’s of both coun-
tries. The smaller the difference in GDP, the larger the net welfare effect of
the trade agreement should be (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004a).
Finally, in addition to the level of corruption there are two other political variables
that are taken into consideration:
• Colony is a dummy variable that is one when the countries have an identi-
cal colonial background. Colonial history is also highly correlated with the
official language of a country and could be interpreted as a proxy for it.
• Polity indicates the level of democracy versus autocracy in a country: -10
being a completely totalitarian regime and 10 a completely democratic one.
Mansfield et al. (2002) find that it has a positive effect on the likelihood to
enter a RIA. The data comes from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2014).
2.5 Econometric specification
When estimating the effect of corruption on RIAs two issues require special atten-
tion. Firstly, the agreements are not bilateral but involve more than two partner
countries. Secondly, there is the problem of endogeneity: the theoretical models all
posit either a positive or a negative effect of RIAs on corruption. In case of ICRG,
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we can use predated values as a first step to control for this. For WGI and CPI we
can only use instrumental variables.
The literature proposes two different econometric models to determine the factors
that drive regional integration attempts. We label these the unilateral and bilateral
approaches.
Wu (2006) uses the unilateral approach (equation 2.1), regressing whether or not
country x entered a RIA in year t on the characteristics of that country in that year.
For example, this can be used to test whether landlocked nations are more likely to
join a RIA or how the level of GDP affects the willingness to join.
Pr(RIAunix,t = 1) =Φ[Corrx,t , Corr2x,t , GDPx,t ×Corrx,t , Z¯x,t ] (2.1)
The probability that country x is a member of a trade agreement at time t is a func-
tion of a linear combination of its level of corruption, its squared values as well
as an interaction with GDP. Z¯x,t contains additional country characteristics that are
controlled for, such as its level of democracy. When estimating a probit model the
function Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The main drawback of the unilateral approach is that the characteristics of the part-
ner countries cannot be taken into account. As a result, this model performs remark-
ably bad when used to explain African integration: with the exception of landlocked
at the 10% level, none of the explanatory variables are significant (appendix 2.D).
The bilateral approach on the other hand does allow the characteristics of one part-
ner country to be taken into account. It entails regressing whether or not two coun-
tries have formed a RIA on the characteristics of both countries. There are two ways
of estimating the effect of corruption in the bilateral regressions: using average lev-
els or individual levels.
The average-levels bilateral approach (equation 2.2) is used in Baier and Bergstrand
(2004a), Endoh (2006), Márquez-Ramos et al. (2011) and Arcand et al. (2011). The
probability that country a and b are members of the same agreement is a function
of the linear combination of their average level of corruption, its squared value and
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other characteristics of the country-couple (Zba):
Pr(RIAbiba = 1) =Φ[Corra+Corrb2 , (Corra+Corrb2 )2 , Zba ] (2.2)
The underlying assumption of this approach is that an increase in corruption has the
same effect regardless of the characteristics of the partner country.
The second way in which corruption can be added is by including the corruption
index of both countries separately, similar to how Mansfield et al. (2002) treat the
level of democracy. This individual-levels bilateral approach (equation 2.3) allows
us to see whether the effect of corruption changes depending on the relative size of
the country, as suggested by the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995).
Pr(RIAbiba = 1) =Φ[Corra, Corr2a, Corrb, Corr2b, Zba ] (2.3)
It should be clear from equations 2.2 and 2.3 that countries a and b enter the equa-
tions symmetrically and the labels can be switched around with no apparent effect.
For this reason, each country couple is only covered once, regardless of the order in
which the countries are listed. In other words, if n countries are covered, the dataset
will contain a maximum of Cn2 = n(n−1)2 observations. In contrast, in for example the
Grossman and Helpman (1995) model only one country’s level of corruption will
influence the probability of an agreement because a positive welfare effect would
ensure that the partner country is always willing to join. In their model, the deciding
factor is the relative size of both countries, which is why the countries were labeled
in such a way that country a is the country with the highest GDP of the country-
couple. In other words, the variation in the effect of corruption between country a
and b can be attributed to differences in relative size. To be clear, this did not alter
the selection of countries, but merely made the interpretation of the variables more
meaningful.
A problem with using the bilateral approach to analyze African trade agreements
is that most agreements involve more than two partner countries and that many are
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overlapping. The former means that we have to take into account that the decision
of two countries to enter into an agreement crucially depends on the decision of the
other partner countries in that agreement, while the latter ensures that this pattern
of interaction effects becomes very complex. As is well known, ignoring any form
of heteroscedasticity in a probit model could render the estimations inconsistent
(Greene, 2002). We control for this by correcting the standard errors for multiple,
non-nested clusters using the methodology outlined in Cameron et al. (2006). While
this methodology is relatively simple to implement, a rise in the number of cluster
variables exponentially increases the number of additional regressions that have
to be run.5 For this reason, the twelve trade agreements were grouped into six
categorical variables such that no overlapping agreements are captured by the same
variable. This significantly lowered the computational burden, without affecting the
results. Take for example the categorical variable R2: it is one if both countries are
a member of SADC, two if they are members of GAFTA, and zero otherwise.
R1: SACU-ECOWAS-EAC-AMU R4: CENSAD-CEPGL
R2: SADC-GAFTA R5: UEMOA-CEMAC
R3: ECCAS R6: COMESA.
In order to control for both the heteroskedasticity as well as the endogeneity, we
used a control function approach. The endogenous corruption variables were first
regressed on their instruments and the remaining exogenous dependent variables.
By including the error term of this first-stage regression (ε) in the probit model out-
lined above, the endogenous part of corruption can be controlled for (Woolridge,
2005). As mentioned in section 2.4.1 when discussing the instrumental variables,
the number of instruments was limited to two for each corruption variable, prevent-
ing the first-stage regressions from losing too many observations. While the instru-
ments have a relatively low R2, they are jointly significant for all three corruption
indicators.
5To correct the standard errors of one regression with n cluster variables, an additional 2n − 1
estimations have to be run. If we use the 12 dummy variables that are one when both countries are
member of a certain RIA as the cluster variables, then each regression would require 4,095 extra
estimations.
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The standard errors of the control function approach were subsequently computed
using bootstrapping.
Bootstrap iteration:
1. Draw a new bootstrap sample (with replacement);
2. Run first-stage regression and collect error term;
3. Run the probit model, including the first-stage error term as de-
pendent variable;
4. Correct standard errors for non-nested clusters;
5. Save standard errors and repeat from step 1.
To check the robustness of our results, we also used the two-step instrumental vari-
able probit estimator (Newey, 1987). However, the standard errors using the ivpro-
bit approach could not be corrected for the heteroscedasticity caused by the over-
lapping trade agreements.
2.6 Empirical results
2.6.1 Average-levels bilateral regressions
Table 2.2 replicates the Baier and Bergstrand (2002) and Mansfield et al. (2002) re-
gressions with the addition of the average level of corruption and its squared value
(equation 2.2). In columns one and two, corruption is measured using ICRG’s in-
dex, three and four use the Worldwide Governance Indicators and five and six use
the Corruption Perception Index.
In contrast to table 2.1, the regressions in table 2.2 are corrected for the multilateral
aspect of trade agreements. As a result, the capital-labor ratio and its deviation with
the rest of the world becomes significant. In line with the prediction and findings
of Baier and Bergstrand (2004a), the higher the difference in the capital-labor ratio
between two countries, the greater the advantage of lowering barriers to trade and
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Table 2.2: Average-levels probit regression
ICRG WGI CPI(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural 1.530∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗(12.78) (9.95) (13.58) (11.01) (12.30) (10.48)
Remote 4.453∗∗∗ 4.481∗∗∗ 4.839∗∗∗ 4.707∗∗∗ 5.926∗∗∗ 5.692∗∗∗(4.17) (3.63) (3.72) (3.10) (3.99) (3.55)
Adjacent − 0.870∗∗∗ − 0.865∗∗∗ − 0.867∗∗∗(15.28) (13.96) (9.83)
Landlocked − 0.0689 − 0.0525 − 0.0648(0.43) (0.27) (0.41)
GDPav −0.0473 −0.0671 −0.0672 −0.105 −0.093 −0.133∗(−0.68) (−0.78) (−0.79) (−1.13) (−1.19) (−1.65)
GDPdi f f 0.0838∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0787∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗(2.12) (2.90) (1.99) (2.90) (3.07) (4.59)
DKL 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗ 0.0284 0.0420∗ 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.0817∗∗∗(2.98) (2.57) (1.61) (1.68) (4.74) (3.91)
DROWKL −0.057 −0.0653∗∗ −0.065 −0.0689∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗(−1.16) (−2.20) (−1.44) (−2.76) (−3.03) (−4.82)
Colony − 0.340∗∗∗ − 0.392∗∗∗ − 0.338∗∗∗(7.59) (6.25) (4.41)
Polityav − −0.0307∗∗∗ − 0.00339 − 0.0208∗∗(−3.56) (0.24) (2.19)
Corruptionav −0.244 −0.355 −0.388 −0.251 −7.090∗∗∗ −6.258∗∗∗(−0.30) (−0.53) (−0.13) (−0.09) (−4.24) (−3.94)
Corruption2av −1.545∗ −1.446∗∗ −5.180 −5.768 −0.874 −3.630(−1.81) (−1.99) (−0.97) (−1.24) (−0.15) (−0.63)
LR(a) corr 5.05e−08 2.24e−7 2.33e−9 4.37e−9 1.72e−22 1.09e−21
Constant −23.98∗∗∗ −25.48∗∗∗ −27.45∗∗∗ −27.22∗∗ −34.81∗∗∗ −33.59∗∗∗(−2.93) (−2.67) (−2.62) (−2.22) (−2.95) (−2.62)
Observations 992 992 1128 1127 1128 1127
Probit regression of RIAbi on corruption and control variables. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are
corrected for multiple non-nested clusters. (a)p-value of the likelihood ratio tests on the joint
significance of the corruption variables. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level.
the more likely they enter into an agreement. Similarly, as the difference with the
rest of the continent decreases, the opportunity cost of the agreement decreases and
the probability of joining increases. Nevertheless, the effect of both factors is small
when compared to distance (natural and remoteness), or having a similar colonial
history.
When using the ICRG index, a number of other variables (e.g. GDPav, Polityav)
also change signs or significance when compared to the regressions using CPI or
WGI. This is caused by selection effects (cf. infra): as is evident from the change in
the number of observations, ICRG is not available for all countries. In an attempt
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Table 2.3: Average-levels probit regression with control function
ICRG WGI CPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural 1.518∗∗∗ 1.420∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗ 1.482∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗(12.09) (9.24) (12.34) (11.24) (13.30) (11.30)
Remote 5.482∗∗∗ 6.096∗∗∗ 5.860∗∗∗ 6.351∗∗∗ 7.077∗∗∗ 6.467∗∗∗(5.24) (4.60) (5.20) (3.52) (3.84) (3.16)
Adjacent − 0.915∗∗∗ − 0.828∗∗∗ − 0.840∗∗∗(11.11) (13.65) (8.83)
Landlocked − 0.350∗∗ − 0.183 − 0.125(2.32) (0.89) (0.65)
GDPav −0.0133 0.0123 −0.0304 −0.0443 −0.0718 −0.116(−0.23) (0.15) (−0.40) (−0.43) (−0.79) (−1.18)
GDPdi f f 0.0695∗ 0.0935∗∗ 0.0608∗ 0.0721∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗(1.90) (2.30) (1.76) (1.89) (2.93) (3.97)
DKL 0.0131 0.0155 0.0374∗∗ 0.0589∗∗ 0.0917∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗(1.35) (1.06) (2.30) (2.27) (3.86) (3.20)
DROWKL −0.139∗ −0.211∗∗∗ −0.0751 −0.0951∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗(−1.88) (−4.04) (−1.57) (−4.00) (−6.18) (−6.42)
Colony − 0.353∗∗∗ − 0.438∗∗∗ − 0.337∗∗∗(7.93) (6.13) (4.27)
Polityav − −0.0242∗∗∗ − 0.0196 − 0.0349∗∗∗(−2.98) (1.52) (2.74)
Corruptionav −3.699∗∗∗ −5.351∗∗∗ −3.241 −5.526∗∗ −10.52∗∗∗ −9.413∗∗∗(−7.70) (−10.51) (−1.29) (−2.35) (−15.00) (−38.32)
Corruption2av −1.114 −0.901 −4.209 −3.297 −2.554 −3.686(−1.55) (−1.45) (−0.84) (−0.80) (−0.37) (−0.60)
LR(a) corr 1.33e−19 9.77e−69 4.34e−12 2.81e−7 6.44e−88 0
Error term ε 3.250∗∗∗ 4.698∗∗∗ 2.873∗∗∗ 4.822∗∗∗ 4.679∗∗ 3.795(2.78) (4.43) (2.68) (4.76) (2.36) (1.60)
Constant −31.15∗∗∗ −37.14∗∗∗ −35.33∗∗∗ −39.67∗∗∗ −44.23∗∗∗ −39.89∗∗(−3.77) (−3.57) (−3.78) (−2.73) (−3.02) (−2.44)
Observations 970 970 1125 1124 1097 1097
Instruments: Tropics Tropics Tropics
Settler mortality British colony Settler mortality
Probit regression of RIAbi on corruption, the error term from the first stage regressions (ε) and
control variables. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are corrected for multiple non-nested clusters.(a)p-value of the likelihood ratio tests on the joint significance of the corruption variables. ∗, ∗∗,∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
to limit selection problems, the average was also computed when only one corrup-
tion indicator was available: Corrav = Corra if Corrb is missing and vice versa.
Without this correction, the number of observations is reduced by more than half
and a number of variables (for example having a similar colonial history) lose their
significance (table 2.4).
Depending on the corruption indicator used, the significance of corruption can
change drastically, however this is entirely due to the multicollinearity problem
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between corruption and its square: the correlation exceeds 90% for each indicator.
Jointly, the corruption indicators are always significant at more than 1% levels, as
shown by the likelihood ratio tests.
Using a control function to check for endogeneity does not change the overall con-
clusion of the results. While a few of the individual corruption variables change
significance, the overall significance of corruption remains unaffected. The biggest
change happens to the parameter on adjacency which loses its significance in case
of CPI and WGI. Similarly, a number of the economic variables change significance
when ICRG is used. Nevertheless, the parameter on the control function (ε) tends
to be significant, which would indicate the need to control for endogeneity.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the effect of corruption on the willingness to enter into an
agreement by plotting out the marginal effect of an increase in corruption. It clearly
shows that as corruption gets worse (or the corruption indexes decrease), the prob-
ability of joining is raised, regardless of whether or not we control for endogeneity.
Using ivprobit instead of a control function also does not affect the results (ap-
pendix 2.E). While the individual parameters of some of the corruption variables
change considerably, the overall marginal effect of corruption is very similar to both
the simple probit model and the control function approach. Only the instrumented
ICRG regression finds evidence of a small reversal at high levels of corruption.
2.6.2 Individual-levels bilateral regressions
Including the corruption indicators separately allows us to check whether there are
asymmetries in the effect of corruption depending on the relative size of the coun-
tries (cf. Grossman and Helpman, 1995). Overall, the coefficients on the control
variables change little. The biggest changes occur when using the ICRG index, but
as explained this can be attributed to the notable drop in observations.
Corruption and corruption squared are jointly significant for both countries at more
than 1% in the probit (table 2.4), control function (table 2.5) and ivprobit model
(appendix 2.E). Figures 2.3 and appendix 2.E plot the marginal effects of a change
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Figure 2.2: Marginal effect of corruption and GDP: average-levels
The marginal effect of average corruption on the probability of joining a RIA, keeping all other
variables at their mean values. The maximum values of WGI and CPI in Africa are 0.62 and 0.5,
while ICRG’s values range between 0 and 1. Higher index values correspond to lower levels of
corruption.
in corruption on the probability of joining for both countries for the different regres-
sion models and indicators of corruption. They show that while the parameters on
corruption and its interaction effects are again relatively unstable, their combined
effect is much less divergent.
The effect of an increase in the largest country in terms of GDP (country A) is
similar over the three corruption indicators and estimation methods. Overall the
probability of joining rises as corruption becomes worse. However, when a control
function is used, the effect of an increase in the ICRG corruption variable is very
small, but still significant. At the same time, the coefficients on the endogenous part
of corruption (εa and εb) are never significant, indicating that the (already lagged)
ICRG variable should not be further corrected for endogeneity. Moreover, when
ivprobit is used, the effect of an increase in ICRG becomes larger again. The insta-
bility of the results using ICRG can be explained in part by the substantial reduction
in the number of observations in these regressions.
The parameters on corruption of the smallest country (country B) differ more strongly
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Table 2.4: Individual-levels probit regression
ICRG WGI CPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural 2.026∗∗∗ 1.913∗∗∗ 1.436∗∗∗ 1.297∗∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗(10.48) (10.24) (12.59) (9.20) (12.42) (9.34)
Remote 8.247∗∗∗ 8.179∗∗∗ 5.084∗∗∗ 5.865∗∗∗ 5.995∗∗∗ 6.161∗∗∗(10.19) (9.00) (3.80) (3.32) (4.05) (3.59)
Adjacent − 0.868∗∗∗ − 0.697∗∗∗ − 0.705∗∗∗(11.14) (10.47) (32.41)
Landlocked − 0.0293 − 0.189 − 0.148(0.14) (0.94) (1.00)
GDPa 0.171∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.0392∗∗ 0.0562∗∗ 0.0574∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗(3.89) (7.37) (1.98) (2.01) (2.84) (2.37)
GDPb 0.142 0.0893 −0.00444 0.0683 −0.0389 0.00695(1.49) (0.64) (−0.09) (1.39) (−0.87) (0.17)
DKL 0.0233∗∗ 0.0190 0.0391 0.0617∗ 0.0721∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗(2.45) (1.06) (1.62) (1.81) (4.21) (4.28)
DROWKL 0.111∗ 0.0882∗ −0.0781 −0.0652∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗(1.85) (1.89) (−1.64) (−2.22) (−2.75) (−3.65)
Colony − 0.102 − 0.409∗∗∗ − 0.358∗∗∗(1.45) (5.58) (3.59)
Politya − −0.0268 − −0.0147∗∗∗ − −0.0137∗∗∗(−1.52) (−4.52) (−2.81)
Polityb − −0.0160 − 0.0255 − 0.0302∗∗(−0.88) (1.49) (2.29)
Corruptiona −1.122 −1.030 −0.403 −1.104 −4.503∗∗∗ −5.811∗∗∗(−0.69) (−0.62) (−0.21) (−0.53) (−5.29) (−7.00)
Corruption2a −0.573 −0.578 −2.727 −2.204 0.516 3.189(−0.33) (−0.31) (−1.00) (−0.77) (0.21) (1.24)
Corruptionb 0.104 −0.0685 1.463 0.237 −0.626 −1.298(0.10) (−0.07) (1.51) (0.17) (−0.34) (−0.60)
Corruption2b −0.699 −0.446 −4.668∗∗ −4.563∗ −5.211 −5.025(−0.44) (−0.32) (−2.23) (−1.83) (−1.52) (−1.22)
Wald(a) corra 1.28e−8 1.55e−5 6.30e−6 3.96e−4 4.36e−16 6.88e−17
Wald(a) corrb 1.22e−4 0.00181 0.00405 1.19e−12 5.86e−4 1.15e−7
Constant −53.37∗∗∗ −54.34∗∗∗ −29.86∗∗∗ −37.83∗∗∗ −35.67∗∗∗ −38.56∗∗∗(−8.46) (−7.72) (−2.82) (−2.70) (−3.01) (−2.79)
Observations 465 465 1128 1035 1128 1035
Probit regression of RIAbi on corruption and control variables. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are
corrected for multiple non-nested clusters. (a)p-value of the wald tests on the joint significance of
the corruption variables of each country. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level.
depending on the estimation model. When a simple probit model is used, the pattern
does not differ from that of the larger country: an increase in corruption raises the
probability of a RIA. Using a control function even reverses the effect in the case of
ICRG, but this is not the case in the ivprobit model. When an ivprobit model is used,
we see signs of a reversal only at very high levels of corruption for ICRG and WGI,
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Table 2.5: Individual-levels probit regression with control function
ICRG WGI CPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural 1.646∗∗∗ 2.087∗∗∗ 1.574∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ 2.320∗∗∗(7.75) (10.00) (11.09) (9.68) (9.60) (11.35)
Remote 7.804∗∗∗ 8.487∗∗∗ 5.867∗∗∗ 6.661∗∗∗ 7.968∗∗∗ 9.546∗∗∗(5.12) (4.76) (4.30) (3.37) (3.60) (4.12)
Adjacent − 0.471∗∗∗ − 0.397∗∗∗ − −0.427∗∗∗(3.52) (3.36) (−3.05)
Landlocked − −0.512∗∗ − 0.234 − 0.00132(−2.53) (1.03) (0.01)
GDPa 0.432∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ −0.00553 −0.0357 0.0237(6.97) (6.69) (6.03) (−0.19) (−0.98) (0.65)
GDPb −0.313 −0.213 0.0739 0.0827 −0.0293 0.0451(−1.43) (−1.28) (1.52) (1.51) (−0.60) (0.79)
DKL −0.164∗∗∗ −0.0247 0.0168 0.0809∗ −0.00637 0.110∗∗∗(−4.71) (−0.63) (0.42) (1.90) (−0.21) (3.36)
DROWKL 0.0902 0.157 0.0963∗ 0.0565 0.0389 −0.0254(0.46) (0.74) (1.67) (1.51) (0.54) (−0.48)
Colony − −0.159∗ − 0.510∗∗∗ − 0.0401(−1.79) (5.22) (0.32)
Politya − 0.000569 − −0.0134∗ − −0.00553(0.03) (−1.79) (−0.57)
Polityb − 0.0194 − 0.0268∗ − 0.0195(0.40) (1.66) (0.95)
Corruptiona −1.611 −0.331 −1.436 −4.075 −2.100 −6.960∗∗(−1.60) (−0.29) (−0.57) (−1.24) (−0.80) (−2.48)
Corruption2a −0.770 −1.884 −2.506 0.569 −0.884 4.694(−0.47) (−1.10) (−0.84) (0.16) (−0.22) (1.03)
Corruptionb 1.654∗ −5.244∗∗∗ −2.011∗∗ −1.976 −12.73∗∗∗ −9.800∗∗∗(1.66) (−4.78) (−2.57) (−1.00) (−7.50) (−4.67)
Corruption2b −1.683 6.236∗∗∗ 1.831 −2.112 7.924∗∗ 10.46∗∗∗(−0.84) (3.23) (0.94) (−0.74) (2.04) (3.18)
Wald(a) corra 1.27e−4 0.0439 1.65e−6 2.71e−4 0.0327 4.78e−5
Wald(a) corrb 0.00374 0.00211 0.0047 4.07e−12 6.76e−10 4.81e−10
Error term εa 0.488 0.143 1.776∗∗∗ 2.286∗∗ −1.955 0.304(0.50) (0.14) (2.66) (2.17) (−1.59) (0.21)
Error term εb 0.194 0.889 −1.312 0.933 5.294∗∗∗ 1.079(0.09) (0.42) (−1.53) (1.28) (4.56) (0.89)
Constant −51.36∗∗∗ −53.35∗∗∗ −36.16∗∗∗ −42.14∗∗∗ −46.37∗∗∗ −57.46∗∗∗(−4.54) (−3.97) (−3.43) (−2.76) (−2.72) (−3.21)
Observations 339 356 1023 951 710 687
Instruments: Tropics Tropics Tropics
Settler mortality British colony Settler mortality
Probit regression of RIAbi on corruption, the error terms from the first stage regressions (εa and εb)
and control variables. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are corrected for multiple non-nested clusters.(a)p-value of the Wald tests on the joint significance of the corruption variables. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
consistent with the findings of for example Arcand et al. (2011).6 The fact that the
6Including an interaction term between corruption and GDP as in Arcand et al. (2011) also does
not change this conclusion, but the interaction term adds little explanatory power. The results have
been omitted to save space, but are available on request.
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Figure 2.3: Marginal effect of corruption and GDP: individual-levels
The marginal effect of average corruption on the probability of joining a RIA, keeping all other
variables at their mean values. The maximum values of WGI and CPI in Africa are 0.62 and 0.5,
while ICRG’s values range between 0 and 1. Higher index values correspond to lower levels of
corruption.
larger country’s level of corruption is consistently negative and significant falls in
line with the predictions of Grossman and Helpman (1995). In their model only the
larger country can have a negative effect on its welfare, making the preference for
rents of its government a deciding factor.
2.6.3 Robustness
We checked to what extent the differences in the effect of corruption when using
different corruption indicators were caused by differences in the sample size. To
that end, the same sample size was kept constant for all regressions (available upon
request). The effect of corruption on the probability of an agreement remained
unaffected by the change in sample size. The control variables are now almost
completely unaffected by the choice of corruption indicator: the only parameters
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that still vary are those on variables that are economically insignificant (e.g. polity).
Comparing the instrumented with the uninstrumented result when the number of
observations is kept constant shows that the effect of controlling for endogeneity is
relatively limited. Overall, the size of the coefficient on the average corruption level
rises in case of ICRG and WGI, but not when using CPI. In the separate level regres-
sions, the effect of the corruption in the largest country also increases (but that of the
smaller country tends to become smaller). An increase in the size of the parameters
when controlling for endogeneity suggests that corruption has decreased after the
agreement was signed, which would match the rent-shielding and rent-destruction
hypotheses. Nevertheless, the effect is very small and changes depending on the
size of the country and corruption indicator used.
In the analyses presented above only the two strongest instruments were used in an
attempt to limit the number of missing variables. However, selecting instruments
based on which one gives the best fit could potentially lead to pre-test biases in the
results. To make sure this did not affect the results, the analysis was repeated using
the six instruments listed in the data section (2.4.1). While this severely reduced
the number of observations, the effect of corruption remained unaffected (available
upon request).
The monotonic effect of corruption
The rent-destruction and rent-shielding hypotheses predicted that the effect of cor-
ruption on the probability of an agreement would follow an inverted U-shape pat-
tern. However, in more than five out of six cases this pattern failed to emerge.
Moreover, the high correlation between corruption and its square value lead to mul-
ticollinearity problems that could distort the results. As a robustness check, the
model was re-estimated using only the level of corruption.7
Appendix 2.F list the parameter values estimation using a control function, while
figure 2.4 plots the marginal effects. Apart from a minimal change in the curvature
7The results did not change when only the squared values of corruption were used. Similarly, the
probit and IV probit results follow the same pattern, all are available upon request.
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of some of the figures, the results are almost identical. In the average level esti-
mations corruption is negative and significant at the 1% level regardless of which
indicator of corruption is used. When including the country characteristics sepa-
rately, ICRG is significant at the 10% level only for the largest of the two countries,
but the results also indicate that the correction for endogeneity is not necessary.
Without the controls for endogeneity it is significant at the 1% level. WGI and CPI
remain highly significant for both countries and the correction for endogeneity is
shown to be necessary.
The fact that the non-monotonic relationship between corruption and trade agree-
ments fails to occur could be seen as evidence that the rent-destruction and rent-
shielding effects do not come into play. However, the regressions performed here
at not the best way of discerning between the different models and there are many
other possible reasons (e.g. measurement errors in the corruption variables) why
this pattern did not emerge.
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Figure 2.4: Marginal effects when regressing without the squared values of corruption
The marginal effect of average corruption on the probability of joining a RIA, keeping all other
variables at their mean values. The maximum values of WGI and CPI in Africa are 0.62 and 0.5,
while ICRG’s values range between 0 and 1. Higher index values correspond to lower levels of
corruption.
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2.6.4 Relevance of corruption in explaining RIAs
While the regressions above show that corruption has a significant impact on the de-
cision to join a trade agreement in Africa, they have not established the relevance of
this effect. To this end, table 2.6 compares the predictive power of various models.
Because missing data in some variables changes the estimation sample, this com-
parison has to be made made model-by-model. Especially when ICRG is added, the
number of observations drops significantly.
After listing the models and the table and column where they can be found, table
2.6 indicates how many of the observations were correctly classified by each model.
An observation is correctly classified if RIAbi is one (zero) and the predicted prob-
ability is higher (lower) than 0.5. To capture the overall change at all probabilities
instead of only at the 0.5 point, the table also lists the average prediction error.
The latter is defined as the Euclidian distance between RIAbi and the predicted
probability (equation 2.4). The lower it is, the closer the model’s predicted values
approximates the dependent variable.
average prediction error ≡¿ÁÁÀ n∑
a=1
n∑
b=a+1[RIAbiab− p(RIAbiab∣Xab )]2. (2.4)
Finally the last column lists the value of each model’s log likelihood. The lowest
prediction error, highest percentage correctly classified and highest log likelihood
are each time indicated in bold.
All three statistics show that while the added predictive power of corruption is small
when compared to that of the geographic variables, the increase is comparable with
that of the other political variables (colonial history and the level of democracy).
The explanatory power of both political variables exceeds that of the economic
variables (GDP and the capital-labor ratios). In line with the conclusion of the
previous section, the additional predictive power of the squared value of corruption
is negligible.
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Table 2.6: Comparison of the predictive power of the various models
% Correctly Av. Pred.
Model Table Column classified(a) error(b) Log likelihood
1 Distance 2.1 1 75.07 182.53 -206.35
Economic 2.1 2 75.71 181.56 -197.84
Economic & political 2.1 7 84.30 177.47 -192.65
2 Economic & political 2.1 7 77.94 159.37 -473.04
ICRG (average) 2.12 2 78.66 150.21 -473.04
ICRG & ICRG2 (average) 2.3 2 78.56 150.05 -472.70
3 Economic and political 2.1 7 83.19 48.07 -156.98
ICRG (separate) 2.13 2 83.76 45.29 -150.07
ICRG and ICRG2 (separate) 2.5 2 83.19 45.19 -149.88
4 Economic & political 2.1 7 75.66 187.60 -554.11
WGI (average) 2.12 4 76.39 178.48 -554.11
WGI & WGI2 (average) 2.3 4 76.12 178.17 -553.44
CPI (average) 2.12 6 78.03 170.29 -528.21
CPI & CPI2 (average) 2.3 6 77.85 170.26 -528.05
5 Economic & political 2.1 7 77.81 109.14 -341.70
WGI (separate) 2.13 4 79.66 101.39 -323.73
WGI & WGI2 (separate) 2.5 4 79.80 101.41 -323.51
CPI (separate) 2.13 6 80.09 99.06 -314.83
CPI & CPI2 (separate) 2.5 6 79.52 98.75 -313.54
This table provides a one-by-one comparison of the explanatory power of various models. The
comparisons are made such that both models operate on the same sample. (a)The percentage of
observations that are correctly predicted by the model. (b)Average prediction error (equation 2.4).
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter explores the motives behind the proliferation of regional integration
agreements in Africa. We focus on rent-seizure, rent-destruction and rent-shielding
because they are able to explain both the growth of African agreements as well as
the lack of progress in liberalizing intra-African trade. Static and dynamic analysis
on the other hand predict strong welfare-reducing effects, and most new regionalism
theories rely on strong economic integration.
While most theoretical models posit a positive relation between rent-seeking and
trade agreements, the underlying mechanism can be starkly different. Broadly
speaking, rent-seizure hypotheses argue that a corrupt government will enter into
agreements to foster rent-seeking behavior, while rent-shielding and rent-destruction
remonstrate that the opposite holds true. All three models predict that at interme-
diate levels of corruption, an increase in corruption will raise the probability of an
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agreement. However, rent-destruction and rent-shielding also predict a reversal at
high levels of corruption.
We find that corruption does have a significant impact on the willingness to enter a
trade agreement. In line with theoretical predictions an increase in the level of cor-
ruption raises the probability of there being a trade agreement, especially if this in-
crease happens in the larger of the two countries. This result is robust for the choice
of corruption indicator, corrections for endogeneity and whether or not we take into
account that intra-African agreements have more than two partner countries. In
contrast to the predictions of the rent-destruction and rent-shielding hypotheses, we
do not find strong evidence of a reversal at high levels of corruption. This could be
seen as very tentative support of the rent-seizing hypothesis of Grossman and Help-
man (1995) when explaining intra-African trade agreements, but further research is
needed.
While the effect of corruption is significant, the most important factor explaining
trade integration is distance. The closer countries lie together and the more remote
they are, the higher the probability of an agreement. While the overall explanatory
power of rent-seeking behavior is not large, it has similar explanatory power to
shared colonial history and even exceeds that of GDPs and capital-labor ratios.
While these results confirm that corruption has had an impact on the formation
of African trade agreements, they cannot differentiate between the different mo-
tivations for the agreements: i.e. whether they were closed to enable or combat
corruption. While it might not be possible to separate them statistically, future re-
search could look at how the level of corruption is subsequently affected by trade
agreements. This would answer which theory prevailed ex post, even if it can not
gauge the original motives behind the agreements. More importantly, finding out
how corruption is affected by integration agreements would have important lessons
for development policy.
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Appendices
2.A Schematic overview empirical literature
Paper Framework Indicator Monotonic? Corruption ↑
Wu (2006) Unilateral Corruption (CPI) Yes Probability RIA ↑
Endoh (2006) Bilateral Governance
(WGI)
Yes Probability RIA ↓
Arcand et al. (2011) Bilateral Corruption (in-
ferred from tariff
data)
Includes squares
and interaction with
bargaining power
Inverted U pattern
and significant inter-
action terms
2.B First stage regressions
Table 2.7: First stage regressions
(1) (2) (3)
ICRG WGI CPI
Tropics −0.159 −0.236∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(−1.41) (−4.34) (−0.322)
Settler mortality −35.19∗ − −8.653
(−1.71) (7.073)
British colony − 0.0725∗ −
(1.98)
Constant 0.704∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(6.34) (9.11) (7.79)
Observations 28 47 39
R2 0.214 0.362 0.308
F-test 3.65∗∗ 12.95∗∗∗ 9.44∗∗∗
Linear regression of ICRG, WGI and CPI on different instruments. t-statistics in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗,∗∗∗ indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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2.C Summary statistics of the dependent variables
Table 2.8: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St.dev Min Max
Natural 1378 -8.036 0.700 -9.188 -1.743
Remote 1378 8.187 0.122 7.914 8.536
Adjacent 1378 0.073 0.260 0 1
Landlocked 1378 0.490 0.500 0 1
GDPa 1368 9.109 1.347 4.681 12.166
DKL 1128 1.165 0.837 0.002 3.791
DROWKL 1128 0.323 1.150 -2.726 3.370
Colony 1378 0.253 0.435 0 1
Politya 1346 -5.338 4.374 -10 9.800
ICRGa 1113 0.448 0.197 0 1
WGIa 1378 0.301 0.139 0 0.644
CPIa 1378 0.178 0.108 0 0.500
Correlation table
Natural Remot. Adj. Landl. GDPa DKL DROWKL Colony
Natural 1
Remote -0.316 1
Adjacent 0.519 -0.052 1
Landlocked 0.046 -0.228 0.051 1
GDPa 0.042 -0.129 0.064 -0.124 1
DKL 0.001 -0.024 -0.001 0.010 0.030 1
DROWKL 0.080 -0.210 0.057 0.268 -0.053 0.170 1
Colony 0.094 0.044 0.121 0.042 0.077 -0.045 -0.034 1
Politya -0.082 0.172 -0.021 0.027 0.202 -0.002 -0.114 0.022
ICRGa -0.098 0.290 0.012 0.018 0.103 0.047 -0.219 0.050
WGIa -0.180 0.484 -0.052 -0.030 0.049 0.078 -0.147 0.068
CPIa -0.161 0.389 -0.035 -0.089 0.104 0.109 -0.239 0.044
Politya ICRGa WGIa CPIa
Politya 1
ICRGa 0.280 1
WGIa 0.332 0.553 1
CPIa 0.370 0.498 0.800 1
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2.D Unilateral regressions
Table 2.9: Unilateral regressions
ICRG WGI(1) (2) (3) (4)
Landlocked − −0.185 − −0.832∗(−0.50) (−1.74)
Land area − 0.000179 − 0.000213(0.67) (0.60)
Island − 0.336 − −0.478(0.36) (−0.52)
GDP 0.00184 0.0701(0.08) (0.37)
GDP/cap − −0.0515 − −0.148(−0.77) (−1.59)
Population − 0.00169 − −0.00165(0.21) (−0.17)
Polity − −0.00759 − −0.0191(−0.26) (−0.44)
Corruption −0.587 0.667 −21.47 1.667(−0.14) (0.19) (−1.22) (0.16)
Corruption2 3.262 0.820 33.80 −2.503(0.64) (0.19) (1.46) (−0.19)
GDP × Corruption −0.0440 −0.00999 −0.691 0.00319(−0.81) (−0.62) (−1.13) (0.16)
LR(a) corr 0.535 0.706 0.310 0.995
Constant − −1.181 − −0.806(−1.40) (−0.38)
Loglikelihood −83.88 −128.4 −31.22 −80.51
Observations 210 209 99 149
no of countries 36 36 33 50
Columns 1 and 3 are fixed effects and 2 and 4 are random effects logistic regressions of RIAuni on
corruption and controlling variables. t-statistic in parentheses. (a)p-value of the likelihood ratio test
on the joint significance of the corruption variables. ∗ indicates significance at 10% level.
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2.E IVprobit regressions
Table 2.10: Average-levels ivprobit regressions
ICRG WGI CPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural 1.536∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.380∗∗∗ 1.329∗∗∗ 1.481∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗(14.73) (12.40) (13.66) (13.65) (13.20) (12.48)
Remote 5.439∗∗∗ 5.548∗∗∗ 6.217∗∗∗ 6.463∗∗∗ 7.515∗∗∗ 6.711∗∗∗(8.35) (7.12) (8.68) (8.16) (7.52) (9.20)
Adjacent − 1.110∗∗∗ − 0.866∗∗ − 0.769∗∗(3.02) (2.45) (2.17)
Landlocked − 0.291∗∗ − 0.183 − 0.157(2.05) (1.58) (1.40)
GDPav −0.00348 −0.00850 −0.0271 −0.0374 −0.0629 −0.102(−0.04) (−0.09) (−0.38) (−0.52) (−0.86) (−1.34)
GDPdi f f 0.0988 0.139∗∗ 0.0454 0.0711 0.110∗ 0.114∗∗(1.56) (2.08) (0.87) (1.36) (1.82) (1.99)
DKL 0.0690 0.0979 0.0347 0.0612 0.0958 0.126∗∗(0.92) (1.26) (0.63) (1.11) (1.50) (2.03)
DROWKL −0.135∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.0563 −0.101∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗(−2.50) (−2.72) (−1.12) (−2.32) (−4.39) (−4.58)
Colony − 0.228∗ − 0.427∗∗∗ − 0.359∗∗∗(1.71) (3.66) (3.13)
Polityav − −5.54e−4 − 0.0227 − 0.0217(−0.02) (1.27) (0.60)
Corruptionav 4.445 7.112 −17.84 −2.693 −7.249 −20.14(0.68) (1.09) (−0.96) (−0.24) (−0.31) (−1.04)
Corruption2av −9.005 −12.21∗∗ 17.13 −8.000 −13.66 20.53(−1.48) (−2.06) (0.60) (−0.47) (−0.23) (0.44)
Wald(a) corr 1.08e−5 1.87e−6 1.38e−7 6.97e−10 1.18e−09 7.07e−10
Wald(a) exog 1.57e−3 6.12e−5 6.99e−3 3.4e−4 0.01 0.033
Constant −32.91∗∗∗ −35.90∗∗∗ −36.21∗∗∗ −40.96∗∗∗ −48.10∗∗∗ −41.26∗∗∗(−6.89) (−6.47) (−6.35) (−7.22) (−5.25) (−7.48)
Observations 970 970 1125 1124 1097 1097
Instruments: Tropics Tropics Tropics
Settler mortality British colony Settler mortality
ivprobit regression of RIAbi on corruption and control variables. The instruments are interacted in
the same way as the corruption variables. t-statistics in parenthesis. (a)p-value of the Wald test of
the joint significance of the corruption values and their exogeneity (H0: corruption is exogenous).∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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The marginal effect of average corruption on the probability of joining a RIA in the average-levels
ivprobit regressions, keeping all other variables at their mean values. The maximum values of WGI
and CPI in Africa are 0.62 and 0.5, while ICRG’s values range between 0 and 1.
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Table 2.11: Individual-levels ivprobit regression
ICRG WGI CPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural 1.731∗∗∗ 1.592∗∗∗ 1.533∗∗∗ 1.425∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗(9.00) (7.29) (15.24) (12.00) (12.36) (11.44)
Remote 8.567∗∗∗ 9.082∗∗∗ 6.674∗∗∗ 4.975∗ 7.439∗∗∗ 6.983∗∗∗(5.23) (4.32) (6.05) (1.79) (6.28) (5.29)
Adjacent − 1.156∗ − 0.673∗ − 0.228(1.82) (1.65) (0.57)
Landlocked − 0.280 − −0.0310 − −0.00452(0.62) (−0.10) (−0.02)
GDPa 0.190 0.220 0.0813 0.0649 0.137 0.109(1.49) (1.46) (1.29) (0.92) (1.51) (1.50)
GDPb −0.0788 −0.137 0.0562 −0.0427 −0.137∗ −0.111(−0.43) (−0.72) (0.93) (−0.35) (−1.65) (−1.31)
DKL 0.0425 0.0569 0.0426 0.0754 0.0724 0.0745(0.35) (0.43) (0.67) (0.96) (0.85) (0.89)
DROWKL 0.112 0.0293 0.0607 −0.0734 0.0285 0.0329(0.71) (0.14) (0.81) (−0.62) (0.35) (0.42)
Colony − 0.107 − 0.160 − 0.131(0.40) (0.52) (0.79)
Politya − 0.00382 − −0.00538 − −0.00912(0.10) (−0.35) (−0.33)
Polityb − −0.00572 − 0.0757∗∗ − 0.0258(−0.14) (2.10) (1.05)
Corruptiona −2.827 −5.352 −0.271 1.047 10.99 6.338(−0.44) (−0.71) (−0.04) (0.11) (1.02) (0.51)
Corruption2a −0.0270 1.542 −4.673 −5.396 −29.42 −18.83(−0.01) (0.31) (−0.55) (−0.50) (−1.38) (−0.80)
Corruptionb 6.153 10.16 −3.472 23.34 −17.27∗∗∗ −11.77(1.01) (1.40) (−0.46) (1.13) (−2.58) (−1.32)
Corruption2b −7.044 −11.98 1.248 −37.73 27.32∗ 15.05(−0.99) (−1.36) (0.12) (−1.35) (1.89) (0.78)
Wald(a) corra 0.0998 0.180 5.01e−6 0.0399 0.0178 0.0300
Wald(a) corrb 0.600 0.371 1.75e−4 7.17e−6 0.00886 0.0375
Wald(a) exog 0.557 0.400 0.0895 0.0171 0.0856 0.388
Constant −57.19∗∗∗ −62.44∗∗∗ −41.98∗∗∗ −31.94 −44.85∗∗∗ −41.69∗∗∗(−5.18) (−4.09) (−5.46) (−1.61) (−4.78) (−4.24)
Observations 351 351 990 946 703 703
Instruments: Tropics Tropics Tropics
Settler mortality British colony Settler mortality
ivprobit regression of RIAbi on corruption and control variables. (a)p-value of the Wald test of the
joint significance of the corruption values of each country and their exogeneity (H0: corruption is
exogenous). ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Surface plots of the marginal effect corruption and GDP on the probability of joining a RIA in the
individual-levels ivprobit regressions, keeping all other variables at their mean values.
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2.F Regressions without corruption squared
Table 2.12: Average-levels without corruption squared
ICRG WGI CPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural 1.508∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.476∗∗∗ 1.388∗∗∗(11.68) (8.98) (11.78) (10.83) (14.57) (12.29)
Remote 5.480∗∗∗ 6.118∗∗∗ 5.839∗∗∗ 6.396∗∗∗ 7.015∗∗∗ 6.429∗∗∗(5.25) (4.62) (5.32) (3.53) (4.06) (3.18)
Adjacent − 0.914∗∗∗ − 0.803∗∗∗ − 0.832∗∗∗(9.70) (9.81) (9.22)
Landlocked − 0.364∗∗ − 0.197 − 0.128(2.44) (0.98) (0.65)
GDPav −0.0584 −0.0474 −0.0605 −0.0950 −0.0823 −0.127(−0.85) (−0.54) (−0.75) (−1.00) (−0.95) (−1.35)
GDPdi f f 0.105∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗(2.32) (3.19) (2.08) (3.60) (3.21) (4.92)
DKL 0.00520 0.00808 0.0370∗∗ 0.0584∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗(0.39) (0.46) (2.22) (2.22) (3.56) (3.04)
DROWKL −0.141∗ −0.215∗∗∗ −0.0701 −0.0924∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗(−1.87) (−3.98) (−1.53) (−4.17) (−6.38) (−6.45)
Colony − 0.369∗∗∗ − 0.455∗∗∗ − 0.342∗∗∗(7.31) (5.33) (4.25)
Polityav − −0.0264∗∗∗ − 0.0178 − 0.0316∗∗(−2.99) (1.23) (2.57)
Corruptionav −4.949∗∗∗ −6.427∗∗∗ −5.966∗∗∗ −7.783∗∗∗ −11.46∗∗∗ −10.83∗∗∗(−4.21) (−5.68) (−5.35) (−5.18) (−5.22) (−4.09)
Error term ε 3.515∗∗∗ 4.991∗∗∗ 3.065∗∗ 5.139∗∗∗ 4.530∗∗ 3.698(2.71) (4.22) (2.45) (4.17) (2.54) (1.58)
Constant −30.81∗∗∗ −37.08∗∗∗ −34.80∗∗∗ −39.73∗∗∗ −43.67∗∗∗ −39.55∗∗(−3.77) (−3.58) (−3.95) (−2.74) (−3.21) (−2.46)
Observations 970 970 1125 1124 1097 1097
Instruments: Tropics Tropics Tropics
Settler mortality British colony Settler mortality
Probit regression of RIAbi on corruption, the error term from the first stage regressions (ε) and
control variables. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are corrected for multiple non-nested clusters. ∗, ∗∗,∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 2.13: Indiviual-levels probit regression without corruption squared
ICRG WGI CPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Natural 1.791∗∗∗ 1.675∗∗∗ 1.554∗∗∗ 1.420∗∗∗ 1.844∗∗∗ 1.800∗∗∗(9.66) (9.58) (10.99) (10.20) (10.01) (9.77)
Remote 8.696∗∗∗ 8.385∗∗∗ 6.360∗∗∗ 6.861∗∗∗ 8.904∗∗∗ 8.117∗∗∗(5.16) (4.35) (4.77) (3.63) (4.28) (3.43)
Adjacent − 0.919∗∗∗ − 0.541∗∗∗ − 0.176∗(12.74) (6.52) (1.75)
Landlocked − −0.218 − 0.165 − 0.0541(−1.20) (0.87) (0.53)
GDPa 0.155∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0916∗∗∗ 0.0378 0.0918∗∗∗(5.94) (4.00) (4.11) (3.78) (1.00) (3.10)
GDPb 0.0149 −0.0683 0.0361 0.0512 −0.00796 −0.0266(0.07) (−0.45) (0.84) (1.08) (−0.19) (−0.50)
DKL 0.0187 0.0545∗ 0.0340 0.0419 0.0847∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗(0.71) (1.69) (0.94) (1.23) (4.88) (7.32)
DROWKL 0.125 0.147 0.0754 0.0810∗∗∗ −0.0268 −0.0183(0.56) (0.63) (1.55) (2.75) (−0.46) (−0.37)
Colony − 0.0147 − 0.439∗∗∗ − 0.214∗(0.20) (4.86) (1.89)
Politya − 0.00594 − −0.00996 − −0.0258∗∗∗(0.41) (−1.61) (−2.72)
Polityb 0.0181 0.0262∗ 0.0407∗∗(0.38) (1.91) (2.31)
Corruptiona −2.991∗ −3.114∗ −3.173∗∗∗ −3.808∗∗∗ −4.304∗∗∗ −4.236∗∗∗(−1.86) (−1.82) (−4.16) (−3.34) (−3.31) (−2.83)
Corruptionb 0.693 1.350 −2.113∗ −3.383∗∗∗ −8.114∗∗∗ −6.990∗∗∗(0.34) (0.63) (−1.95) (−5.24) (−7.77) (−5.98)
Wald(a) corr 5.94e−4 1.99e−4 2.80e−9 9.75e−10 3.0e−14 3.67e−10
Error term εa 1.441 1.697 1.729∗∗∗ 2.563∗∗∗ −0.174 −0.174(0.90) (1.04) (3.77) (3.60) (−0.19) (−0.16)
Error term εb −0.602 −1.128 0.167 0.920 4.759∗∗∗ 3.082∗∗∗(−0.29) (−0.53) (0.17) (1.41) (4.20) (2.78)
Constant −57.32∗∗∗ −55.20∗∗∗ −38.83∗∗∗ −44.02∗∗∗ −56.04∗∗∗ −50.58∗∗∗(−4.84) (−3.94) (−3.72) (−2.95) (−3.49) (−2.75)
Observations 351 351 990 946 703 703
Instruments: Tropics Tropics Tropics
Settler mortality British colony Settler mortality
Probit regression of RIAbi on corruption, the error terms from the first stage regressions (εa and εb)
and control variables. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are corrected for multiple non-nested clusters.(a)p-value of the Wald tests on the joint significance of the corruption variables. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

3 | Divining the level of corruption -
A Bayesian state-space approach
Abstract
This chapter outlines a new methodological framework for combining indicators
of corruption. The state-space framework extends the methodology of the World-
wide Governance Indicators (WGI) to fully make use of the time-structure present
in corruption data. It is estimated using a Bayesian Gibbs sampler algorithm. The
state-space framework holds many advantages from a practical, an estimation and
a theoretical point of view. Most importantly, it significantly expands the period
for which the index can be computed while at the same time addressing the selec-
tion bias issues that trouble the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In addition, its
estimates are more stable and have smaller confidence intervals than both CPI and
WGI. Finally, the estimation procedure is explicit in its assumptions and allows the
data to be entered without any ex-ante imputations resulting in an index that is less
affected by ad hoc modeling choices.
Keywords: Corruption perception; State-space model; Bayesian econometrics;
Worldwide Governance Indicators.
JEL classification: C43; O17; O57; P16; P26.
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3.1 Introduction
Researchers looking at the effects or determinants of corruption are faced with the
difficulty of having to choose one out of the more than 70 individual indicators
available. Each indicator differs in availability in time, countries covered, exactly
what it is trying to measure, and where or with whom it was collected. Because that
one indicator that meets all requirements often proves elusive, most studies resort
to aggregated indicators of corruption. The two most used are the Corruption Per-
ceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International and the Worldwide
Governance Indicators’ index of corruption (WGI) made available by the World
Bank.
However, the use of these aggregated indicators is not without criticism, especially
when making comparisons over time. Shifts in the indices are not only driven by
the level of corruption, but by changes in the methodology and sources as well.
Moreover, both indicators only go back to the mid-nineties and early values suffer
from serious selection bias problems (Treisman, 2007).
This chapter outlines a new methodology for combining indicators of corruption
that fixes a number of the issues plaguing the WGI and CPI. Starting from the
WGI methodology, the state-space model uses the persistence of corruption to better
identify actual changes in the level of corruption. This leads to smaller confidence
intervals, especially when only a few indicators are available.
Following Høyland et al. (2012), the model is estimated using a Bayesian Gibbs
sampling algorithm. In combination with the solution to missing data, this al-
lows the model to be estimated without additional assumptions or manipulations
to the data (imputations, sub-level aggregations, etc.). Moreover, the flexibility of
the Gibbs sampling algorithm makes it easy to extend the model to allow cross-
correlated or persistent measurement errors in the individual indicators. Further-
more, it can be combined with the approach of Givens (2013) and capture multiple
aspects of governance in the style of an exploratory principal component analysis.
The resulting indicator is dubbed the Bayesian Corruption Indicator and is available
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for download at www.sherppa.be.
The following section reviews the data and methodology used in the CPI and the
WGI and highlights some of their shortcomings. This is followed by the presenta-
tion of the new framework after which its results are discussed.
3.2 Individual indicators of corruption
An important question when choosing the sources for an indicator of corruption is
whether to use incidence or perception-based surveys. The former asks for personal
experience with corruption within the last x months, while the latter asks respon-
dents for their opinion on the level of corruption in the country as a whole, or in
various branches of the government. Following the CPI and the WGI, this chapter
focuses explicitly on corruption perception1. For comparability’s sake, the same
sources as the WGI are used, which include firm and household survey data as well
as expert assessments from governmental, NGO and commercial institutions (table
3.1).
Table 3.1: Overview of perceived corruption indicators
Cross-country survey of households Expert assessment from commercial
- Gallup World Poll risk rating agencies
- Latinobarometer - International Country Risk Guide
- Global Risk Service
Expert assessment from NGO - World markets online
and think tanks - Economist Intelligence Unit
- Global Integrity - Political and Economic Risk Consultancy
- The Freedom House
- Bertelsmann Transformation Index Expert assessment from governments
- Global Corruption Barometer and multilaterals
- Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
Cross-country survey of firms - African Development Bank
- Afrobarometer - Asian Development Bank
- Global competitiveness survey - IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessment
- Vanderbilt University’s Americas Barometer - Institutional Profiles database
- World Competitiveness Yearbook
- Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey
(Arndt and Oman, 2006)
1For a discussion on the merits and demerits of perception versus experience based measures
of corruption, see e.g. Kaufmann et al. (2004); Lambsdorff (2005); Kaufmann et al. (2007a,b);
Treisman (2007); Kaufmann et al. (2010) or Roca (2011).
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However, there are a few differences with the WGI dataset. First of all, whenever
possible, the individual indicators/survey questions are used instead of sub-level
aggregations. While this leads to shorter time-series for some indicators, it also
minimizes measurement errors due to changes in the composition of the grouped
indicator. The effect of using the individual indicators on the overall precision of
the index is discussed in more detail in section 3.7.3.
The individual survey questions were separated into indicators measuring corrup-
tion perception, experience and anti-corruption measures. For example, a sur-
vey question asking for ‘personal experience with corruption during the last year’
(Global Corruption Barometer) is considered to measure experience and is left out.
On the other hand, a more broad question about the experience with corruption
of ‘firms in my line of business’ (Business Environment and Enterprise Survey) is
deemed to measure perception.
In contrast to the WGI, indicators of the (perception of) the efficiency of anti-
corruption measures were also left out. Anti-corruption measures capture a cause
of corruption and the relation between the two is not necessarily positive or linear.
A country with high levels of corruption that it is actively trying to fight would have
high corruption and strong measures. A country without corruption might have no
need for strong anti-corruption institutions or on the contrary have little corruption
because of strong institutions. In addition, removing these indicators makes it pos-
sible to test whether institutions are successful in bringing down the perceived level
of corruption.
A final distinction between the two datasets is that indicators available every couple
of years (e.g. the Latinobarometer) were only used in one year. The WGI on the
other hand impute the data onto all intervening years as well. How the state-space
model subsequently deals with these missing observations is described in more de-
tail in section 3.4.2.
Constructed in this way, the corruption perception dataset contains 69 variables
coming from 18 different sources and covers 211 countries and regions. While the
dataset starts in 1984, ICRG is the only available indicator for the first 10 years.
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From then on the number of available indicators rapidly increases and remains high
up to 2012. A full description of the sources and their individual indicators of
corruption can be found in 3.B. For a more thorough analysis of the sources see
Arndt and Oman (2006, p. 52-57).
3.3 Composite indicators of corruption
3.3.1 Corruption Perceptions Index
Published yearly since 1995 by Transparency International, the Corruptions Per-
ceptions Index (CPI) is probably the most widely known composite indicator of
corruption. As the name indicates, it combines perception-based indicators in order
to capture the ‘misuse of public power for private benefit’ (Lambsdorff, 2005, p.4).
The higher a country’s CPI score, the lower its level of corruption.
It merges the indicators by first standardizing their values and then taking a simple
average. Up until 2012, they used a technique called matching percentiles to stan-
dardize the rank data from indicators. However, since 2012 they have changed this
to a normalization of the nominal values of the indicators, which is then adjusted to
ensure backwards compatibility. If y is the original indicator value, its normalized
equivalent y⋆ is computed as:
y⋆ = y−mean(y)
std(y) ∗ sign∗20+45. (3.1)
The sign variable ensures that all variables associate an increase in the index with a
drop in the level of corruption. These standardized values are rescaled and capped
to lie between 0 and 100 (Saisana and Saltelli, 2012).
The methodology used in creating the CPI index has a number of drawbacks, the
most important of which is that it should not be used for comparisons over time
(Transparency International, 2012). Because the matching percentiles technique
uses only the rank data and combines it with a simple average, the index is very
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sensitive to changes in countries covered and indices used. While the change in
methodology in 2012 has improved on this, the pre-2012 values are still computed
using the old methodology.
Secondly, it uses only a subset of the available corruption indicators and does not
include countries for which there are less than three sources available in a given
year. As a result, the coverage of the indicator is limited, especially for its earlier
values. Moreover, the selection is not independent of the level of corruption, causing
the index to be prone to a selection bias issue (Treisman, 2007). In order to alleviate
some of the availability problems, the data is manipulated in a number of ad-hoc
ways. For example, some (but not all) sources are averaged over the last three
years, while others are used twice.
Lastly, there is the issue of apparent randomness in the weighing of the individual
indicators. The updated methodology makes the arbitrary choice of multiplying
with 45, adding 20 and capping all values over 100 purely for reasons of continuity.
However, there are no clear ex ante reasons why the variables should be rescaled
in this way and changing these weights would lead to different values and rankings
that are equally valid.
3.3.2 Worldwide Governance Indicators
The Worldwide Governance Indicators’ index of corruption measures ‘the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private inter-
ests. (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p.4). To do this, they combine the perception based
corruption indicators using an unobserved components (or factor) model.
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Unobserved components model
Denoting the (k×1) vector of corruption indicators with yi,t , and the unknown ‘true’
level of corruption with the scalar αi,t , they estimate the following model:
yi,t = Ct +Ztαi,t +εi,t (3.2)
αi,t ∼ N(0,1) (3.3)
εi,t ∼ N(0,Ht) (3.4)
for all countries i = 1, ..., p and years t = 1, ...,n, with k the number of individual
corruption indicators in yi,t .
Re-estimated in each year, the (k×1) vectors Ct and Zt capture both differences in
scaling as well as the distribution of values. For example, some indicators might
easily assign the highest score, while others reserve that only for a limited num-
bers of countries. The unknown level of corruption α is assumed to be normally
distributed.2 To identify this model, the choice of units of α in each year is fixed
at mean zero and standard deviation of one (equation 3.3). Kaufmann et al. (2010)
argue that this choice of units does not preclude their use in time-series or panel
studies because they find no significant evidence of a worldwide trend in corrup-
tion.
Finally, εi,t is an error term with (k × k) variance matrix, Ht . The measurement
errors of different indicators are assumed to be uncorrelated: E(ε′i,tε j,t) = 0 ∀i /= j,
which means that H is a diagonal matrix. The error term is meant to capture two
effects. Firstly, it will account for errors in the data collection process. Secondly, it
also corrects for the possibility that the indicators do not measure the overall level
of corruption, but a related concept like the level of petty corruption, or the level of
corruption in the judiciary.
2Høyland et al. (2012) work out a model that relaxes this assumption as it is clear that it is
incompatible with the distribution of many of the underlying indicators in y.
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Estimation
In order to estimate this model, αi,t and εi,t are assumed to be multivariate normal
distributed. The data then is split up in a representative and non-representative
group. Simply put, the representative group contains all indicators whose scope
either covers the entire population, or represents a random selection of countries.
Conversely, the non-representative group contains those indicators whose coverage
is not independent from the level of corruption. For example the Freedom House
index, which focuses on Eastern European countries.
In the first step, estimation is done using only the representative group, where the
yearly expected value of α is assumed zero. These estimates are then updated with
the information from the non-representative group. The advantage of this two-step
procedure is that the results from the representative group can be used to assess and
correct the bias in the non-representative group without having to make any prior
assumptions on the size or direction of the bias.
A final rescaling of the variables ensures that the mean is zero and standard devia-
tion is one in each year. However, selection bias issues require a second rescaling
for the earliest index values. Countries that are added later to the sample are found
to have lower levels of corruption, meaning that the earlier WGI values are skewed
upwards. To compensate, the mean value in each year is adjusted using the values
of 2003 as a benchmark.
WGI’s index of corruption
The inclusion of the error term with indicator-specific variance is a big advantage
of the WGI. It makes it more robust to the inclusion of indicators that are less cor-
related with the general level of corruption, whether due to measurement errors or
because it only measures a related concept (for example, the level of corruption in
elected officials). The CPI on the other hand treats all indicators the same, regard-
less of their reliability or conceptual suitability.
As was the case with the CPI, the initial years of the index are available for a select
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Table 3.2: Correlation of the corruption indicators with their lagged values
yκ ρ(yκt ,yκt−1) yκ ρ(yκt ,yκt−1) yκ ρ(yκt ,yκt−1)
WGI 0.988 GCB2 0.870 GCS4 0.970
CPI 0.989 GCB27 0.700 GCS5 0.978
ADB 0.905 GCB28 0.575 GCS6 0.973
ASD 0.878 GCB29 0.857 GCS7 0.982
EIU 0.975 GCB3 0.955 GWP 0.931
FRH 0.994 GCB4 0.650 IFD 0.873
GCB1 0.858 GCB5 0.723 LBO1 0.312
GCB10 0.887 GCB6 0.712 LBO3 0.175
GCB11 0.903 GCB7 0.914 LBO4 0.797
GCB12 0.923 GCB8 0.727 PIA 0.951
GCB13 0.919 GCB9 0.782 PRC 0.963
GCB14 0.896 GCS1 0.976 PRS 0.966
GCB15 0.917 GCS2 0.981 WCY 0.976
GCB16 0.971 GCS3 0.974 WMO 0.972
group of countries. The problem is less severe because the index is composed even
when only one datasource is available. Nevertheless, from its start in 1996 to 2002
the index is only available every two years. Those values of the individual indicators
in the years in between are imputed onto the following year.
3.3.3 Persistence
Because the level of corruption is in a large part driven by social norms and values,
it is expected to show a high degree of persistence. Table 3.2 confirms this. While
the panel unit root test always rejects the hypothesis that the observed measures
of corruption have a unit root for all countries, the simple correlation coefficient
between the corruption indicator and their lagged values is still greater than 0.9 for
more than half of the indicators. In other words, regardless of the rejection of the
unit root, the persistence in the observed level of corruption for many countries and
indicators is notable.
While this time-dependence is reflected in the values of the CPI and the WGI (table
3.2), they do not make use of it in their estimations. However, by taking the past
values into account, the reliability of the estimates can be significantly increased
and random ‘noise’ can be better filtered out from the corruption indicators. It will
also expand the time period for which the level of corruption can be computed.
72 3. Divining the level of corruption
In Governance Matters IV, Kaufmann et al. (2005) explore the use of the time-
dimension to better assess the level of governance. Using a two-period model, they
find that while the overall correlation between the static and dynamic approaches
is high, the behavior of the index does change when compared over time. The
approach presented in the next section generalizes their model and introduces a
different estimation method that simplifies a number of the assumptions used in the
WGI model.
3.4 The updated framework
3.4.1 Model
Extending the WGI framework to take the time dependence into account leads to
the following system of equations:
yi,t = C+Zαi,t +εi,t (3.5)
αi,t = Tiαi,t−1+νi,t (3.6)
εi,t ∼ N(0,H) (3.7)
νi,t ∼ N(0,Q) (3.8)
The measurement equation
As before, the measurement equation (3.5) states that the k indicators of corruption
yi,t try to measure the ‘true’ level of corruption αi,t . The variables i and t respec-
tively represent the different countries and time-periods. Corruption is defined in
the same way as in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
The scaling parameters C and Z can vary over the indicators of corruption but are
kept constant over time and country. This differs from the WGI methodology where
these values are recomputed for each year. In doing so, we assume that the relation
between the overall level of corruption and a specific question asked using a spe-
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cific methodology does not change over time.3 To the extent that the parameters
remain constant, reestimating them in each period would imply a significant loss of
information. The validity of this assumption is tested in section 3.7.1.
Similarly, the variance of the error term ε can differ over all corruption indicators,
but is kept constant over time. Initially cross-correlation between the error terms of
different indicators is also ruled out (H diagonal): E[ε(k),ε(m)] = 0, ∀ k ≠ m. This
assumption is subsequently relaxed to allow the indicators coming from the same
source to be correlated (H block-diagonal).
The state equation
The state equation (3.6) allows for the ‘true’ level of corruption to depend on its
previous values. If the values for Ti are set to zero this model coincides with that
of the WGI index (equation 3.3). This persistence is modeled as an AR(1) process,
restricting the values of T to lie inside the [-1,1] interval. While more complex
ways of modeling the persistence might be possible and even desirable, the number
of observations per country is too limited to include richer dynamics without having
to impose strong a-priori assumptions.
Unlike the parameters of the measurement equation, each country is allowed a dif-
ferent level of persistence, enabling some countries’ level of corruption to change
more rapidly than that of others.4 The fact that the unit root tests reject an overall
unit root despite the high correlation in the individual indicators (table 3.2) sug-
gests that this level of dependence is to some extent country-specific. Nevertheless,
section 3.7.2 discusses the effect of imposing Ti = τ and Ti = 1 as robustness checks.
By bringing the time dimension into play, a lot more information is used in the
estimation of each corruption value. Figure 3.1 illustrates this graphically. In the
WGI framework, only the current information on corruption, yt , is used (step b). In
3Since the WGI groups indicators per source, this assumption would still imply that its parame-
ters need to be reestimated in each year as the composition of questions per source does not remain
constant over time.
4While the speed of adjustment is determined both by the value of T and the variance of the
innovation in corruption, the latter has been normalized to one to ensure that the model is identified.
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the new framework the level of corruption is predicted using both past and future
values (step a), after which the information in yt is used to update that estimate
(step b). The importance of step a versus step b will depend on how reliable the
corruption indicators (H) are versus how reliable the past values are (Ti and Q).
Because αt−1 and αt+1 in turn also depend on their past and future values, all avail-
able information will be used to estimate the current level of corruption. Not only
does this increase the reliability of each estimate, it also helps smooth out the esti-
mates of corruption. By taking the past and future values of corruption into account,
the algorithm is better able to distinguish between actual changes in the level of cor-
ruption and random measurement errors.
Following Givens (2013), this model could also be used to extract multiple states
from the governance indicators, simply by defining αi,t as a vector, rather than a
scalar and extracting multiple states. Under the assumptions that each variable is
equally reliable (H = σI) and disregarding the time-dependence (Ti = 0), the model
would return a similar exploratory principal component analysis.
Figure 3.1: Estimation using time dependency
3.4.2 Estimation
This section aims to provide only a very general overview of the estimation tech-
nique. More information can be found in 3.A, but for a complete overview of state-
space models and how to estimate them, see Kim and Nelson (1999) or Durbin and
Koopman (2012).
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Gibbs sampling
The updated framework is estimated in a Bayesian framework because of the con-
venience the Gibbs sampling algorithm provides. Solving the model entails finding
the optimal solution for the parameters of the state and measurement equation (C,
Z, T and H) as well as the level of corruption (α). While it is possible to solve this
model using maximum likelihood, the problem quickly becomes very complex as
more and more countries are added. However, using the Gibbs sampling we can
split the estimation up into various subcomponents which can be dealt with one
at a time. In addition, the modular approach makes it easy to change parts of the
estimation model.
Simply put, the Gibbs sampler allows us to draw from a multivariate probability,
p(a,b), using only conditional probabilities, p(a∣b) and p(b∣a). Starting from a cer-
tain value b1, draws are taken iteratively from both conditional distributions while
conditioning on the last drawn values:
a1 ∼ p(a∣b1)→ b2 ∼ p(b∣a1)→ a2 ∼ p(a∣b2)→ ...
It can be shown that after a sufficient number of iterations (the burn-in), an and bn
represents random draws from the unconditional probability function p(a,b). Using
enough random draws, we can then reconstitute the original multivariate probability
p(a,b).
In this case, the Gibbs sampler consists of two main components (figure 3.2). In part
A, the parameters of the state and measurement equations are drawn conditional on
the values for α. Part B samples from the distribution of the ‘true’ level of corruption
while conditioning on the parameters of the state and measurement equation.
An additional advantage of the Gibbs sampling algorithm is that it avoids the need
to distinguish between representative and non-representative sources, nor does it
require the assumption that α and ε are multivariate normal. The reason is that
estimation no longer requires the assumption that the expected value of α is zero.
76 3. Divining the level of corruption
Draw H, Z, C and T!
conditional on α"
Kalman filter: !
compute p(αt | y1, … , yt )#
conditional on H, Z, C and T"
Simulation smoother:  !
draw αt | y1, … , yT#
conditional on H, Z, C and T"
αT > αT-1 > … > α1#
Initialize with !
WGI estimates#
α0 > α1 > … > αT#
Figure 3.2: Estimation flow chart
If for example an indicator only covers more corrupt countries, it will only be used
to update the corruption estimates of those countries it covers (step B, figure 3.2).
Similarly, when estimating its scaling parameters (step A), only the information of
the relatively more corrupt countries will be used.
More information on the estimation procedure can be found in the appendix 3.A,
which also discusses the convergence of the Gibbs sampler. For more details on
Bayesian econometrics and Gibbs sampling algorithms, see Lancaster (2004) and
Koop et al. (2007).
Missing observations and non-representative indicators
Finally, there is the issue of missing observations. There are different ways of
dealing with this in the state-space framework, but they all boil down to the same
idea: missing data is replaced by information which is entirely uncertain and con-
sequently holds no value: ymissing = 0, Var(εmissing) =∞. As a result, the state-space
model will recognize that any information contained in ymissing should have no ef-
fect on the resulting indicator. This allows the model to run uninterruptedly without
fundamentally changing the nature of missing data. In combination with the time
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dependency, it enables us to significantly increase the number of countries and years
for which the index can be calculated without having to impute, group or otherwise
manipulate the data (Kim and Nelson, 1999; Durbin and Koopman, 2012).
This solution to missing data also solves the problem of what to do with non-
representative indicators: e.g. indicators that only cover the more corrupt countries.
To reiterate, the Gibbs sampling algorithm splits up the estimation into two stages.
In the first stage the level of corruption is computed and drawn from. Because miss-
ing data is replaced by random noise, all the indicators can be included regardless
of their availability or selection issues. Moreover, this step is conditional on the
parameters C and Z, through which the model will take into account that an index
might be unrepresentative. A high value of C will reflect that the indicator covers
relatively more corrupt countries (leading a lower estimated BCI index) and vice
versa.
In the second stage of the Gibbs sampler the parameters are computed conditional
on the value of corruption. Say we have an indicator that only covers more corrupt
countries. To compute C and Z, its indicator values will be compared to the values
of BCI for the more corrupt countries. In other words, unlike the WGI index, the
estimation does not rely on the idea that on average corruption has to be zero for this
subsample. Instead, the estimated C will be positive to compensate for the relatively
lower values of BCI that it is being compared to.
Standardization
Following the WGI index the expected value of corruption was standardized such
that it has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. However, unlike the WGI
index, this was done for the entire sample rather than on a yearly basis (3.A.4).
Normalizing the yearly means would destroy the overall trend and invalidate com-
parisons over time (cf. section 3.5.4).
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3.5 The Bayesian Corruption Indicator
Figure 3.3 plots of the Bayesian Corruption Indicator (BCI) for the USA, North
Korea, South Africa and France alongside the values of the WGI and the CPI. Sim-
ilar to the latter two, a high score for the BCI indicator means that there is little
corruption.
The estimation period is significantly expanded relative to the CPI and WGI. Even
though the index was computed starting in 1984, we will only cover the results
starting in 1995 seeing that there is only one source that goes back further. Even
over this more limited period, the BCI index increases the size of the dataset by
40%. Also visible in figure 3.3 is the effect of an increase in the number of in-
dividual indicators on the size of the confidence intervals. For example, in 1995
there are 2 indicators that cover France and the uncertainty of the initial estimates is
relatively large. As the number of indicators rises to 23 in 2010, this band narrows
progressively. The subsequent drop to only five in 2012 once again increases the
uncertainty.
Secondly, the BCI estimates are more stable (figure 3.3). Other corruption indica-
tors (both individual and combined) have been criticized as being prone to small
jumps in the data that have nothing to do with the level of corruption (Arndt and
Oman, 2006; Treisman, 2007). By taking the past and future values of corruption
into account, more information is used to discern between random measurement
errors and actual changes in the level of corruption. As the time-dependency in-
creases, more and more changes are filtered out and the resulting indicator becomes
smoother (Kaufmann et al., 2004). On the other hand, as shown in the dynamic fac-
tor model of (Kaufmann et al., 2004), adding time-dependence is inadvisable when
not corruption but the measurement errors are persistent. For this reason, section
3.7.5 adds persistent measurement errors to the state-space model, but finds that this
model performs significantly worse than than the baseline model.
It should be reiterated that all available indicators are used in these estimations,
meaning that the stability of the BCI is not the result of pre-selecting only the most
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(a) United States of America
(b) Democratic Republic of Korea
(c) South Africa
(d) France
Figure 3.3: The BCI indicator over time
Plot of the BCI estimates, including 90% highest posterior density interval (dotted lines). Values of
the standardized CPI (▽) and WGI (△) are also included.
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stable individual indicators. In addition, the smoothness does not change when the
indicators are grouped per source as in the WGI.
3.5.1 Correlations
Despite their methodological differences, the BCI, the WGI and the CPI give rela-
tively similar predictions. Table 3.3 lists the pairwise correlations between the three
indexes. Their overall correlation is very high. However, this is almost completely
driven by their between-correlations (the correlation between the mean values for
each country). The within correlation (between the demeaned values) on the other
hand is significantly lower. In other words, while the choice of indicator might
not have a large effect on the results in a cross-country study, this will change in
time-series or panel studies (cf. section 3.5.4).
The reason why the within correlation is so low is related to the relative smoothness
of the BCI estimate over time. As shown in figure 3.3 the small changes present in
the WGI and CPI are identified as noise and filtered out of the BCI. The correlation
of this noise over the different indicators is very low. Since the noise constitute
a significant fraction of the total variation over time in WGI and CPI, the within
correlation will also be low. On the other hand, the within correlation rises drasti-
cally when looking at large changes. This is shown in the last four columns where
the correlation of the three indicators is computed over the significant changes as
identified by either the rule of thumb or at the 10%, 5% or 1% significance level
(cf. section 3.5.4).
Unfortunately, the pattern of missing values prevent us from comparing the good-
ness of fit of all variables simultaneously, as there are no observations where all
indicators are available. Figure 3.4 shows the pairwise correlation of the BCI index
with the individual indicators that went into the index. By far, most indicators are
very highly positively or highly negatively correlated with the BCI index, meaning
that a lot of the information contained in these indicators is used. Furthermore,
the correlations are fairly similar over the different types of indicators, whether
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Table 3.3: Pairwise correlations between BCI, WGI and CPI
BCI - WGI BCI - CPI CPI - WGI
Total 0.948 0.956 0.970
Between(a) 0.969 0.965 0.984
Within(b) 0.352 0.202 0.347
Within - significant(c): RoT 0.803 0.946 0.892
Within - significant(c): 0.10 0.703 0.680 0.713
Within - significant(c): 0.05 0.760 0.815 0.758
Within - significant(c): 0.01 0.830 0.932 0.860(a)Between correlation is defined as the correlation between the means of each countries;(b)Within correlation is the correlation between the demeaned values of all countries.(c)Within correlation of significant changes over time as identified by the rule of thumb (RoT) or at
the 10%, 5% or 1% significance level (cf. section 3.5.4).
they are surveys or expert opinions. In other words, unlike Arndt and Oman (2006)
suggested, all types of sources are represented by the BCI index. Appendix 3.E pro-
vides a more detailed look by listing the R2 of the measurement equation5, ordered
from highest to lowest, and decomposing it further into the within and between R2.
It reveals that the explained within variance is very low for most indicators, but this
is mitigated by the fact that the between variation is the foremost source of variation
in the BCI index. The between variance of the standardized index is 0.995, while
the within variance is only 0.009. The individual indicator that does the best job
capturing both within and between variation of the BCI is the Global Corruption
Barometers’ perception of corruption in parliament/legislature (GCB2).
3.5.2 Validity of the time-dependence parameter Ti
Finally, the values for parameter T give an indication of the necessity of the added
time-dependence. As was explained earlier, setting T = 0 will reduce the BCI frame-
work to that of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. However, the hypothesis that
this parameter is zero is rejected for the vast majority of countries: 203 out of 219
at the 1% significance level. In fact, for most countries, T lies close to one (figure
3.5). Keep in mind that the values for T are restricted to lie within the [-1,1] interval,
5As each measurement equation is a univariate regression, the R2 is equal to the square of the
correlation.
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Figure 3.4: Correlations with individual indicators
Correlation of the 43 individual indicators of corruption with the BCI. ◯ mark indicators from
commercial sources; + from firm-level surveys; ◇ from governmenental and multilateral sources; ◻
from household surveys; and  from NGOs.
to ensure that corruption is a stable, non-explosive time series and the steady-state
variance of corruption is non-negative.
The formal test of the validity of Ti involves comparing each models’ marginal
probability. Similar to the likelihood ratio, marginal probability of a model ex-
presses how likely the data is, given that it was generated using this model. The
ratio between the two marginal probabilities, the bayes factor, will be greater than
one if the model in the numerator better suits the data (Carlin and Louis, 2000).
The computation of the marginal probability of each model is described in 3.A.6.
The bayes factor confirms that the time-dependence is a valid addition to the model:
according to Kass and Raftery (1995), a value of more than 5 is decisive evidence
in favor of the baseline model.
ln[BFbaseline,T=0] = ln[ p(y∣baseline)p(y∣T = 0) ] = 443
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Figure 3.5: Plot of mean values of T and their 95% highest posterior density interval
Plot of expected values parameter T100 to T150 (circles) and their 95% highest posterior density
intervals (triangles).
3.5.3 Reliability
By using the time-structure present in the data, the estimates of corruption can be
made with greater precision and certainty. Table 3.4 lists the average size of the
confidence intervals and highest posterior density intervals of the three combined
indicators over different samples and using different standardization methods.
In order to make the right comparison between the average standard deviations of
the three indicators, it is important to compare them over the same sample and using
the same standardization techniques. The BCI indicator goes farther back in time
than the WGI, covering countries and time periods for which there is less certainty.
Once corrected for this, it becomes clear that the average standard deviation of the
BCI is smaller than that of the WGI. Using a yearly normalization for the BCI index
does not change this conclusion. The WGI’s confidence interval is smaller than that
of BCI in less than 10% of the sample.
The correlation coefficient between the two standard deviations is 0.607, meaning
that for the most part the standard deviation of BCI and WGI follow the same pat-
tern. The differences are caused the adding the time parameter T , the individual
indicators used (even though they come from the same sources), and the fact that α
and ε are no longer assumed to be multivariate normal distributed (eqn. 3.5).
The CPI on the other hand scores worse than both the BCI and WGI, regardless
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of normalization and sample size. Moreover, its confidence bounds follow a com-
pletely different pattern: the correlation coefficient with BCI and WGI is -0.031 and
0.243, respectively.
Table 3.4: Average standard deviation of BCI, WGI and CPI
Standardization(A) Sample BCI WGI CPI
None Total 3.226 0.236 1.087
Total Total 0.249 0.236 0.484
Total WGI 0.156 0.236 0.258
Total CPI 0.163 0.182 0.484
Yearly Total 0.247 0.236 0.531
Yearly WGI 0.157 0.236 0.262
Yearly CPI 0.163 0.182 0.531
Average standard deviation of the BCI, WGI and CPI. (A)None: indicator values are used without
normalization; Total: all mean values are normalized to mean of zero and standard deviation of one
(cf. BCI); Yearly: yearly mean values are normalized to mean of zero and standard deviation of one
(cf. WGI).
3.5.4 Significant changes in corruption
Table 3.5: Changes in the level of corruption between 2000 to 2010
Significance Deteriorated (BCI decreased) Improved (BCI increased)
1% ItalyRoT, WGI GreeceRoT, WGI GeorgiaRoT, WGI
Czech Rep.RoT HungaryRoT Saudi ArabiaRoT
5% Kuwait South Africa Gambia
Colombia USA Iraq
Iceland VenezuelaWGI MacedoniaWGI
Slovakia QatarWGI
10% Algeria Maldives Bahrain
Argentina Moldova Indonesia
Austria Russia LiberiaWGI
Brazil Slovenia Oman
Bulgaria Spain Palestine
Croatia Ukraine Zimbabwe
Madagascar
not EritreaWGI RwandaWGI
Great BritainWGI SerbiaWGI
UAE WGI
List of countries whose level of corruption changed significantly between 2000 and 2010. RoT
indicates whether the change was detected using the rule of thumb and WGI using WGI’s data.
Before comparing any countries, the question should be asked whether the underly-
ing indicators allow comparisons over time. For example, the use of ranked data in
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the old methodology of the CPI limited its use to cross-sectional studies. However,
an analysis of the survey questions listed in appendix 3.B reveals that this is not the
case for the BCI index. For example, the frequency of payments/gifts when deal-
ing with the taxes and tax collection (BPS14), the perception of corruption in the
judiciary (GCB14) and the fraction of people that identify corruption as the most se-
rious problem facing the country (VAB1) are all variables that can be meaningfully
compared over time.
In order to see whether the level of corruption has changed over time, Kaufmann
et al. (2004) suggest a rule of thumb based on dynamic factor model that takes into
account persistence in corruption as well as in the measurement errors. The rule
of thumb is that if the 90% confidence intervals overlap, the change is deemed big
enough to be significant. The problem is that this ignores the time structure in the
corruption data. If corruption did not depend on its previous values, this approx-
imation would return relatively good results. However, because of the high level
of persistence this rule ends up making a lot of type I errors by labeling significant
changes as not significant.
Using the data from the Gibbs sampler, it is possible to test whether the change in
corruption is significant. If in more than 95% of the drawn values of α a country’s
level of corruption decreases, this change is significant at 5% significance level.
This can be extremely useful given the increased importance of changes in gov-
ernance in for example the allocation of international aid (Kaufmann et al., 2004;
Arndt and Oman, 2006).
Table 3.5 lists those countries for which there was a significant change in the level
of corruption between 2000 and 2010 at 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. It also
indicates which of these changes would have been identified using the rule of thumb
and using the WGI.
Even though the rule of thumb uses the 90% confidence intervals, it is only able to
identify the changes in the level of corruption at the 1% level. However, it does not
necessarily capture all of the changes at the 1% level. For example, it misses almost
40% between 2005 and 2012 (9 out of 23).
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The results using the WGI on the other hand differ strongly from those of the BCI.
Using WGI data, some of the changes from 1,5 and 10% are identified (7 out of 36),
but 5 shifts are also spuriously identified. This demonstrates the fact that despite
their high overall correlation, BCI and WGI will come to significantly different
conclusions when used for making comparisons over time.
Worldwide trend
The evolution of the average worldwide level of corruption can be investigated in a
similar way. As figure 3.6 makes clear, a simple rule of thumb would not be able
to find any significant evolution in the average level of corruption. However, using
the results from the Gibbs sampler, the overall decrease between 1995 and 2012
is significant at 5% and the drop between 2005 and 2012 even at 1%. The small
increase between 1995 and 2005 on the other hand is not significant.
Figure 3.6: Worldwide trend in corruption values
Plot of the yearly mean value of the BCI index and its 95% highest posterior density interval
(dotted lines).
Rankings
Analogous to the comparisons over time, the index also allows us to identify sig-
nificant differences between countries. Country A has significantly less corruption
(a higher score) than country B at the 1% level if its score is higher in more than
99% of the drawn values. For example, using the cross-correlated indicator 16,841
significant differences can be found between 210 countries/regions in 2010 at the
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Table 3.6: The 15 best and worst ranked countries in 2012
rank country BCI rank country BCI
1 Denmark 2.26 27 Myanmar -1.64
1 New Zealand 2.21 27 Somalia -1.62
1 Finland 2.12 27 Korea, P.D.R. -1.59
1 Sweden 2.09 27 Iraq -1.42
2 Singapore 2.10 27 Afghanistan -1.41
2 Netherlands 1.97 27 Angola -1.37
2 Switzerland 1.94 27 Haiti -1.34
2 Australia 1.93 27 New Caledonia -0.97
2 Iceland 1.87 26 Chad -1.40
2 Norway 1.87 26 Turkmenistan -1.37
2 Canada 1.87 26 Sudan -1.34
3 United Kingdom 1.57 26 Equatorial Guinea -1.30
3 Austria 1.53 26 Congo, D.R. -1.28
4 Luxembourg 1.86 26 Burundi -1.27
4 Hong Kong 1.75 26 Zimbabwe -1.21
This table lists the 15 countries with the lowest (left) and highest (right) level of corruption. The
ranking is based solely on significant differences in the cross-correlated BCI scores at the 5%
significance level.
1% level. Using the WGI and the rule of thumb only 15,298 can be identified: 2,085
are no longer significant while 542 are significant using WGI but not using BCI.
Table 3.6 uses these differences to rank countries according to the following rule:
country A is ranked higher than country B if, and only if, its level of corruption is
significantly lower than that of B or than that of a country whose level of corruption
is not significantly different from that of B. In other words, a country has rank x if
it is significantly less corrupt than at least one country with rank x+1.
The main advantage of this ranking relative to one based only on the values of the
index is that it ignores the insignificant differences between countries. As Høy-
land et al. (2012, p.2) pointed out, simply using the scores of an indicator to rank
countries can falsely give the impression of a clear-cut ordering of countries. Us-
ing a ranking based on significant differences removes some of the randomness of
rankings, making them a more useful policy analysis tool.
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3.6 Selection bias
As a number of authors, including Kaufmann et al. (2010), have made clear, the
initial values of the WGI and the CPI potentially suffer from selection bias issues.
Because early commercial corruption indicators focused on countries their clients
are interested to trade in, they were more likely to cover countries with high levels
of GDP and/or low levels of corruption. Consequently, the selection of countries
covered by CPI and WGI could depend on the level of corruption and GDP. How-
ever, because the BCI index uses the time structure in the data, it is able to provide
an estimate of the level of corruption for all countries starting in 1984, avoiding this
selection bias problem.
Additionally, it is possible to use the BCI values to formally test the existence of a
selection bias in the WGI and the CPI. Defining DWGI and DCPI as dummy variables
indicating whether or not a country is covered by WGI or CPI (1 if it is, 0 otherwise),
equation 3.9 is tested. Following Treisman (2007), real level of GDP from the Penn
World tables was also included in equation 3.10 (Heston et al., 2012).
D¯Ai,t = c+βBCI ∗BCIi,t +ψi,t (3.9)
D¯Ai,t = c+βBCI ∗BCIi,t +βGDP∗GDPi,t +ψi,t (3.10)
DAi,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if D¯Ai,t ≥ 0
0 otherwise
ψi,t ∼ N(0,σ)
with A ∈ {CPI,WGI} and t ∈ [1995,2011].
For each year, these equations were estimated using a Bayesian Gibbs sampler al-
gorithm. The uncertainty of the corruption estimate was taken into account by using
a different generated value of the BCI index in each iteration of the Gibbs sampler.
Figure 3.7 summarizes the results by plotting the coefficients on BCI and GDP for
each year (the complete tables are in 3.C). These show that the availability of the
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WGI is influenced by the level of corruption in 1996, but only at the 10% signif-
icance level. For all other years, only the level of GDP plays a role. However,
the GDP data is only available for 189 countries and almost perfectly matches the
countries covered by WGI, meaning that these results should be interpreted with the
necessary caution.
The pattern is reversed in the case of the CPI where, with the exception of 2004,
there is evidence that its selection is significantly influenced by the level of cor-
ruption in all years. Initially CPI tends to cover less corrupt countries more, but
from the mid-00’s this pattern is turned upside down. In addition, the higher the
level of GDP, the more likely the country will be covered by the CPI. Regardless of
the direction of the effect, the fact that the level of corruption influences whether a
country is covered or not strongly cautions against using the (early values of the)
CPI in statistical research as they are likely to produce biased results.
3.7 Robustness checks
3.7.1 Stability of the parameters
In contrast to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the parameters of the mea-
surement equation are assumed to be constant over time (eqn. 3.5). In order to test
the validity of this assumption, the model was run for five (overlapping) periods to
see whether the parameters remain stable: 1995-2005, 1997-2007, 2000-2010 and
2002-2012. Because many of the indicators are only available for a couple of years,
the dataset was restricted to the five variables that have sufficient observations in all
periods to run the model: EIU, PRC, PRS, WCY and WMO.
Figure 3.8 shows the empirical distribution function of the slope parameter Z for
the different sub-periods. It clearly shows that while there are small differences,
these are not significant for any of the variables. This is confirmed in table 3.7
where the results of a formal, two-sided test are presented. The null-hypothesis that
the parameters of the subset are equal to those of the baseline model can never be
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(a) Corruption only
(b) Including GDP
Figure 3.7: Selection bias in CPI and WGI
Plot of the expected value (black crosses) and 95% highest posterior density interval (blue
triangles) of the coefficient of BCI and GDP in equations 3.9 and 3.10 for different years.
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Figure 3.8: Stability slope parameter Z
Plot of the parameter values of Z estimated over different time periods: 1995-2012 (bold blue line),
1995-2005 (full line), 1997-2007 (dashed line), 2000-2010 (dash-dotted line),
2002-2012 (dotted line).
rejected.6 In other words, the assumption that these coefficients are constant over
time should not affect the resulting indicator.
3.7.2 Keeping Ti fixed for all countries
In contrast to the parameters of the measurement equation,(C Z and H) the time-
dependence parameter (Ti) can be different for each country. Considering the cost
in degrees of freedom this imposes, this section considers setting Ti equal to τ for
each country. Re-estimating the model under this restriction returns very similar
expected values (table 3.8). The within correlation further increases to 98% when
only the values from 1995 onwards are compared (removing the period when only
a couple of indicators are available). The effect of keeping T fixed on the standard
deviations on the other hand is stronger: their average size increases with 30% while
their overall correlation with those of the baseline model is only 0.782.
6If the H0 ∶ βs = βo, H1 ∶ βs ≠ βo and E [βs] < E [βo], the p-value is computed as: 2∗ p(βs > βo).
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Table 3.7: Stability of the slope parameter Z
Overall 1995 1997 2000 2002
PRS Mean 0.03 0.034 0.041 0.034 0.036
St.dev. −0.006 −0.008 −0.013 −0.008 −0.009
p-value(a) 0.683 0.435 0.665 0.565
WMO Mean 0.037 0.045 0.051 0.04 0.039
St.dev. −0.005 −0.006 −0.01 −0.006 −0.007
p-value(a) 0.344 0.199 0.711 0.829
PRC Mean −0.036 −0.045 −0.05 −0.038 −0.037
St.dev. −0.006 −0.006 −0.015 −0.006 −0.007
p-value(a) 0.243 0.323 0.756 0.905
EIU Mean 0.036 0.043 0.049 0.038 0.038
St.dev. −0.006 −0.006 −0.011 −0.007 −0.008
p-value(a) 0.383 0.258 0.75 0.804
WCY Mean 0.035 0.043 0.049 0.038 0.037
St.dev. −0.007 −0.011 −0.007 −0.006 −0.005
p-value(a) 0.529 0.166 0.755 0.824(a)p-value of the 2-sided test of the equality of the overall parameter to the parameter of the
1995/1997/2000/2002 subset.
When the restriction is split up into Ti = Tj, ∀i ≠ j almost 10% is rejected (at 5%
significance level) using the values from the baseline model. Moreover, comparing
each value of Ti from the baseline model with the posterior density of τ, more than
a quarter is found to be significantly different at 5% significance level. In other
words, similar to what was found in table 3.2, the persistence in the level of cor-
ruption is high for the majority of countries, but there are some where the level of
corruption changes more quickly. While the Bayes factor is lower for models with
more variables (all other things equal), it nevertheless finds that the baseline model
outperforms the model where Ti = τ:
ln[BFbaseline,Ti=τ] = 1566.
In addition to keeping Ti fixed, one could also impose a unit root on the BCI index
and estimate the model in first differences. There are however a number of problems
with the corruption data that undermine the usefulness of this approach. The most
important one is that the variation in the corruption data is mostly cross-sectional,
which is lost when using first differences. In addition, because not all indicators
are available on a yearly basis, 29 of the 69 indicators drop from the dataset and
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Table 3.8: Correlations between the different corruption indicators
Overall Within Between
BCI - BCITi=τ 0.990 0.683 0.993
BCI - BCIGrouped 0.968 0.713 0.971
WGI - BCIGrouped 0.975 0.455 0.977
BCI - BCIBlock−diag 0.974 0.753 0.977
BCIGrouped - BCIBlock−diag 0.998 0.964 0.999
BCI - BCIpersistence 0.970 0.661 0.963
Between correlation is defined as the correlation between the average values of countries; The
within correlation is the correlation between the demeaned values of all countries.
the number of non-missing observations is reduced by 30%. As a result, the within
correlation of the first-differences model with WGI, CPI and the baseline BCI is
only 0.12, 0.05 and 0.25, respectively.
3.7.3 Grouping indicators per source
The BCI index is computed under the assumption that the indicators do not have
a shared measurement error: E[ε(k),ε(m)] = 0, ∀ k ≠ m. However, it is unlikely
that indicators coming from the same source do not share a certain ideological or
methodological bias. While ignoring the cross-correlation will not skew the drawn
values of Z, C and H in step A (figure 3.2)7, the same cannot be said of the estima-
tion of α in step B.
To control for cross-correlation, the WGI first groups all observations coming from
the same source using a simple average. While grouping the indicators avoids the
cross-correlation problem, it introduces two potential new ones. Firstly, using the
average ignores the underlying variability of the individual indicators (a generated
variable bias). For example, when one sub-indicator gives a score of 0/10 and an-
other 10/10, the average is seen as equally reliable as a source where both sub-
indicators rate 5/10. As a result, the size of the confidence intervals would be driven
down.
In addition, the composition of the indicators per source changes from year to year
7The measurement equation is a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model with identical inde-
pendent variables, meaning that its estimates are mathematically identical to running k independent
linear regressions.
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because of missing values, especially in firm and household surveys. This means
that a change in the average value of the indicator could simply be the result of a
different composition per source. This measurement error would in turn increase
the size of the confidence intervals.
To illustrate, the index was recomputed using the average values per source. Table
3.8 shows that the grouped indicator lies somewhere in between the BCI and WGI
values. The main difference when grouping data lies in the size of their predicted
standard errors. They are on average 15% smaller for the grouped indicator: 0.210
(grouped) versus 0.245 (BCI). This indicates that the negative effect of the generated
variable bias on size of the confidence intervals outweighs the positive effect of the
measurement error and loss of information.
3.7.4 H block-diagonal
A more straightforward solution is to simply allow variables from the same source
to have a shared measurement error: E[ε(k),ε(m)] ∈R, if k and m originate from the
same source. The effect on the estimation procedure remains limited. When draw-
ing values for α the variance matrix H is now block-diagonal rather than diagonal
(step A, figure 3.2). In addition, the diagonal elements of H can no longer be drawn
separately for each indicator (step B). Instead, they are now drawn per cluster in the
style of a seemingly unrelated regression model8.
The many missing variables do complicate matters, in that the clusters cannot sim-
ply be defined as indicators coming from the same source. Some indicators do not
share enough observations to enable them to be grouped. More specifically, there
are 17 such variables, six of which are treated as individual data and others that
can still be clustered in smaller groups. The complete list can be found in the last
column of 3.B where the exceptions are marked in bold.
Table 3.8 lists the correlations between the block-diagonal, the original and the
grouped index and the WGI. It shows that the block-diagonal indicator is close to
8This approach differs from that of Høyland et al. (2012), who account for group-specific shocks
by using a group-specific error term in addition to an idiosyncratic one.
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perfectly correlated with the grouped indicator on the overall as well as the between
and the within level. However, as with the grouped indicator the real difference
lies in the predicted standard errors. The average standard deviation of the block-
diagonal indicator is 0.2409, which is larger than that of the grouped indicator but
smaller than the baseline model.
To put the changes in significance in perspective, 3.D lists the significant changes in
corruption between 2000 and 2010 according to the block-diagonal indicator. Only
3 of the 47 countries appear in the same place as in table 3.5. Interestingly, quite
a few countries whose change was identified using the WGI index but not using
the BCI index are now also found to have changed significantly. In other words,
ignoring the cross-correlation in the corruption indicators does have an impact on
the combined indicator.
Finally, the majority of the estimated cross-correlations is significant at the 5% level
(155 of the 195). The validity of the added cross-correlation is confirmed by the
bayes factor: ln[BFbaseline,Hdiag] = −2139.
3.7.5 Persistent measurement errors
An alternative adjustment to the measurement equation is to allow the individual
indicators to make persistent measurement errors, in other words letting some indi-
cators persistently under- or overestimate the level of corruption. To that end, the
equation 3.5 is adjusted to include an error term following an AR(1) process:
yi,t = C+Zαi,t +εi,t (3.11)
εi,t = Dεi,t−1+ξi,t (3.12)
ξi,t ∼ N(0,H) (3.13)
with D a diagonal matrix and D(κ,κ) = 0 if the indicator yκ is not available on a
yearly basis. The changes to the estimation procedure are outlined in 3.A.3.
Similar to what happened when Ti = τ, the expected values of the BCI change little
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when adding persistent measurement errors (table 3.8). The standard deviations on
the other hand are more affected: they increase by 30% over the entire sample, and
even 60% when comparing from 1995 onwards.
While the parameter values of D seem to indicate that the persistence measurement
errors are a valid addition to the model (Figure 3.9), the Bayes factor nevertheless
prefers both the baseline and the cross-correlated model to the model with persistent
measurement errors.
ln[BFbaseline, persistence] = 4865
ln[BFHdiag, persistence] = 7079
Figure 3.9: Persistence of the measurement errors (Dκ,κ)
Plot of the expected value for the diagonal elements of D (circles) and their 95% highest posterior
density interval (blue triangles).
3.8 Conclusion
The Bayesian Corruption Indicator (available at www.sherppa.be) improves on the
existing corruption indicators in a number of ways.
From a practical point of view, the BCI indicator can predict the level of corrup-
tion with greater certainty and increases coverage. The possibility of capturing the
shared measurement error of certain corruption indicators further enhances the reli-
ability of the estimates and is found to be the model that fits the corruption data best.
Allowing some indicators to persistently under- or overestimate the actual level of
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corruption has little influence on the expected values of the BCI index, although the
effect on the standard deviations is more substantial.
By taking the time-aspect into account, the model more effectively filters out ran-
dom measurement errors, leading to more stable estimates. Most importantly, the
BCI index does not suffer from the serious selection bias issues that plague the Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index. Finally, because the estimation of the BCI returns the
entire distribution of corruption, it makes it possible to say whether or not the level
of corruption significantly increased or decreased over time with greater accuracy.
From an estimation point of view, the underlying assumptions of the BCI model
are explicitly stated, making it a very transparent approach. The combination with
the solution to missing data points also eliminates the need for additional assump-
tions, imputations or sub-level aggregations, further increasing the objectivity of the
index.
Lastly, from a theoretical perspective, the parameter values and Bayes factors clearly
indicate that the time-dependence of corruption and cross-correlated errors are valid
additions to the state-space model. Moreover, in most countries the level of persis-
tence is very close to one, meaning that the utmost caution has to be used when
regressing corruption on other non-stationary series. It also invalidates any regres-
sions on stationary data as they should lead to insignificant results.
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Appendices
3.A Estimation
3.A.1 Priors
Flat probabilities
Because the state-space model is estimated in a Bayesian framework, it is necessary
to specify the prior distribution of the parameters. However, since there is no prior
information available on the parameters of the measurement equation, Z, C and
log(H), flat probabilities are used for these variables. This means that all values in
R are equally probable. It is important to note that the WGI or CPI indexes cannot
be used as sources of prior information, seeing that they are based on the same data
sources used in the estimations.
p(Z) ∝ 1(k,1) (3.14)
p(C) ∝ 1(k,1) (3.15)
p(log(H)) ∝ Ik (3.16)
with 1(k,1) a (k×1) vector of ones, Ik an identity matrix of size (k×k) and k the total
number of individual indicators.
For the state equation, there is a prior restriction on Ti that its absolute value does
not exceed one, for all countries i. This ensures that αi,t is a non-explosive time
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series, without precluding non-stationary series.
p(T) = 0.5∗1∣T ∣≤1 (3.17)
Finally, as an identifying assumption, the variance of the state equation, Q, is set to
one.
Actual probabilities
As a robustness check, the model was also estimated using actual, but uninformative
prior probabilities. However, the resulting indicator did differ from the one using
flat probabilities.
Z∣H ∼ N(0, 1
2
); (3.18)
C∣H ∼ N(0, 1
2
); (3.19)
H ∼ iWish(8,4); (3.20)
T ∣Q ∼ N(0, 1
2
Q). (3.21)
with iWish the inverse Wishart distribution.
To see why these probabilities are uninformative, consider first of all that the yearly
change in corruption has been set to have a standard deviation of one (Q = 1). How-
ever, we expect the level of corruption to have a high persistence, which implies that
the standard deviation of worldwide α values will be greater than one. Secondly all
individual indicators are normalized to mean 0 and standard deviation one. Substi-
tuting this into the measurement equation (3.5), it follows that the parameter values
C, Z should be smaller than one if the indicator is to be informative. Similarly the
measurement error should have a standard deviation smaller than one.
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3.A.2 Gibbs sampler
As was explained, the Gibbs sampler allows us to split the estimation process up in
two main blocks, which can then be further divided into a number of easily solvable
subroutines (Kim and Nelson, 1999):
A. Conditioning on the values for α = (α1,0, ...,α1,n, ...,αp,1, ...,αp,n)′, the state and
measurement equation are reduced to simple linear regressions:
p(T ∣α,Q) ∝ .5∗1∣T ∣≤1 ∗N[bOLS(αt ,αt−1); (α′t−1αt−1)−1Q] (3.22)
p(Z,C∣α,y,H) ∝ N(bOLS(y,[α,1]),([α,1]′[α,1])−1H] (3.23)
p(H ∣α,y) ∝ iWish[e′e; n] (3.24)
with e ≡ y−Tα and bOLS(Y,X) ≡ (X ′X)−1(X ′Y)
B. Conditional on the parameters of the state and measurement equations, the prob-
ability of the ‘true’ level of corruption can be computed and drawn from using
the Carter and Kohn (1994) simulation smoother.
• The Kalman filter
Starting from a wild guess, p(α0) = N(0,∞), the following equations are
iteratively solved for t = 1 to t = n:
at∣t = E(αt ∣y1, ...,yt)= T ∗at−1∣t−1+κ(yt −C−ZTat−1∣t−1) (3.25)
pt∣t = V(αt ∣y1, ...,yt)= pt∣t−1+κZpt−1∣t−1 (3.26)
with κ = pt∣t−1Z′(Zpt∣t−1Z′+H)−1; and pt∣t−1 = T pt−1∣t−1T ′+Q.
• Simulation smoother
The simulation smoother algorithm is used to draw values for α for each
country one at a time. Starting from the last iteration of the Kalman filter,
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draw αˆn from N(an∣n; pn∣n) and iterate backwards from t = n−1 to t = 1:
at∣n = E(αt ∣y1, ...yn)= at∣t +ς(aˆt+1∣n−Tat∣t) (3.27)
pt∣n = V(αt ∣y1, ...yn)= pt∣t +ς(pt+1∣n−T pt∣tT ′−Q)ς′ (3.28)
with ς = pt∣tT ′p−1t+1∣t ; and aˆt+1∣n a random draw from N(at+1∣n; pt+1∣n).
3.A.3 Persistent measurement errors
In order to estimate the model including persistent measurement errors, the model
first has to be rewritten in the standard state-space form:
yi,t = C+ [Z Ik]⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
αi,t
εi,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (3.29)⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
αi,t
εi,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ti 0(1,k))
0(k,1) D
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
αi,t−1
εi,t−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
µi,t
ξi,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (3.30)
It can subsequently be estimated much in the same way as described above with
equation 3.29 and 3.30 as the measurement and state equation, respectively. One
important difference is that the parameter values Z and C are now computed and
drawn conditionally on α, H and D using the following equation:
yi,t −Dyi,t−1 = (1−D)C−Z(1(k,1) αi,t −D 1(k,1) αi,t)+εi,t −D εi,t−1= (1−D)C−Z(1(k,1) αi,t −D 1(k,1) αi,t)+ξi,t
with ξi,t ∼N(0,H).
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3.A.4 Standardization
Setting the variance of the state equation, Q, to one gives us mean values for α that
lie between -23 and 31. These were normalized such that the expected value for all
countries has mean zero and standard deviation one. Each drawn value of α( j) is
modified in the following way:
BCI( j) = α( j)i,t − α¯( 1p∑pi=1 1n∑nt=1 (α¯i,t − α¯)2) 12
with α( j)i,t the value of α for country i at time t in the jth iteration; α¯i,t is the mean of
alpha over all iterations, and α¯ is the mean over all iterations, years and countries.
The BCI index for country i at time t and its variance is then respectively the mean
and variance of BCI( j)i,t with respect to j.
yearly standardization
The normalization used in the WGI on the other hand is such that the mean values
for all countries has a yearly mean of zero and standard deviation one.
BCI( j) = α( j)i,t − 1p∑pi=1 α¯i,t( 1p∑pi=1(α¯i,t − 1p∑pi=1 α¯i,t)2) 12
3.A.5 Convergence
The Gibbs sampler algorithm ran 100,000 iterations of which the first 50,000 were
discarded as burn-in. To ensure that the model has converged, the draws of the
(more than 400) parameters of state and measurement equation were individually
examined using simple plotted values, autocorrelation functions and a rolling win-
dow CUMSUMs. Figure 3.10 illustrates this for the parameter Z(41,1). All plots
point to a well-behaved, converged distribution, which is what is found for the other
parameters as well.
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Figure 3.10: Convergence statistics for Z(41,1)
Top left: simple plot of all drawn values; top right: the empirical distribution function; bottom left:
the autocorrelation function; and bottom right: the rolling window CUMSUM statistic, with 95%
significance bounds (window: 1000 draws).
3.A.6 Model selection
Chibbs’ method enables the computation of the marginal probability of complex
models using any collection of parameter values θ⋆ (Carlin and Louis, 2000):
log pˆ(y∣Mi) = log f (y∣Mi,θ⋆)+ log p(θ⋆∣Mi)− log p(θ⋆∣Mi,y) (3.31)
with θ⋆ = (C⋆,Z⋆,H⋆,T⋆i ) for the baseline, cross-correlated and Ti = τ models, θ⋆ =(C⋆,Z⋆,H⋆) when T is set to zero, and θ⋆ = (C⋆,Z⋆,D⋆,H⋆,T⋆i ) for the model with
persistent measurement errors. In our computations, the expected parameter values
from the converged models were used as θ⋆.
The last term in equation 3.31 can be split up into a number of conditional proba-
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bilities in the following way (suppressing the Mi term to keep notation simple):
log p(C⋆,Z⋆,H⋆∣y) = log p(C⋆,Z⋆∣H⋆,α⋆,y)
+ log p(H⋆∣α⋆,y)
+ log p(α⋆∣y) (3.32)
log p(C⋆,Z⋆,H⋆,T⋆i ∣y) = log p(C⋆,Z⋆∣H⋆,T⋆i ,α⋆,y)+ log p(H⋆∣T⋆i ,α⋆,y)+ log p(T⋆∣α⋆,y)
+ log p(α⋆∣y) (3.33)
log p(C⋆,Z⋆,D⋆,H⋆,T⋆i ∣y) = log p(C⋆,Z⋆∣y,D⋆,H⋆,T⋆i ,α⋆,y)+ log p(D⋆∣H⋆,T⋆i ,α⋆,y)+ log p(H⋆∣T⋆i ,α⋆,y)+ log p(T⋆∣α⋆)
+ log p(α⋆∣y) (3.34)
When conditioning on α⋆, the distributions of C, Z, D and H do not depend on Ti,
and vice versa, which simplifies the computations significantly. Carlin and Louis
(2000, chapter 6.2) explain in detail how to calculate these conditional probabilities,
where it should be noted that p(H⋆∣T⋆i ,α⋆,y), p(H⋆∣α⋆,y) and p(D⋆∣H⋆,T⋆i ,α⋆,y)
require an additional Gibbs sampler to be run. In addition, p(α⋆∣y) is computed
using the Kalman smoother. Lastly, the Bayes factor is not defined when using flat
priors, which is why the actual (uninformative) priors from 3.A.1 are used, where
D has the same prior as T .
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3.B Summary of the used corruption indicators
Table 3.9: Summary of the used corruption indicators
Corr.
Source Name Indicator Obs BCI group
African Development
Bank(A)
ADB Transparency, accountability and corruption in
public sector
388 0.618 1
Afrobarometer How many of the following people are in-
volved in corruption:
AFR2 ... elected leaders 64 -0.4 2
AFR3 ... civil servants 64 -0.533 2
AFR4 ... president 54 -0.591 2
AFR5 ... police 54 -0.72 2
AFR6 ... judges and magistrates 54 -0.701 2
Asian Development
Bank(A)
ASD Transparency, accountability and corruption in
public sector
192 0.388 3
Business Environ-
ment and Enterprise
Frequency of unofficial payments/gifts...
performance Survey BPS1 ... to deal with occupational health and safety
inspections
61 -0.375 4
BPS2 ... to deal with fire and building inspections 61 -0.667 4
BPS3 ... to deal with environmental inspections 61 -0.596 4
BPS8 ... to deal with customs/imports 117 -0.533 4
BPS12 ... to get connected to public services 86 -0.553 4
BPS13 ... to get licenses and permits 86 -0.662 4
BPS14 ... to deal with taxes and tax collection 117 -0.689 4
BPS15 ... when dealing with courts 117 -0.53 4
BPS19 ... to influence the contents of new laws 86 -0.23 4
BPS30 ... obtain government contracts 86 -0.24 4
BPS10 % of annual sales typically paid in bribes by a
firm like yours
117 -0.284 4
BPS11 How corrupt/honest are court systems? 117 0.182 4
BPS20 Frequency of informal payments to get things
done
117 -0.629 4
BPS21 % of contract value typically paid as bribe in
government contract
117 -0.271 4
BPS26 Total annual informal payment 31 -0.335 19
BPS27 Firms in my line of business know in advance
how much to bribe
86 -0.535 4
Economist Intelli-
gence Unit(A)
EIU Corruption among public officials 1840 0.893 5
Freedom House - Na-
tions in transit
FRH Control of corruption 382 -0.777 6
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Table 3.9: Summary of the used corruption indicators
Corr.
Source Name Indicator Obs BCI group
Global Corruption
Barometer (TI)
Perceptions of corruption for each of the fol-
lowing institutions:
GCB1 ... political parties 421 -0.466 7
GCB2 ... parliament/ legislature 421 -0.601 7
GCB10 ... police 349 -0.484 7
GCB11 ... business/ private sector 351 -0.695 7
GCB12 ... media 251 -0.821 28
GCB13 ... public officials/ civil servants 251 -0.681 28
GCB14 ... judiciary 251 -0.59 28
GCB15 ... NGOs 250 -0.769 28
GCB16 ... religious bodies 131 -0.895 20
GCB3 ... military 350 -0.806 7
GCB4 ... education system 421 -0.161 7
GCB5 ... registry and permit 421 0.058 7
GCB6 ... medical services 169 -0.635 27
GCB7 ... utilities 420 -0.765 7
GCB8 ... tax revenue 352 -0.223 7
GCB9 ... customs 350 0.184 7
corruption affects
GCB27 ... politics 239 -0.455 26
GCB28 ... business environment 239 -0.387 26
GCB29 ... personal life 239 -0.662 26
Global Competitive-
ness Survey
GCS1 Public trust in politicians 923 0.849 8
GCS2 Diversion of public funds 923 0.967 8
How common are bribes in...
GCS3 ... export-import 1062 0.928 8
GCS4 ... utilities 1062 0.899 8
GCS5 ... tax collection 1062 0.914 8
GCS6 ... public contracts 1062 0.945 8
GCS7 ... judicial decisions 1062 0.936 8
Gallup World Poll GWP Is corruption in government widespread? 967 0.634 9
IFAD rural sector per-
formance
IFD Transparency, accountability and corruption in
rural areas
856 0.515 10
Institutional Profiles
Database
IPD1 Level of "petty corruption" 257 0.858 11
IPD2 Level of "large-scale corruption" 257 0.835 11
Latinobarometer LBO1 The biggest problem in the country is corrup-
tion
260 -0.242 12
LBO3 Evolution of corruption over the past 5 years 68 0.229 24
LBO4 How serious is the corruption problem 51 0.419 24
LBO6 % of corrupt civil servants 54 -0.777 22
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Table 3.9: Summary of the used corruption indicators
Corr.
Source Name Indicator Obs BCI group
LBO8 Probability of bribing a police man 37 -0.7 25
LBO9 Probability of bribing a judge 37 -0.76 25
LBO10 Probability of bribing someone in a ministry 37 -0.677 21
Country Policy and
Institutional Assess-
ment
PIA Transparency, accountability and corruption in
the public sector
536 0.634 13
Political and Eco-
nomic Risk Consul-
tancy in Asia(A)
PRC To what extent does corruption exist and hinder
business
189 -0.942 14
International Country
Risk Guide (PRS)
PRS Control of corruption 3868 0.766 15
Vanderbilt VAB1 The most serious problem facing the country is
corruption
92 -0.352 16
VAB4 Level of corruption in political parties 21 0.023
VAB5 Level of corruption in public officials 91 0.47 16
World Competitive-
ness Yearbook
WCY Bribing and corruption exist in the economy 928 0.956 17
Global insight(A) WMO Control of corruption 2538 0.903 18(A)Data from WGI: www.govindicators.org
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3.C Selection bias in WGI and CPI
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Table
3.11:
Selection
bias
regressions:corruption
and
G
D
P
W
G
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2000
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-
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(0.3805)
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G
D
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-
35168.9907***
-
12360.5732***
-
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-
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(2858.59)
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-
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-
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-
2.1772***
-
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186
187
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188
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C
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2.6186***
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-
-
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(0.5336)
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(0.5152)
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187
187
187
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188
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0.4737***
1.285***
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(0.148)
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(0.2013)
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179
179
179
total
188
188
188
189
189
189
189
189
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3.D Changes in the block-diagonal BCI
Table 3.12: Changes in the level of the block-diagonal BCI between 2000 to 2010
Deteriorated (BCI decreased) Improved (BCI increased)
1% GreeceWGI GeorgiaWGI QatarWGI
ItalyWGI MacedoniaWGI RwandaWGI
5% Fiji Senegal Algeria Paraguay
Great BritainWGI South Africa Bangladesh Saudi Arabia
Kuwait Turkmenistan Indonesia SerbiaWGI
Madagascar Japan Slovenia
Malaysia Lesotho Turkey
Moldova Liberia
10% Brazil USA Congo, Dem. Rep. Latvia
Burkina Faso Cuba Palestine
Hungary Djibouti Serbia and
Iran Ghana Montenegro
Papua New Guinea Hong Kong UAEWGI
Philippines Iraq Uruguay
Trinidad and Tobago Jordan Zambia
not EritreaWGI
VenezuelaWGI
List of the countries whose level of corruption changed significantly between 2000 and
2010 according to the cross-correlated BCI. WGI indicates whether the change was detected
using WGI.
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3.E Variance decomposition
Table 3.13: Variance decomposition and goodness of fit of the measurement equation
R2overall R
2
between R
2
within R
2
overall R
2
between R
2
within
GCS2 0.924 0.945 0.538 GCB6 0.385 0.378 0.095
WCY 0.916 0.96 0.165 ADB 0.383 0.418 0.012
PRC 0.875 0.932 0.083 GCB2 0.351 0.243 0.084
GCS6 0.873 0.929 0.561 GCB14 0.344 0.348 0.001
GCS7 0.869 0.902 0.492 BPS3 0.329 0.475 0.397
GCS3 0.843 0.912 0.499 AFR3 0.308 0.42 0.003
GCS5 0.827 0.858 0.5 AFR4 0.306 0.372 0.186
WMO 0.821 0.876 0.056 BPS27 0.285 0.659 0.341
EIU 0.802 0.854 0.031 BPS12 0.282 0.389 0.29
GCS4 0.8 0.834 0.413 BPS8 0.282 0.513 0.032
GCB16 0.791 0.782 0.085 BPS15 0.274 0.446 0.023
IPD1 0.742 0.769 0.003 IFD 0.272 0.343 0.002
GCS1 0.71 0.733 0.199 GCB10 0.226 0.203 0.039
FRH 0.702 0.758 0.072 VAB5 0.215 0.43 0.007
IPD2 0.695 0.758 0.002 GCB1 0.21 0.11 0.058
GCB12 0.668 0.672 0.013 GCB27 0.201 0.156 0.023
GCB3 0.633 0.565 0.068 LBO4 0.188 0.314 0.003
LBO6 0.624 0.725 0 AFR2 0.17 0.243 0.017
GCB15 0.58 0.608 0 GCB28 0.144 0.153 0.007
GCB7 0.579 0.419 0.033 ASD 0.124 0.207 0.034
LBO9 0.56 0.658 0.001 BPS1 0.121 0.215 0.333
PRS 0.545 0.758 0.105 VAB1 0.115 0.266 0.004
AFR5 0.514 0.538 0.005 BPS10 0.086 0.365 0.083
AFR6 0.495 0.531 0.065 BPS26 0.082 0.082 −
BPS14 0.488 0.527 0.06 LBO1 0.079 0.364 0.037
GCB11 0.475 0.479 0.013 BPS21 0.072 0.248 0.026
GCB13 0.462 0.47 0 BPS11 0.065 0.176 0.086
LBO8 0.457 0.538 0.011 LBO3 0.062 0.149 0.001
BPS2 0.443 0.556 0.46 GCB8 0.046 0.013 0.014
LBO10 0.431 0.517 0.017 GCB9 0.04 0.087 0.068
GCB29 0.428 0.414 0.01 BPS30 0.037 0.149 0.039
BPS20 0.415 0.648 0.01 BPS19 0.034 0.077 0.092
BPS13 0.401 0.596 0.212 GCB4 0.024 0 0.031
PIA 0.396 0.427 0.017 GCB5 0.004 0.009 0.001
GWP 0.39 0.412 0.129 VAB4 0.002 0.002 −
List of the R2 of the measurement equation for each indicator of corruption, in descending order of
their goodness of fit. The last two columns decompose the overall R2 into its between and within
components (Verbeek, 2010).


4 | Measuring Actual Economic
Integration - An outline of a
Bayesian state-space approach1
Abstract
In spite of the spectacular growth of integration agreements, there does not exist a
standard, systematic index that measures regional integration. The most likely rea-
son for this dearth is that it is hard to capture this complex and multidimensional
process in a single indicator. Even the most basic definition of regional integration
encompasses many different aspects, increasing the difficulty of finding appropriate
data exponentially. This chapter proposes using the state-space model to construct
an index of the level of integration. The versatility of this approach allows us to
capture the multidimensional nature of integration, even when using data of varying
quality and availability. We build a bilateral index of the level of Actual Economic
Integration, capturing trade in goods and services, migration and financial flows.
Gravity model estimations reveal that while the EU and Nafta were closed between
countries that were already highly integrated, these agreements succeeded in further
raising the level of economic integration both in the short and long term.
Keywords: Actual economic integration; State-space model; Gravity equation;
1This chapter is the result of joint work together with Prof. Dr. Glenn Rayp.
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Free trade agreements.
JEL: F15; F55; C43.
4.1 Introduction
Despite widespread academic and policy interest and in contrast with other aspects
of institutional and international economics (e.g. governance or globalization) there
does not exist a standard, systematic index of regional integration. Such a measure
could be used to determine the trends in the world economy more precisely (e.g.
the link between globalization and regionalization), to monitor integration policy
initiatives more accurately and to assess the effectiveness of current or past policy
initiatives (e.g. indicating good practices). Nevertheless, in their review, De Lom-
baerde et al. (2008, p.2) note that ‘only a few attempts have been undertaken to
design composite indices of regional integration and no proposal has been system-
atically and continuously used as a policy tool.’
The most plausible explanations for this lack are data availability and methodolog-
ical issues. Regional integration is a complex and multidimensional process and
therefore difficult to capture in a single or even a few indicators. Typically, a larger
set of indicators is used, usually of very different quality in which scoring by the
analyst is not uncommon.
Studies of the efficacy of regional integration agreements such as the EU or Nafta
have for the most part focused on the effect on bilateral trade flows. However, re-
gional integration agreements typically also include provisions dealing with trade
in services, migration and financial flows. Moreover, the determinants of these bi-
lateral flows are analyzed using the same estimation framework: the gravity model.
This means that an index of the overall level of integration would allow us to com-
bine these analyses into a single study that matches the scope of the agreements.
Constructing an indicator that integrates the information of all the available data,
immediately brings up the question of how to summarize (i.e. aggregate) the in-
dividual indicators and which weighting scheme to use. For example, Feng and
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Genna (2003) follow Hufbauer and Scott (1994) in their construction of Integration
Achievement Scores by using the simple arithmetic average of the categories that
measure distinct components of (institutional) regional integration. The index of
institutional regional integration in Dorrucci et al. (2004) is also computed as an
unweighted average of assigned achievement scores in each of the Balassa stages in
regional integration. This index is subsequently linked to a set of indicators of ac-
tual economic integration in order to study causal effects. In UNECA (2001, 2002,
2004) the composite index is constructed as a weighted mean: first at the country
level taking expert opinions as the basis of the weighting scheme; Second at the
regional level, using country GDPs as weights. Dennis and Yusof (2003) take as
composite integration indicator the simple arithmetic average of a small subset of
their key indicators. Finally, the UN-ESCWA (2006) report uses a principal com-
ponent analysis to compute the level of actual integration of Arab countries.
In this contribution, we propose a new approach to constructing a regional integra-
tion indicator, that is a bayesian state-space approach, which can circumvent the
data quality and availability issues allowing a systematic and continuous use.
De Lombaerde et al. (2011) formulate a three-step method in constructing a com-
posite index. The first step concerns the principles on which the individual in-
dicators of the index should be based: relevance, accuracy and credibility, data
availability, timeliness and comparability. Often, these principles are (partially) ne-
glected out of necessity: the lack of indicators that take the multidimensionality of
regional integration into account compels to use incomplete or inaccurate data. Of
course, this is common to whichever method is used to construct an aggregate in-
dicator. However, in contrast to other methods that have been used, the state-space
approach can take the uncertainty of the data into account as well as correct for
missing values in a statistically transparent way.
The second step of De Lombaerde et al. (2011) refers to the classification of the
variables according to particular aspects of regional integration, e.g. the distinction
between indicators of the actual integration process and the institutional character-
istics. The state-space approach allows for such a functional distinction between
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the indicators and can deal with this in two ways: either as separate composite in-
dices, which can be further used for analytical purposes, or as components of a
more general index, in which case their respective weights are informative about
the impact on the integration process just like their correlation gives an indication
of their complementarity.
The third and final step of De Lombaerde et al. (2011) consists of the construction
of the composite regional integration index, in particular the issues of the deter-
mination of the weighting scheme for the indicators (e.g. statistical or not) and
the method of aggregation (e.g. arithmetic mean or more involved). There, the
bayesian state-space approach offers the advantage of making fewer assumptions in
determining the indicators’ weights and of being more transparent in the aggrega-
tion.
In the next section, we describe the principles of the bayesian state-space method-
ology. We keep this description brief and refer the interested reader to more formal
and thorough treatments of the subject. To show the potential of the approach, the
third section discusses the construction of an indicator of actual economic integra-
tion at the bilateral country level for the member countries of the OECD. For these
countries a sufficiently large amount of data is available that due account can be
taken of the multidimensionality of regional integration. Based on this first ap-
plication, we consider in the fifth section the extensions that the method allows.
Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
4.2 Methodology
This section only aims to give a limited overview of the state-space methodology.
For more information on state-space models and how to estimate them, see Kim and
Nelson (1999) or Durbin and Koopman (2012). More detailed information on this
particular model can also be found in Standaert (2014) where it is used to combine
indicators of corruption.
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4.2.1 The state-space model
The main idea in the state-space model is to estimate the unknown overall level of
regional integration RI (the state variable), using the information in the different
indicators of regional integration, y.2 In order to understand how this happens, it is
necessary to go back to the two equations that define its workings: the measurement
(4.1) and state equation (4.2).
yi,t = C+Z ∗RIi,t +εi,t (4.1)
RIi,t = Ti∗RIi,t−1+νi,t (4.2)
εi,t ∼ N(0,H) (4.3)
νi,t ∼ N(0,1) (4.4)
for all country-couples i ∈ [1,n] and years t ∈ [1,N].
The measurement equation states that the k indicators of regional integration yi,t
(e.g. the level of bilateral trade) depend on the overall level of integration RIi,t .
The error term εi,t captures differences in the quality of the indicators whether due
to measurement errors or because of the influence of factors other than the level
of integration. The better an indicator y( j) measures the level of integration, the
smaller the variance of the corresponding error term H( j, j).
The (1×k) vectors C and Z rescale the indicator variables to put them on equal foot-
ing. The intercept also controls for the possibility that an indicator covers only the
relatively higher or lower integrated, or that it consistently over- or underestimates
the level of integration. For example, a standardized index that covers relatively
more integrated countries would receive a negative intercept. The exact rescaling
parameters are indicator-specific, but are kept constant over time, t, and country-
couples, i. Similarly, all indicators can differ in terms of their reliability (H), but
2For the sake of readability, the notation is sometimes simplified. y( j) is a single indicator of
integration, j, for all country-couples and all years. yi,t is the vector of all indicators in a given
year, t, and for a given country-couple, i, while this vector for all years and all country-couples is
abbreviated to y.
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the reliability of an indicator does not change over time or country-couples.
The state equation (equation 4.2) allows the current level of integration to depend
on its past values. The level of dependence, Ti, can vary for each country-couple, i,
but is restricted to lie within the [-1,1] interval. This rules out ever-increasing values
for the RI index and ensures that the model converges to a steady solution. It does
not preclude non-stationarity in the level of regional integration.
Figure 4.1: Estimation using time dependency
Figure 4.1 illustrates the advantage of adding the time-dependency in the state equa-
tion. To the extent that the level of integration depends on its previous values, both
past and future information is used to predict what the level of integration is at time
t (step a). This prediction is governed by the state equation (equation 4.2): the
weaker the link between AEI and its preceding values, the more uncertain the pre-
diction becomes. This forecasted value is subsequently compared to the indicators
of integration today, yt , using the parameter values in the measurement equation
(equation 4.1). If the yt contains new information, the estimated level of integration
is adjusted (step b). The more reliable an indicator is, the bigger the influence of
step b is.
Because the RIi,t−1 and RIi,t+1 in turn depend on their past values and future val-
ues, the entire time-series is used when estimating the current level of integration.
The advantages are manifold. First of all, it significantly increases the number of
years for which the indicator can be reliably computed. Moreover, the increase in
information helps the algorithm to better distinguish between random measurement
errors and the actual changes in the level of integration. This results in smoother
estimates made with smaller confidence bounds.
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The main strength of the state-space model is the ease with which it handles missing
observations. Simply put, missing observations are replaced by information which
has absolutely no value: y(k)i,t = 0 and var(ε(k)i,t ) =∞. This allows the model to run
uninterruptedly without fundamentally changing the value of missing data. Because
the entire time-series is used when estimating the value of RI, this negates the need
to impute or otherwise manipulate missing data ex ante (Kim and Nelson, 1999;
Durbin and Koopman, 2012).
An additional advantage of this model is that it encapsulates a number of other
techniques. For example, if we assume that RI does not depend on its previous
values (T = 0) and all indicators have the same reliability (H( j, j) = cH), it can be
shown that this model will return a principal component analysis. If in addition it
is assumed that all indicators are scaled the same way (Z( j,1) = cZ and C( j,1) = cC),
then it returns a simple average.
In other words, the usefulness of the state-space approach follows directly from the
validity of the assumptions on the parameter values. If the level of integration is not
expected to depend on its previous values (T = 0) a principal component analysis
will suffice. However, if these assumptions are incorrect, using more simple tech-
niques discards information and could lead to incorrect conclusions. It also means
that it is possible to test the validity of the state-space model using its parameter
values.
4.2.2 Bayesian estimation
In order to estimate the state-space model, it is necessary to solve for RIi,t as well
as the parameters of the state and measurement equation: H, Z, C and T . As the
number of countries and years increases, this estimation becomes increasingly cum-
bersome. However, using a bayesian Gibbs sampler, it can be split up into different
sections that can be dealt with one at a time.
If the values for RIi,t were known, the state and measurement equations would be
simple linear regressions and we could easily compute and draw from their distribu-
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tions. Similarly, if the parameters were known, we could draw from the distribution
of RI using a simulation smoother (Durbin and Koopman, 2012). It can be shown
that by iteratively drawing from both distributions while conditioning on the last
drawn value, these draws will converge to the unconditional distribution. After dis-
carding the first non-converged values (the burn-in), the remaining drawn values
can be used to reconstitute the original unconditional distribution of RI as well as
those of the parameters. For more information on Bayesian econometrics and Gibbs
sampling see Lancaster (2004) and Koop et al. (2007).
Because this model is estimated in a Bayesian framework, it is necessary to be
explicit about the prior distribution of the parameters. However, seeing that there is
no ex-ante information on them we use flat priors. This means that these parameters
are not restricted in any way. The only variables that are limited are Ti, whose values
have to lie inside the [-1,1] interval, and the diagonal elements of the variance H,
whose values have to be strictly positive.
p(C) ∼ 1(1×k) (4.5)
p(Z) ∼ 1(1×k) (4.6)
p(log(H( j, j))) ∼ 1 ∀ j ∈ [1,k] (4.7)
p(Ti) = 0.5∗1[−1,1], ∀i ∈ [1,n] (4.8)
4.2.3 Rescaling to a ratio variable
As it is specified in equations 4.1−4.4, the state-space model returns an interval
variable. Lacking a fixed zero point, the index can still be compared over time
and countries, but ratios of the index would be meaningless. For example, we can
say that a country has become more/less integrated, but not that that its level of
integration has doubled/halved (cf. temperature in degrees Celsius vs. Fahrenheit).
The reason why the underlying indicators, even when they are ratio variables, are
translated into an index that is an interval variable is the intercept in the measure-
ment equations. Without it, the index would be zero if all the underlying variables
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are zero. However, simply setting C = 0 might cause other problems in the state-
space model as this parameter also controls for persistent over- and underestima-
tions and selection bias problems.
The solution is to leave the intercepts in the model, but rescale the index afterwards
to ensure that the expected value of RIi,t is zero when all underlying indicators are
zero. In each iteration of the Gibbs sampler, the expected value of the index is
computed when y = 0 (conditional on the parameters of the state-space model C,
Z, H and T ) and this is subtracted from the index. This rescaled index is a ratio
variable and will also double when all underlying indicators double making it much
easier to interpret.
4.3 An application to the OECD
4.3.1 Defining integration
This section illustrates the state-space approach by measuring the level of bilateral
integration between the members of the OECD. Specifically, it examines the level
of Actual Economic Integration (AEI) defined by Mongelli et al. (2005, p.6) as
‘the degree of interpenetration of economic activity among two or more countries
belonging to the same geographic area as measured at a given point in time.’
This definition is relatively narrow and puts strict limits on the variables to be in-
cluded. It excludes institutional or cultural integration and even within the concept
of economic integration it focuses on actual interpenetration of activities. This
implies that strictly speaking the co-movement of prices and GDP and other fac-
tors from the optimal-currency-area theory should not be included. In addition,
it focuses on actual integration as opposed to measuring the potential benefits of
integration (e.g. differences in factor endowments).
As a result, the RI indicator computed here is relatively neutral. It does not rely
on any specific (economic) theory on integration, nor does it treat integration as
necessarily good or bad. It simply measures the extent to which the economic flows
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of two countries are intertwined. Needless to say, this definition is but one of the
many possible choices and the state-space methodology can be easily expanded to
include different definitions of regional integration.
The unit of analysis in this study is country couples, and their integration is mea-
sured in a directional sense. In other words, the values of the index AEIA,B express
to what extent the bilateral economic flows between countries A and B are important
for country A. Allowing the values of AEIB,A to differ from AEIA,B makes sense in
a network where country size varies significantly. For example, that the German-
Estonian trade is important for Estonia does not necessarily imply that the same
holds for Germany.
It is important to note that even using Mongelli’s definition of integration, many
other units of analysis are possible. For instance it would also be possible to study
the level of integration of a country within a region. The choice of unit should
be primarily driven by the intended use of the indicator. The index of bilateral
integration defined here enables us to build a directed and weighted network of
integrated countries or use the indicator in a gravity model, but other uses require
different definitions and measurement units.
4.3.2 Data
Actual economic integration is measured on four levels, organized according to the
‘four freedoms’ of the European Single Market: flows of goods, flows of services,
FDI and other financial flows and migration. For each a distinction is made between
incoming and outgoing flows. Table 4.1 lists the different categories of economic
flows in more detail.
Table 4.1: Categories of integration variables
Goods Services Migration Financial flows
- Primary goods - Total flows - Foreign population - Foreign Direct Investment
- Manufactured goods - Seasonal workers - Equity
- Foreign workers - Debt securities
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In order to compare the importance of the flows over countries, these flows are
corrected for the size of the sender countries. Specifically, they are normalized both
using GDP (population in the case of migration) and as a percentage of total flows.
This means that for each category four different variables are used: incoming flows
to GDP, incoming flows to total flows, outgoing flows to GDP and outgoing flows to
total outgoing flows. The idea is that there are two dimensions in which the bilateral
flows can matter for a country: either it covers a significant fraction of total flows
and/or it represents a large proportion of GDP. By rescaling the indicators in this
way, the size of the country is abstracted from the index: only the relative size of
the flows matters.
The bilateral trade data comes from UN Comtrade database. Trade data was col-
lected on the 1 digit level of SITC (v3) product categories. These were subsequently
combined into primary goods (categories 1 + 2 + 4 + 68) and manufactured goods
(categories 5 + 6 - 68 + 7 + 8) (WTO, 2011, p. 206). The financial flow data on
equity and debt securities comes from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Survey (CPIS). All other bilateral flow data was gathered form the OECD statistical
compendium and the OECD iLibrary. Finally, the data on GDP and population is
taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2012).
Because of the present lack of detailed data on the flows between non-OECD coun-
tries, the dataset was constructed using the 34 current members of the OECD as
sender countries. This means that it covers all flows originating from OECD coun-
tries, including those directed to non-OECD countries. However indicators of the
level of integration from the perspective of non-OECD countries are left out. The
target countries were not limited to states, but also include territories (e.g. the
French Southern and Antarctic Territories) forming a total of 253 distinct target
countries. Dropping those on which no information was available, the dataset con-
tains 8,526 country couples from 1985 to 2012 for a total of 191,493 observations.3
The Gibbs sampler ran for 6,000 iterations, of which the first 4,000 were discarded
3In order to run the computations on a dataset of this size, we used the resources of the Flemish
Supercomputer Center, which was kindly provided by Ghent University, the Flemish Supercomputer
Center (VSC), the Hercules Foundation and the Flemish Government - department EWI.
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as burn-in. By way of example, figure 4.2 shows the convergence statistics for the
scale parameter Z of the outgoing flows of debt securities to GDP. They point to a
well-converged posterior distribution, which is what is found for the other parame-
ters in the model as well (available upon request).
Figure 4.2: Convergence statistics of the outgoing flows of debt securities to GDP
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From left to right a simple plot of all the iterated values (including the burn-in) and the
empirical distribution function and autocorrelation function of the converged parameter.
4.3.3 An index of Actual Economic Integration
The model returns values for AEI which lie between 0.19 and 296. However, the
exact scaling of the AEI index is arbitrary and can be adjusted as long as the relative
differences and the zero-point remain unchanged.
By way of illustration, figure 4.3 plots the level of integration and the 90% confi-
dence bounds for two country-couples: USA-Mexico and Mexico-USA. The bilat-
eral flows between Mexico and the United States of America are crucial for Mexico
as they lie entirely within the top 99th percentile of all AEI values. The level of
integration of the USA in Mexico on the other hand is much lower. Nevertheless, it
is both significant and within the top 95th percentile of all values of the index. Mex-
ico’s integration into the USA doubles between 1980 and 1995, after which it levels
off. In contrast, the USA increases its integration in Mexico throughout the entire
time period. The difference in their patterns is probably caused by the increased
integration of Mexico in the Chinese economy which rises from less than 5 before
2001 to 24 in 2012.
Secondly, we see that as the number of missing observations decreases, the uncer-
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Figure 4.3: Plot of normalized AEI indicator with 90% confidence interval (dotted lines)
tainty bounds grow tighter. This is especially clear in the second panel, where the
average values are smaller. The number of available indicators is less than 10 for
the first 4 years, after which it jumps to 16 in 1989 and keeps rising steadily to 32 in
2008. However, because the entire time series is used in the estimation of each data
point, the change in the confidence intervals is much less abrupt than the changes in
availability.
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Figure 4.4: Correlation of AEI with individual indicators
Plot of the correlation of the AEI index with the individual indicators from which it was computed.◯ denote trade in goods; + trade in services; ◇ financial flows; and ◻ migration.
Returning to the individual indicators of integration, there are only 50 observations
where all indicators are available, making it impossible to compare the contribution
of all indicators simultaneously. Instead, figure 4.4 graphs their pairwise correla-
tion with the AEI index. It shows that the indicators from all four types of flows
are highly correlated with the index, but that migration and the financial flows (rep-
resented by diamonds and squares) score relatively worse. A possible explanation
is a non-monotonic interaction between the indicators of integration. For example,
economic migration is expected to subside when high trade between countries cre-
ates opportunities in the home country. On the other hand, the existence of many
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migrants from a particular country increases the information on potential beneficial
trade, leading to a positive correlation. Similarly, having good trading relations in-
crease information which can lead to investment opportunities, but FDI can also be
used to circumvent barriers to trade. When both effects are in play simultaneously,
the total correlation between the different flows can get muddled. Appendix 4.A
lists the R2 of the measurement equation for each of the indicators of integration,
in decreasing order of their goodness of fit.4 The imports and exports (manufac-
tured and primary) goods and services are found to be the highest correlated with
the overall level of integration. The last two columns further decompose the R2 into
its between and within components (Verbeek, 2010), revealing that the between R2
is markedly higher than the within R2 for all indicators of integration.
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Figure 4.5: Position of the OECD countries in the AEI network in 2010
The nodes represent countries. The higher the weighted indegree, the bigger the node and the closer
toward the middle it lies. Nodes are colored red when the country is a member of the OECD.
As mentioned, we can use the values for AEI to construct a network of integration
4As these are univariate regressions, the R2 of this regression is equal to the square of the corre-
lation between AEI and the indicators.
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worldwide. Countries are represented by circles (nodes). When one country is
highly integrated into another, an arrow (or edge) is drawn between them. The
AEI index values represent a natural way of assigning weights to these edges, after
resizing them to be strictly positive.
In order to make the network more informative, edges between countries that are
not or barely integrated are removed from the network. Instead of choosing an ar-
bitrary cut-off value for the AEI index, the uncertainty of the index values is used
to determine the edges. To start, we computed the distribution of the index when all
underlying indicators are zero for the entire period and label these values AEI0,t . An
edge is then said to exist between two countries, if their level of integration is signifi-
cantly different from AEI0,t at the 1% significance level: ei,t = 1 ⇐⇒ AEI0,t <AEIi,t
in at least 99% of all iterations of the converged Gibbs sampler. This definition
identifies 17,102 edges or 9% of all observations.
Figure 4.9 shows the shape of this network in 2010.5 The values of the index are re-
flected in the darkness of the arrow between the countries. The position and color of
the countries are determined by its weighted indegree: the more important a coun-
try is for its partner countries, the darker its color and the more central its position.6
Countries that are a member of the OECD are indicated in red. Unsurprisingly, it
shows that the most central players in the OECD are the USA and Germany, fol-
lowed by Great Britain, the Netherlands and France. A few non-OECD countries
also end up with a high indegree. The importance of China and Russia is driven by
intensive trade flows from the OECD countries. Figure 4.6 shows that the distribu-
tion of China’s (panel a) and Russia’s incoming edges (panel b) is similar to that of
OECD countries like for example Belgium (panel c).
Density and transitivity
Figure 4.9 gives an overview of the evolution of the network over time. As before,
the position of a country on the concentric circles is determined by its indegree. It
5The network graphs were generated using the Python package NetworkX
6The weighted indegree of a country is the sum of the AEI index of all incoming edges.
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Figure 4.6: Incoming-edge distribution of central countries
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Histogram of the incoming edge weights of Russia, China and Belgium. Significant bilateral links
(edge = 1) are colored blue, while insignificant links (edge = 0) are colored black
shows that the core of the network stays relatively constant over time. Germany
and the USA are by far the most central players in the network followed by France,
Great Britain and Italy. Japan quickly rises to a central position in the late 1980s,
but then enters a slow decline while still staying in the top ten. Russia and China
on the other hand start in the periphery of the network and steadily gain importance
over time.
For the most part, the countries in the outermost circle are not members of the
OECD, which explains in part their low indegree. There are a few OECD countries
that are on the fringes of the network. Ireland for example starts in the periphery
and rapidly gains importance in the last decade. However, most peripheral countries
do not change position over time (for example Greece, Chile, Slovenia and New
Zealand).
While the number of edges (arrows) increases strongly in the first ten years, the
plot of the network density7 (figure 4.7, panel a) reveals the network is becoming
less dense over time until 2003, after which this trend is reversed. As the dotted
lines show, this pattern is not caused by changes in the number of countries covered
7The network density is the fraction of the number of edges between countries divided by the
total possible number, measuring the overall connectedness of the network. The network transitivity
rates the degree of clustering in the network by looking for triangles: the extent to which a link be-
tween countries A-B and A-C also implies that countries B-C are connected. Because these network
characteristics are sensitive to changes in data availability, each statistic is recomputed using only
the countries that are continuously in the dataset since 1985, 1990 and 1995, respectively.
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in the dataset. The network transitivity on the other hand increases strongly over
this period. While it is not caused by an increase in the number of countries in
the dataset, this initial increase could be driven by the stark increase in the data
availability (panel c).
Overall the integration network is characterized by a high transitivity, especially
given the density of the network. This pattern corresponds to the strong core-
periphery structure visible in figure 4.5 in which there are a few strongly connected
countries (the core) with a large periphery feeding into it.8 Nevertheless, part of the
reason why this structure is so prevalent is the fact that links between non-OECD
countries are not covered. Except for a dip in 2003, the network density remains
relatively constant over time, while the transitivity keeps increasing steadily.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
D
e
n
si
ty
Total
1985<
1990<
1995<
(a) Network density
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
T
ra
n
si
ti
v
it
y
Total
1985<
1990<
1995<
(b) Network transitivity
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
A
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
(c) Data availability
Figure 4.7: AEI network characteristics over time
8Most links are formed in the strongly connected core, resulting in a lot of triangles. Links in the
periphery, where such triangles are less likely to form, are more sparse.
132 4. Measuring Actual Economic Integration
4.3.4 Comparison with other techniques
In this section, the AEI index is compared to the two other techniques used in the
literature: the simple average and a principal component analysis (pca). Key issue
when making this comparison is how to deal with missing observations, since there
are only 50 observations where all data is available. For this reason, the mean is
calculated over all available values. The weights of the pca are computed using the
pairwise correlation matrix, and the index is composed when at least one observa-
tion is available.
As was already mentioned, both techniques can be seen as simplified versions of
the AEI index where the values of the parameters are restricted in some way. This
means that we can test the statistical validity of the state-space approach using the
parameter values we find. In this instance, those parameter values confirm the
validity of the state-space approach. For example, more than 96% of the time-
dependency variables, Ti, are significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. Ad-
ditionally, the scale parameters are also significantly different over the different
indicators, as figure 4.8 shows for the slope parameter Z.
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Figure 4.8: Plot of the mean (○) and 95% confidence interval (△) of the scaling parameter
Z
The correlation (table 4.2) shows that the result can significantly differ depending
on which technique is used: the overall correlation with the adjusted pca is only
0.78 and the adjusted mean scores even worse with 0.53. The high correlation be-
tween the three techniques when there are no missing observations suggests that the
different solutions to the problem of missing variables is what drives these differ-
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ences.
Table 4.2: Correlation with mean and principal component analysis
Obs. Overall Between(a) Within(b)
mean 50 0.972 0.966 0.040
pca 50 0.961 0.970 −0.021
mean (adj.) 179242 0.534 0.754 0.361
pca (adj.) 179242 0.779 0.927 0.293(a)The between correlation is defined as the correlation between the means of each country-pair;(b)The within correlation is the correlation between the demeaned values for all country-pairs.
The last two columns further decompose the overall correlation into the correlation
between the means for each country (between), and that of the demeaned series
(within). It shows that the positive overall correlation is the result of the high cor-
relation of the mean values, while the within-variation is close to zero. In other
words, the choice of indicator will matter a lot in time-series or panel data studies
that use the variation over time. This could lead to substantial differences in fixed
effects studies, that use only the within variation, or for example in the analysis of
the effect of institutional integration on actual economic integration (cf. Dorrucci
et al., 2004).
4.4 The effect of the EU and Nafta on the level of in-
tegration
This section uses a gravity model approach to look at the effect of the expansions
of the European Union (EU) and formation of the Canada-US free trade agreement
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) on the AEI index. Have
these trade agreements increased the level of actual economic integration for the
participating countries?
Head and Mayer (2013) give an extensive overview of gravity models, their theo-
retical underpinnings and the econometric issues that arise when estimating them.
In order to be consistent with economic theory, the structural gravity model corrects
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Figure 4.9: Plot of the AEI network over time.
The nodes represent countries. The higher the weighted indegree, the bigger the node and the closer
toward the middle it lies. Nodes are colored blue (red) when the country is a member of the EU
(Nafta), as are the edges between members of the EU (Nafta).
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Table 4.3: Effect of the EU and Nafta on Actual Economic Integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed effects Sy-Ty Sy-Ty Sy-Ty S-T S-T S-T
log(distance) −0.063 −0.057 −0.064 −0.096 −0.090 −0.095(0.002)a (0.002)a (0.001)a (0.002)a (0.002)a (0.002)a
Contiguity 0.426 0.401 0.414 0.397 0.377 0.384(0.006)a (0.006)a (0.006)a (0.006)a (0.007)a (0.006)a
log(GDPs) - - - −0.087 −0.119 −0.084(0.004)a (0.005)a (0.004)a
log(GDPt) - - - 0.006 0.002 0.006(0.002)a (0.003) (0.002)a
Colony 0.032 0.036 0.034 0.051 0.056 0.054(0.003)a (0.003)a (0.003)a (0.003)a (0.004)a (0.003)a
Com. col. 0.013 0.006 0.013 −0.004 −0.009 −0.005(0.007)c (0.008) (0.007)c (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
EU 0.124 0.096 - 0.092 0.079 -(0.003)a (0.006)a (0.003)a (0.005)a
F10 EU - 0.047 - - 0.032 -(0.005)a (0.004)a
L10 EU - 0.058 - - 0.052 -(0.006)a (0.005)a
EU6 - - 0.192 - - 0.165(0.007)a (0.007)a
EU9 - - 0.151 - - 0.114(0.006)a (0.006)a
EU15 - - 0.148 - - 0.130(0.005)a (0.004)a
EU27 - - 0.048 - - 0.036(0.005)a (0.004)a
NAFTA 0.786 0.306 0.794 0.744 0.287 0.753(0.014)a (0.031)a (0.015)a (0.015)a (0.030)a (0.014)a
F10 NAFTA - 0.463 - - 0.438 -(0.026)a (0.024)a
L10 NAFTA - 0.253 - - 0.268 -(0.034)a (0.033)a
nObs 180349 117385 180349 128758 88671 128758
Sender-year and target-year fixed effects (1-3) and sender and target fixed effects (4-6) regression
of the log of the AEI index on RIA dummies and control variables. Standard errors (between
brackets) are corrected for the uncertainty of the AEI index. a, b and c denote significance at 1%,
5% and 10% level.
for (time-varying) multilateral resistance terms by using sender-year and target-year
fixed effects. Seeing that the number of sender countries is limited to the OECD
members, the number of sender-year dummies is only 1012 as opposed to the 6727
target-year combinations. By first demeaning the dependent and explanatory vari-
ables in the target-year dimension the number of dummy variables in the model is
severely reduced, making the estimation process fairly straightforward. As a ro-
bustness check, the model is also computed using the more simple sender and target
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fixed effects.
It is interesting to note that the problem of the overabundance of zero-flows in trade
data does not occur when using the AEI index, since its values are not truncated
at zero. As the index values are all strictly greater than zero, they can simply be
log-transformed. In addition, because the AEI is corrected for the size of the sender
country, the issue of heterogeneity which complicates the regressions that use trade
flows also does not come about, invalidating the need for a Poisson-type estimation.
Instead, a simple log-linear model corrected for fixed effects suffices.
The standard deviations reported in table 4.3 also take uncertainty of the AEI index
into account. When the state-space model is estimated using Gibbs sampling, it
returns a set of random draws from the distribution of the AIE index. These draws
also correctly reflect the time-dependence in the index. By estimating the gravity
model using Gibbs sampling and using a different draw from AEI’s distribution
in each iteration, the standard deviation of the gravity model’s parameters can be
corrected for the uncertainty of the AEI index (Standaert, 2014).
Finally, it bears repeating that these estimations results represent the effect of these
trade agreements on the overall level of integration, as opposed to the traditional
gravity model that focuses solely on bilateral trade.
The control variables come from CEPII’s gravity dataset (Head et al., 2010). While
they conform to those listed in Head and Mayer (2013), the size of of the coefficients
can differ considerably. For example, according to the first column of table 4.3 an
increase in the distance of 1% lowers integration by 0.06% which is significantly
lower than the 1.1% most other authors find. On the other hand, sharing a border
increases integration with more than half (100× (e0.426 −1)% ≈ 53%) which is on
par with what is found in the literature. The level of integration between a colonial
power and its former colonies is on average 3% higher, but having been colonized
by the same country does not significantly affect integration. This last result is
not particularly surprising seeing that trade between non-OECD countries is not
covered. The GDPs of sender and target are completely captured by the sender-year
and target-year dummies, but not when using the more simple sender and target
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fixed effects. These show that larger sender countries are less open, while large
target countries attract higher levels of integration. Nevertheless, the effect of GDP
is very small.
To capture the effect of the trade agreements, the EU dummy is one when both
countries are members of the European Union and the Nafta dummy does the same
for the Canada-US and North American free trade agreements. The first column
(table 4.3) shows that members of the EU are on average 13% more integrated,
while the level of integration between members of Nafta is 119% higher. These
coefficients fall well within the bounds of what other structural gravity models have
found (Head and Mayer, 2013).
To control for the possibility that the agreements were closed between countries that
were already highly integrated, F10 EU and F10 Nafta lead the agreements by 10
years, while L10 EU and L10 Nafta capture the long term effects of the agreement
by lagging by 10 years. In the case of Nafta, they show almost half of the effect
(59%) is because the member states were already highly integrated. However, the
agreement also succeeded in raising the level of integration both in the short (36%)
and long term (29%).
The interpretation in the case of the EU is slightly less straightforward because the
agreement predates the period studied. As a result, the leading EU variable (L10 EU)
only controls for the level of integration of the new EU25-EU27 member states.9
Similarly, the latest expansions of the EU are too recent, which is why the lagged
values (F10 EU) only captures the long-term effect of the EU12-EU15 expansions.10
They show that the EU25-27 enlargement included countries that were already more
highly integrated (5%), but not as much as in the case of Nafta (both in an absolute
sense as well as relative to the overall effect of the EU). Additionally, similar to
Nafta, the long term effect of the EU12-15 enlargements (6%) is about half of the
short term effect (10%).
Finally, column three separates the different enlargements of the EU. For example,
9The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Bulgaria and Romania.
10Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
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EU9 is one when both countries are member of EU9 but not when both are also
members of the original EU6, etc. Interestingly, it shows that the effect of the EU12-
15 (16%) is identical to that of enlargement to nine members (including United
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) even though the latter have been in the EU for a
decade longer (on average). The level of integration of the founding members is
the largest (21%), but we cannot rule out that this might be because these countries
were already highly integrated.
Figure 4.9 summarizes these findings by plotting the network over time. Countries
that are members of the EU (CUFTA/Nafta) are colored blue (red) as are the edges
between two member countries.
4.5 Extensions
The state-space model estimated in this chapter can be extended in multiple ways.
An obvious extension is to include a larger number of countries. As more non-
OECD countries are added, the quality and availability of data becomes increas-
ingly problematic. A second extension concerns the type of integration studied and
the unit of analysis. The state-space model can be used to study potential economic
integration, or political integration. With respect to the latter, a powerful advantage
of the state-space model is that it can combine different types of data. For example,
the model defined in section 4.2 only combines continuous variables, but through
the use of latent variables it can easily be extended to combine dichotomous infor-
mation or a combination of both. The value of the (observed) dichotomous indicator
y depends on the value of the (unobserved) continuous latent variable y⋆ which in
turn is driven by the to-be-estimated level of regional integration RI:
y⋆i,t = C+Z ∗RIi,t +εi,t (4.9)
yi,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if y⋆i,t ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
(4.10)
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The ability to combine both different types of data means that qualitative data on
integration can be added without having to impose a subjective scaling. This means
that different aspects of integration can be viewed in a parallel, rather than a se-
quential way. For example, currency unions can be viewed separately from customs
unions. In this way, the index would prevent a one-track, EU-dominated view of
integration. Secondly, it also does away with the linear scaling between the differ-
ent forms of integration as the information contained in the continuous indicators
provides a natural scaling. For example, if closing a free trade agreement goes hand
in hand with a significant increase in bilateral flows, the scaling parameters C and Z
(equation 4.9) will be significantly higher than if it leaves those flows unperturbed.
4.6 Conclusion
Despite a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of agreements of different types, not so much is known
about regional integration. Frequently, this is linked to the absence of a representa-
tive and adequate measure thereof.
Regional integration is a complex and multidimensional process, which is the main
reason why a systematic standard index of integration is lacking to this day. Even
the most basic of definitions of regional integration encompasses many different
aspects, increasing the difficulty of finding appropriate data exponentially. The so-
lutions to these problems often undermine the objectivity of the resulting index:
different definitions, data and methodologies lead to different results and rankings.
The state-space model can bring some much needed standardization and objectiv-
ity to the problem of measuring regional integration. By using the time structure
present in the regional integration indicators, it circumvents the problem of miss-
ing observations. Moreover, the model is designed to filter out the measurement
noise and is able to deal with data of inferior and dissimilar quality. The Bayesian
estimation of the model returns the entire probability distribution of the regional
integration indicator, making it possible to say whether the change in the index over
time is significant or whether the level of integration significantly differs between
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countries. Moreover, this uncertainty can be taken into account whenever the index
is used in subsequent statistical analyses or when constructing a network.
To illustrate the advantages of using the state-space model, we computed the level
of actual economic integration of all current members of the OECD towards the rest
of the world. The index is based on indicators of international flows of goods, of
services, FDI and other financial flows and migration. Using network analysis tools
Germany, the USA and Great Britain are revealed to be the most central countries to
the integration network. The network also shows the slow rise of China and Russia
throughout the last two decades.
In line with the findings throughout the literature, we find a positive effect of the
EU and Nafta/Cusfta on the level of economic integration. Partly this is due to a
selection effect: countries that joined the EU (5%) and Nafta (35%) were already
more likely to be highly integrated. Nevertheless, both agreements also had a posi-
tive short term and long term effect on the level of integration: 10% to 16% for the
EU and 36% to 75% for Nafta.
Based on this first application of the state-space approach an obvious extension
would be to include institutional characteristics to capture a broader concept of inte-
gration, or estimate a separate index of institutional integration. A further challenge
is the use of the indicator for analytical purposes in view of its estimated character,
non-stationarity and endogeneity, which calls for appropriate techniques such as a
Bayesian VAR approach. We intend to consider this in future research.
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Appendices
4.A Variance decomposition
Table 4.4: Goodness of fit and variance decomposition of the AEI index
variable R2overall R
2
between R
2
within
Manufactured goods outflow / total flow 0.890 0.919 0.405
Primary goods outflow / total flow 0.874 0.910 0.433
Manufactured goods inflow / total flow 0.852 0.909 0.343
Primary goods inflow / total flow 0.603 0.650 0.061
Services outflow / total flow 0.523 0.745 0.006
Manufactured goods inflow / GDP 0.522 0.661 0.254
Debt securities outflow / total flow 0.485 0.554 0.004
Services inflow / total flow 0.477 0.728 0.001
Primary goods outflow / total flow 0.431 0.587 0.009
Debt securities inflow / total flow 0.425 0.485 0.021
Manufactured goods outflow / GDP 0.393 0.574 0.214
Primary goods outflow / GDP 0.325 0.454 0.211
Equity inflow / total flow 0.324 0.368 0.003
Services inflow / GDP 0.290 0.328 0.004
Equity outflow / total flow 0.285 0.337 0.015
Foreign population inflow / GDP 0.259 0.368 0.153
Services outflow / GDP 0.245 0.286 0.006
Foreign population outflow / pop 0.238 0.336 0.000
Foreign population inflow / total flow 0.174 0.201 0.001
Foreign workers inflow / total flow 0.164 0.160 0.002
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Foreign workers inflow / pop 0.133 0.101 0.252
Foreign workers outflow / total flow 0.117 0.137 0.002
Foreign population inflow / pop 0.097 0.110 0.009
Debt securities inflow / GDP 0.083 0.102 0.001
Debt securities outflow / GDP 0.063 0.067 0.003
Foreign workers outflow / pop 0.054 0.066 0.008
Equity inflow / GDP 0.046 0.052 0.003
Seasonal migration outflow / pop 0.039 0.065 0.000
Equity outflow / GDP 0.036 0.040 0.001
Seasonal migration inflow / total flow 0.032 0.015 0.000
Seasonal migration inflow / pop 0.031 0.015 0.004
Seasonal migration outflow / total flow 0.031 0.058 0.002
FDI inflow / GDP 0.006 0.017 0.001
FDI outflow / GDP 0.006 0.026 0.001
FDI outflow / total flow 0.001 0.011 9.27e−7
FDI inflow / total flow 0.000 0.001 1.7e−6
List of the R2 of the measurement equation for each indicator of integration, in descending order of
their goodness of fit. The last two columns decompose the overall R2 into its between and within
components (Verbeek, 2010).

5 | Historical trade integration -
Globalization and the distance
puzzle in the long twentieth
century1
Abstract
In times of ongoing globalization, the notion of geographic neutrality expects the
impact of distance on trade to become ever more irrelevant. However, over the last
three decades a wide range of studies has found an increase in the importance of
distance during the second half of the twentieth century. This chapter tries to re-
frame this discussion by characterizing the effect of distance over a broader histor-
ical point of view. To make maximal use of the available data, we use a state-space
model to construct a bilateral index of historical trade integration. Our index dou-
bles to quadruples yearly data availability before 1950, allowing us to expand the
period of analysis to 1880-2011. This implies that the importance of distance as
a determinant of the changing trade pattern can be analyzed for both globalization
waves. In line with O’Rourke (2009) and Jacks et al. (2011), we find that the first
wave was marked by a strong, continuing decrease in the effect of distance. Initially,
the second globalization wave started out similarly, but from the 1960s onwards the
1This chapter is the result of joint work together with Stijn Ronsse and Benjamin Vandermarliere.
147
148 5. Historical trade integration
importance of distance starts increasing. Nevertheless this change is dwarfed by the
strong decrease preceding it.
Keywords: Trade integration; Globalization; Distance puzzle; State-space model.
JEL: F15; C4; F14.
5.1 Introduction
Over the past two centuries, globalization and the increase in international trade in
goods and services has dramatically altered living conditions around the world for
billions of people. Understanding the intricacies of the changes in the worldwide
trade pattern is therefore of key importance. From as early as the 1980s, authors
have visualized international trade using the instruments of network science. By
representing countries as nodes and capturing their trade relations by drawing a link
(or edge) between a pair of countries (or dyads), disaggregated trade data can be
amalgamated into a complete overview of the worldwide trade network.
During the last three decades, gravity models have been used to study the impact
of distance on the worldwide trade network. The theory of geographic neutrality
predicts that as the world becomes more globalized, the effect of distance on the
choice of trading partners would become less important. However, for the second
half of the twentieth century, a period marked by ever increasing worldwide trade,
the opposite pattern emerges: distance is becoming more important (e.g. Leamer
and Levinson, 1995; Schiff and Carrere, 2003). The research question subsequently
shifted towards the causes of this distance puzzle. Proffered explanations range from
sample selection issues (Brun et al., 2005), the choice of estimation model (Bosquet
and Boulhol, 2013) to the overall methodology used (Disdier and Head, 2008). This
would imply that the distance puzzle would also emerge when the same approach
is used when studying globalization in the first half of the twentieth century.
An alternative explanation coming from the field of economic history is that the in-
creasing importance of distance is not caused by some aspect of the analysis frame-
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work, but is effectively a feature of the worldwide trade pattern. Globalization in
the late 19th to early 20th century (the first wave) was driven by decreasing trade
costs. Whereas the second wave in the latter half of the 20th century was induced
by changes in the productive capabilities of countries (Jacks et al., 2011) or geopo-
litical changes centered on Western Europe and North America (O’Rourke, 2009).
This means that while geographic neutrality would increase during the first glob-
alization wave, such a pattern would not necessarily be present during the second
wave.
This chapter contributes to this literature by expanding the analysis of the worldwide
trade network to the period 1880-2011, enabling a direct comparison of the distance
effect during both globalization waves. In order to do this, we have to overcome the
problem that data availability worsens significantly before the 1950s. Both network
and gravity models impose high demands in terms of data availability. Constructing
a proportionally weighted network requires data on imports and exports for each
dyad as well as the GDPs of each country. Incomplete data makes it impossible
to tell whether a change in the network is structural or a result of a change in data
availability. The gravity models run into similar problems, especially when the
Head-Ries index (HRI) of trade integration is used, since it requires either a measure
of internal trade, the GDPs of both countries or extensive tariff data (Head and
Mayer, 2013). Because this data is more readily available from the 1950s onwards,
most studies are limited to this period leaving out the first globalization wave.
To deal with the availability problem, we propose an alternative indicator of trade
integration. A state-space model is used to combine several indicators of the level
of trade integration into one overall index: the historical trade integration (hti) in-
dex. Because of the way it handles missing observations, the state-space model
uses differences in availability in an offsetting rather than a reductive way. In other
words, differences in availability can compensate for each other instead of reducing
the dataset to instances when only all data is available. Gaps in one measure can
be imputed automatically using information in the others without imposing strict
assumptions on or ad hoc manipulations to the data. This allows us to more than
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double data availability in the period 1880-1914 and extend the analysis to the pe-
riod 1880 to 2011, covering both globalization waves. Moreover, by combining
the correlates of war bilateral trade data with data from the RICardo project and
the IMF’s direction of trade statistics, the hti index also covers a large fraction of
colonial trade.
The hti index is subsequently used as the dependent variable in a gravity model
to study how the importance of distance evolves over time. In line with O’Rourke
(2009) and Jacks et al. (2011), we find a small increase in the importance of distance
from the 1960s onwards, but show that this is dwarfed by the sharp decrease during
the first globalization wave. In other words the behavior of distance during the
second globalization wave is not puzzling when considered in its historical context.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides a
short overview of the literature on globalization and the distance puzzle. This is
followed by a detailed discussion of the construction of the historical trade index
and how it compares to other measures of trade integration. The index is then used
in a benchmark gravity model after which we look at the effect of distance during
both globalization waves.2
5.2 Historical framework
Since the 1980s the term globalization has been used in a myriad of scientific dis-
ciplines, each using its own definition(s). A common denominator to most defini-
tions is the shift of economic transactions from the local towards the global market.
From this point of view, our dataset can be divided into three distinct phases: 1880-
1914 and 1945-1995 were marked by increasing globalization, while the Interbel-
lum (1919-1939) was a period of de-globalization.
There has been much discussion on the timing of the first phase of globalization.
Some authors believe it started at the end of the 19th century (e.g. Estevadeordal
et al., 2002; Dilip, 2003). Others believe that it started from as early as the 1840s
2The hti index is made available at: http://www.sherppa.ugent.be/hti/hti.html.
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(e.g. O’Rourke and Williamson, 2004; Jacks et al., 2010). Nevertheless, both recog-
nize that the end of the 19th century was part of the first globalization wave and that
the decreasing importance of trade costs, brought on by political and technological
improvements, were an important factor at the time (O’Rourke, 2009). With Great
Britain in the lead, the mercantilist era was replaced by the idea of a more free trade
regime. The European colonizers also imposed this new trading regime on their
colonies and even forced independent countries to open up their trade. Technologi-
cal progress, such as the use of steam engines and the construction of an extensive
railway network significantly reduced trading costs. At the same time, the gold
standard offered a stable international trading climate (Crafts, 2004).
This liberalizing trend was undone by the first World War and the subsequent con-
ference of Versailles which did little to stabilize international relations. The sit-
uation was exacerbated by the Great Depression and the protectionist policies it
induced. At the time, the United States took over the leading role in the world econ-
omy but failed to further the free trade agenda and could not pull the world econ-
omy out of the recession. World War II strengthened the anti-imperialist nationalist
and communist states, the disintegrating effect of which lasted till the 1990s. On
top of that, globalization was countered by the use of higher tariffs in support of
import substitution policies, mostly by newly decolonized countries (Findlay and
O’Rourke, 2007). Inspired by Prebisch-Singer motives, the increased tariffs’ mag-
nitude was such that it even raised the average world tariff (Lampe and Sharp, 2013).
As a result, the post-war efforts to improve international relations, with for example
the GATTs and WTO, had a more regional character limited to Western Europe and
North America. Intensification of trade relations took place in these regions, but did
not extend to the rest of the world (O’Rourke, 2009; Irwin and O’Rourke, 2011).
Because of this, O’Rourke concluded that the second wave of globalization, in con-
trast to the first one, was not driven by a reduction in trade costs, but by geopolitical
factors.
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5.2.1 Geographic neutrality and the distance puzzle
Geographic neutrality states that the effect of distance on the trade patterns fades as
the world becomes more globalized. The pinnacle of this process is the theoretical
ideal of a trade pattern that is completely unaffected by distance, in the words of
Frances (1997): the death of distance. However, as Leamer and Levinson (1995)
discovered, analyses of the second globalization wave found that distance is be-
coming more important. This distance puzzle was confirmed in many subsequent
studies, as illustrated by Disdier and Head (2008) whose paper offered an overview
of 1467 distance estimates from over a hundred papers. The robustness of this find-
ing was surprising given that distance serves as a proxy for (ice-berg type) trade
costs in gravity models (cf. Head and Mayer, 2013) and those were assumed to
decrease over time.
The economic research into the explanations of this apparent contradiction can
broadly be categorized into three groups. The first group attributed the distance puz-
zle to sample selection and the level of aggregation. For example, it was suggested
that the distance puzzle only manifested itself in the trade flows of developed coun-
tries but not in the case of developing countries (Brun et al., 2005; Boulhol and De
Serres, 2010). Alternatively, Larch et al. (2013) and Bosquet and Boulhol (2013)
suggested that the heterogeneity of exporters or of trade flows in general was to
blame. Arribas et al. (2011) proposed the construction of a specific integration in-
dicator that takes this country-level heterogeneity into account. Similarly, Bleaney
and Neaves (2013) posited that access to the sea, remoteness and land area caused
a divergence in the effect of distance. Others claimed that the distance effect could
be explained by the use of aggregated trade data and suggest the use of data on
the sectoral level (e.g. Siliverstovs and Schumacher, 2009; Berthelon and Freund,
2008).
Besides problems with sample selections, the second group assumed that the used
estimation technique has distorted the coefficient on distance. Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) and Bosquet and Boulhol (2013) questioned the appropriateness of OLS-
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estimators, arguing that the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estima-
tor should be used. Additionally, by log-transforming the dependent variable, dyads
with zero trade were removed from the dataset (Coe et al., 2007). While the coef-
ficients changed little or even increased slightly when PPML was used, correcting
for zero-trade flows caused the coefficient on distance to decrease during the second
half of the 20th century.
The third group of arguments blamed the distance puzzle on wider methodologi-
cal issues. For example, Disdier and Head (2008) argued that the standard gravity
model can only measure relative transport costs. Assuming that the effect of glob-
alization is evenly spread among the different trading partners, it is likely that the
coefficients on distance and trade costs remain stable over time. Other arguments
were offered by Buch et al. (2004), who posited that the effect of globalization was
channeled through the constant gravity term. Schiff and Carrere (2003) suggested
that instead of overall trade costs the focus should be on the relative evolution of its
components. Finally, Lin and Sims (2012) suggested that the distance puzzle could
be explained by the difference between the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
They reasoned that many of the new long distance trade links were small in volume,
while the opposite held for short trade links.
An alternative to these three groups of explanations comes from the field of eco-
nomic history. Jacks et al. (2011) reasoned that the behavior of distance during the
second globalization wave makes sense when looked at from a wider historical per-
spective. They argue that globalization in the pre-World War period was driven by
decreasing trade costs, leading to a decrease in the importance of distance during
this period. On the other hand, during the second globalization wave technological
progress and economies of scale increased the productive capabilities of countries,
causing the increase in worldwide trade. Decreasing trade costs played a much
smaller role, explaining the lack of an increase in geographic neutrality. Using
wheat prices of several cities in the United States and Europe, Jacks (2009) went on
to show the distinct effect both globalization waves had on transport costs. Subse-
quent research by Jacks et al. (2010) looked at the endogenous nature of trade and
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trade costs. They found that the reduction of freight rates in the last quarter of the
19th century was caused by the ongoing globalization wave and not the other way
around. Nevertheless, when Jacks et al. (2011) used a broader definition of trade
costs, they found that trade costs were a determining factor of the first globalization
wave.3 For a comprehensive overview of the empirical analyses of the determinants
of trade costs, we refer to the chapter of Lampe and Sharp (2015) in the Handbook
of Cliometrics.
In summary, if the explanation of O’Rourke (2009) holds true, an expansion of the
gravity model analysis to include both the globalization waves should reveal the
different nature of both waves. On the other hand, if the distance puzzle is caused
by sample selection, the estimation technique or the overall methodology, it should
also be present during the first globalization wave.
5.3 Measuring historical trade integration
The definition of historical trade integration used in this chapter is based on that of
Actual Economic Integration by Mongelli et al. (2005, p.6): “the degree of inter-
penetration of economic activity among two or more countries [...] as measured at
a given point in time.” The main difference is that because of data limitations, the
historical trade integration index only focuses on traded goods.
Throughout this section, the new index will be compared with other measures used
in the literature. In decreasing order of availability, these are exports over total
exports; exports over GDP of the sender country (e.g. Fagiolo et al., 2008); the sum
of exports and imports over GDP of the sender country (e.g. Arribas et al., 2011);
and the Head and Ries Index (HRI) of integration (Head and Ries, 2001), which
compares the bilateral trade flows with the level of internal trade of both countries.4
3In addition to freight rates and distance, Jacks et al. (2011) also controls for tariffs, the gold
standard, empire membership, railroad infrastructure, exchange rates, common language and shared
borders.
4
√
Xi jX ji/(XiiX j j), with Xi j the exports from i to j and Xii the internal trade in country i. Internal
trade is usually approximated by subtracting exports from GDP, even though this can cause negative
values for small open economies. Alternative solutions include using tariff data (Head and Mayer,
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5.3.1 Indicators of trade integration
To measure the level of trade integration we collected four indicators that reveal the
importance of the bilateral trade flows for the sender country. The trade flows are
normalized to correct for differences in scale, since for example the importance of
a million dollars worth of imports will be starkly different in the case of Latvia as
opposed to the United States. Defining Xi j,t as the total exports from the sender i to
target country j in year t, these measures are:
yi j,t ≡ { Xi j,t∑ j Xi j,t , X ji,t∑ j X ji,t , Xi j,tGDPi,t , X ji,tGDPi,t }.
Firstly, the level of trade integration is considered high when a significant fraction
of total exports go to, or imports come from, a single partner country. This normal-
ization has the advantage that it can be computed using only trade data, but has the
weakness that it does not take the overall openness to trade into account. For this
reason, the last two indicators normalize import and export flows using the GDP
of the sender country. However, because of the additional need for GDP data, the
availability of the latter indicators is significantly lower.
To the extent that all four indicators give a similar signal the resulting index will
have small confidence intervals.5 However, when these indicators start to diverge
the standard deviation will enlarge, reflecting the underlying uncertainty of the in-
dicators. For example, in the early sixties Russia imported between one and two
million dollars from Pakistan, but exported nothing. Using only exports or imports
would give a very skewed view of trade relations and using the sum of both misrep-
resents the ambiguity of the data. In line with the critique of Morgenstern (1962),
the data on trade flows and GDP is not treated as an ‘observed fact,’ but rather as
an estimate with a certain (and sometimes severe) measurement error. If different
indicators give an opposing signal, the indexation method will treat this informa-
2013).
5Since we will estimate this model using Bayesian techniques it would be more correct to use the
term highest posterior density intervals, but for readability’s sake, we will use confidence interval
throughout this chapter.
156 5. Historical trade integration
tion as unreliable. The added uncertainty of both the underlying data as well as the
indexation method itself is then taken into account in subsequent analyses.
The historical import and export data came from three sources: the Correlates of
War (COW) bilateral trade database version 3.0 (Barbieri et al., 2009; Barbieri and
Keshk, 2012), the Research on International Commerce (RICardo) database6 and
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS). Historical GDPs were provided by
the Maddison project (Bolt and van Zandan, 2013) and supplemented with data
from the Penn World Tables 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013).
In accordance with the Real Openness measure of Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), trade
flows were measured in exchange rate converted US dollars while GDP was mea-
sured in PPP converted US dollars. As Alcalá and Ciccone (2004, p.4) show, using
exchange rate converted GDPs (like Klasing and Milionis, 2014) makes the mea-
sure of openness depend on the level of the nontradable good prices. Especially in
the case of developing countries, exchange rates conversion will underestimate the
GDP (the Balassa-Samuelson effect) and trade shares will be overestimated.
Following de la Escosura (2000, p.4), the trade flows and GDPs were measured in
current dollars instead of the constant 1990 US dollars (or Geary Khamis dollars),
because only the former can correctly compare any pair of years in the time span.
In order to get GDPs in current PPP, we used Klasing and Milionis (2014) method
of multiplying the GDPs in Geary Khamis dollars with a GDP deflator.7 The de-
flator was provided by Williamson (2015) and population data came from COW’s
National Material Capabilities database version 4.0 (Singer et al., 1972) and the
Penn World Tables. More information on each of the sources and how they were
converted can be found in the appendix 5.A.
This data was collected for 225 countries and territories from 1870 up to 2011,
6We are grateful to Beatrice Dedinger (Beatrice.Dedinger@sciencespo.fr) for providing ac-
cess to the unpublised RICardo data. It was converted from pounds to US dollars using the historical
exchange rate from Williamson (2015).
7De la Escosura (2000) starts with current, exchange rate converted, GDPs and uses the shortcut
method to compute the current, PPP converted, GDPs. Klasing and Milionis (2014) on the other
hand start with Maddison’s GDPs in constant, PPP converted, 1990 US dollars and transform it
using a GDP deflator in current US dollars. They subsequently transform this series into current,
exchange rate converted, US dollars using a similar (but inverted) shortcut method.
5.3. Measuring historical trade integration 157
giving us a total of more than 1.8 million observations. Because most trade data
was missing during the World Wars, these periods were left out. It should be noted
that as a lot of countries (politically speaking) did not exist at the beginning of the
dataset, the total possible number of observations for this period is much lower than
the more than 6.6 million suggested by the total number of countries.8
By including the DOTS and RICardo trade data, many colonial countries are cov-
ered before their independence. Panel a of figure 5.1 plots the number of obser-
vations over time for the entire dataset as well as for the subset of non-colonial
countries (the colonial powers and independent states). It shows that the dataset
covers colonial trade flows from as early as 1880. Almost half a million of the 1.8
million observations involve a colony and three percent covers trade flows between
two colonial countries. While the majority of these trade flows concern the period
after World War II, panel b shows that a large number of colonies are covered early
on.9 The large spike in the number of observations in the 1950s is caused by the
addition of the DoTS trade data. Finally, it should be mentioned that the trade data
only captures the official trade flows between countries. If all trade between two
countries passes through a third country (re-exportation) or is smuggled, this will
not be captured using this dataset.
5.3.2 The state-space model
Following the methodology outlined in (Rayp and Standaert, forthcoming), the four
indicators were combined into the historical trade integration (hti) index using the
8no of countries × (no of countries -1) × no of years (excl. World Wars) = 225×224× (2011−
1870+1−5−6).
9The Overseas Countries and Territories account for the remaining colonies after the year 2000.
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Figure 5.1: Plot of the number of observations and countries in each year for the entire
dataset (bold line) and when limited to non-colonial countries (dash-dotted
line).
following state-space model:
yi j,t = C+Z ∗htii j,t +εi j,t (5.1)
htii j,t = Tt ∗htii j,t−1+νi j,t (5.2)
εi j,t ∼ N(0,H) (5.3)
νi j,t ∼ N(0,Q) (5.4)
The measurement equation (5.1) states that the four indicators yi j,t try to measure
the level of trade integration between sender i and target country j at time t. Unlike
for example a simple average the slope Z and intersect C vary over the different
indicators of trade integration. Similarly, the variance of the error term ε can differ
over all indicators, in contrast to a principal component analysis where this is kept
constant. On the other hand, cross-correlation between the error terms of different
indicators is ruled out: E[ε(k),ε(m)] = 0, ∀ k ≠m.
The state equation (5.2) allows for the trade index to depend on its previous values
5.3. Measuring historical trade integration 159
in the manner of an AR(1) model (an autoregressive model with one lag). This
level of dependence (Tt) is assumed to be the same for all dyads. Allowing it to be
different for each country couple adds more than a hundred thousand parameters
to the model and slows the regression algorithm down to an infeasible degree.10
By defining the state equation as an AR(1) process, we implicitly restrict Tt to the
[-1,1] interval, including the boundary values. In other words, both stationary and
non-stationary values of the hti index are allowed, but explosive series are not.
Because of their magnitude and duration, the World Wars were likely to have altered
trade relations considerably. This, in combination with the lack of information dur-
ing the wars, is why they are modeled as a structural break. The level of trade
integration before and after each World War was assumed to be uncorrelated and
the parameter of time dependence can differ over the three periods (equation 5.5).
In this way, the estimation of trade integration before World War I is unaffected by
whatever changes happened during the Interbellum or after World War II, and vice
versa.
Tt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
T1 if 1914 > t
T2 if 1918 < t < 1940
T3 if 1945 < t
(5.5)
The issue of incomplete and missing observations is solved by replacing them with
information that is entirely uncertain and does not influence the resulting index:
y = 0, var(ε) =∞. This allows the model to run uninterruptedly without funda-
mentally changing the nature of missing data. This, in combination with the time
dependency, enables us to increase the number of countries and years for which the
index can be calculated without having to impute or otherwise manipulate the data
(Kim and Nelson, 1999; Durbin and Koopman, 2012). This matters especially for
those observations where there is only partial information, for example when GDP
data is missing. Without this solution for missing observations, either the index
cannot be computed for those years (reducing the dataset by more than 20%), or the
10Initial tests found that the time-dependency is the same for the vast majority of country couples:
94.4% of the time Ti j is not significantly different at the 1% level from Tjl with i j ≠ jl.
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resulting indicator runs the risk of being distorted. The state-space model on the
other hand can still produce an estimate but will adjust the confidence intervals of
this estimate to reflect the lack of a complete dataset (cf. infra, figure 5.2).
This model is estimated using a Bayesian Gibbs sampler algorithm, mainly because
of the convenience the Gibbs sampling algorithm provides. This algorithm allows
us to split up the computation of a complex (posterior) probability into several much
simpler conditional probabilities. For example, if the hti index values were known,
the state and measurement equations become simple linear regressions. Appendix
5.B provides more information on the estimation procedure and an excellent and
detailed introduction to Bayesian Gibbs sampling and state-space model can be
found in chapters 7 and 8 of Kim and Nelson (1999).
The Gibbs sampler ran for 6000 iterations of which the first 4000 were discarded
as burn-in.11 The remaining iterations were used to reconstruct the posterior dis-
tribution of the level of trade integration of each dyad in each year. The index was
rescaled to ensure that it has an expected value of zero if there is no trade between
the country couple. This was done by generating the expected value of the index
when all indicators are zero in each iteration and subtracting it from the hti esti-
mate. The resulting index is a continuous variable with values between -0.8 and
189.12 Following the taxonomy of the levels of measurement, the hti index is a ratio
variable. While the actual values of the index are meaningless, it can be compared
over time and countries without any restrictions. Barring any measurement errors,
the index is zero when the underlying indicators are zero. As a result, a doubling of
the underlying indicators would result in a doubling of the index value.
11The size of the dataset required the use of the resources of the Flemish Supercomputer Center,
which was kindly provided by Ghent University, the Flemish Supercomputer Center (VSC), the
Hercules Foundation and the Flemish Government − department EWI.
12While the underlying indicators are never smaller than zero, the index can still be negative due
to the nature of the state-space model, i.e. the fact that indicators are viewed as imprecise measures
of the actual level of integration. For example, a positive measurement error on an indicator that is
zero would result in a negative hti estimate.
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5.3.3 The historical trade integration index
By way of illustration, figure 5.2 shows the index values for USA-Mexican bilat-
eral trade from the perspective Mexico (panel a) and the USA (panel b). The figure
shows both the expected value of the index as well as its 95% confidence interval.
It should be clear from this graph that the level and evolution of trade integration
can differ significantly depending on the point of reference. The Mexican-US trade
is highly important to the former as its index values lie entirely within the top 1 per-
centile. From the perspective of the US on the other hand, trade with Mexico only
really becomes important from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The divergence
in the evolution of the hti index values of both countries in the 21st century exempli-
fies the fact that hti measures relative trade integration. Trade between the US and
Mexico did not decrease after 2000, but trade between China (and to a lesser extent
Canada) and Mexico did increase significantly. This led to a drop in the Mexico-
US index, but had no effect on the US-Mexico hti index values. Furthermore, the
widening of the confidence interval immediately after the World Wars illustrates the
effect of a decrease in data availability in this period.
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Figure 5.2: The normalized historical trade index and 95% confidence interval (dotted
lines).
The most notable difference between the hti index and the other indicators of trade
integration is the increase in data availability, especially when compared to the
Head-Ries index. When using one of the alternative indicators, overall data avail-
ability decreases with 13% in the case of exports over total exports and even 38% (≈
700,000 observations) when using the HRI. To illustrate, figure 5.3 plots the number
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Figure 5.3: Yearly availability of the alternative indicators of integration as a percentage of
the availability of the hti index.
Plot of the number of dyads covered by the Head-Ries Index (HRI), bilateral openness((Xi j,t +X ji,t)/GDPi,t) and the exports over total exports (Xi j,t/Xi,t) in each year, relative to the
number of dyads covered by the historical trade integration index.
of dyads covered by each index over time, expressed as a percentage of the number
of dyads covered by the hti index. Overall, the increase in data availability when
using hti grows the further we go back in time. For example, more than half the
dyads covered by hti are missing when using trade flows over GDP and this rises to
80% when using the HRI.
In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the historical trade integration
index we used it to construct a weighted, directed network. Two countries were
linked by an edge if their index values were statistically significant, with the index
values serving as edge weights (details in appendix 5.C). Figure 5.4 shows the
evolution of this network over time. The higher the indegree of a country (the sum of
all incoming edges), the more central its position. The larger the pagerank (similar
to the indegree, but it gives a higher weight to edges coming from countries that are
themselves important (Newman, 2010)), the bigger the size of the country’s node.
With only a few exceptions, the indegree and pagerank reach the same conclusion
on country’s centrality. Initially, France and Great Britain were the most central
players, but over time the USA superseded both. After World War II, Germany
started to overtake both France and Great Britain, rising to the second most central
position. The last two decades of the dataset are marked by the rapid ascent of
China as one of the most prominent countries in the network.13 Lastly, as is shown
in the appendix 5.4, both globalization waves considerably increased the overall
13These and other yearly graphs are made available together with the indicator at
http://www.sherppa.ugent.be/hti/hti.html.
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connectivity of the trade network.
Finally, table 5.1 compares the hti index with the indicators of integration it summa-
rizes. The first column shows the R2 of the measurement equations of each variable,
ordered according to their goodness of fit. The second and third column then split
this up into the between and within R2. In addition to this equation-by-equation
comparison, the last column compares the contribution of all indicators simultane-
ously using a dominance analysis based on the R2 test statistic (Grömpig, 2007).
Comparable to the normalized eigenvalues in a principal components analysis, the
dominance score shows the relative contribution of each variable to the hti index.14
It comes to the same conclusion as the equation-by-equation R2. The imports and
exports flows divided by total flows are the two most important variables and their
between and within R2 are both high. While the overall match between the flows
divided by GDP is much lower, their between match is still acceptable.
Table 5.1: Goodness of fit and variance decomposition of the HTI index
R2overall R
2
between R
2
within Dominance
Imports / total imports 0.916 0.974 0.799 0.512
Exports / total exports 0.782 0.880 0.602 0.357
Exports / GDP 0.305 0.479 0.131 0.120
Imports / GDP 0.004 0.193 0.002 0.014
List of the R2 of the measurement equation for each indicator of integration, in descending order of
their goodness of fit. The third and fourth columns decompose the overall R2 into its between and
within components (Verbeek, 2010). The last column shows the dominance statistic of each
indicator based on the R2 statistic (Grömpig, 2007).
5.4 Benchmark regressions
To ensure that the hti index values conform to expectations and to provide a bench-
mark for the later analyses, we regressed the log of the hti index on a number of
14To compute this statistics, the hti variable is regressed on all possible 2k−1 combinations of the
individual indicators. The dominance score of a variable is the average marginal contribution to the
R2 over all possible models where the variable is included.
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Figure 5.4: The historical trade network over time.
The higher the indegree of the node, the closer the node lies to the center. The size of the nodes is
determined by their pagerank. The higher the edgeweight, the darker the edge.
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economic and political variables using a structural gravity model:
log(htii j,t) = α log(distancei j)+β1 log(GDPi,t)+β2 log(GDPj,t)+β3Xi j,t +µi j,t +εi j,t (5.6)
where µi j,t is a vector of fixed effects.
In accordance with Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) the GDPs are measured in current USD.
Xi j,t contains additional control variables, including membership of the European Union
(EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta)15. f10 EU and l10 EU are the
10 year leading and lagged variable of the EU membership dummy. This allows a differ-
entiation between the anticipatory/selection, short term and long term effects of signing the
trade agreement. The remaining control variables include a dummy capturing the Interbel-
lum and a measure of the completeness of the dataset in each year (hiiAv). The latter is
defined as the number of dyads covered in each year, divided by the total possible number
of dyads given the number of countries in the dataset in that year. Finally, we included
two dummy variables to control for the influence of wars on trade integration: War is one
when the dyads are engaged in a military conflict, while Allied checks whether the countries
were on the same side during a conflict. Both variables were constructed using the COW’s
Inter-State War dataset version 4.0 (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010).
The results are shown in table 5.2. Following Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Head and
Mayer (2013), the baseline estimates in column 4 and 5 include sender-year and target-year
fixed effects to cancel out any time-varying multilateral resistance terms16: µi j,t = µi,t +µ j,t .
In order to estimate this many fixed effects, we used a strategy outlined in Guimarães and
Portugal (2009) which was adapted to a Bayesian estimation framework (details in appendix
5.D). For completeness sake, column one shows the results using no fixed effect (µi j,t = 0);
column two using sender-target fixed effects (µi j,t = µi j); and column three using sender and
target fixed effects (µi j,t = µi+µ j).
A distinct advantage of using the hti index as the dependent variable in the gravity model
is that its values are not truncated at zero. When using trade flows, almost half of the
observations are zero and would be removed when trade is logarithmically transformed.
While the estimation procedure can be adjusted to cope with the selection problem, the
15Nafta also includes the preceding 1987 Canada-US Free Trade agreement
16Multilateral resistance terms are country-specific barriers to trade that in this case are allowed
to vary over time.
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truncation of the data is harder to solve (Head and Mayer, 2013). In contrast, because it
has an interval scale the hti index can simply be rescaled to be strictly greater than zero
before being log transformed. Furthermore, because the Gibbs sampler returns the entire
distribution of the hti index for each dyad and year, the gravity model can be adjusted to
take into account the uncertainty of the hti index estimate (Standaert, 2014).
Table 5.2: Benchmark gravity regression using the hti index
hti
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance −0.026 − −0.035 −0.035 −0.035(0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a
Contiguity 0.124 − 0.120 0.119 0.117(0.001)a (0.001)a (0.001)a (0.001)a
GDPs −0.002 −0.010 −0.011 − −(0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a
GDPt 0.026 0.015 0.017 − −(0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a
Interbellum −0.059 −0.006 −0.010 − −(0.002)a (0.002)a (0.002)a
War −0.020 −0.011 −0.056 −0.038 −0.038(0.008)a (0.005)b (0.007)a (0.008)a (0.007)a
Allied 0.094 0.008 0.025 0.026 0.026(0.005)a (0.003)a (0.004)a (0.005)a (0.005)a
EU 0.103 0.044 0.064 0.081 0.033(0.002)a (0.002)a (0.002)a (0.002)a (0.003)a
f10 EU − − − − 0.012(0.002)a
l10 EU − − − − 0.083(0.004)a
Nafta 0.763 0.135 0.606 0.645 0.052(0.012)a (0.010)a (0.011)a (0.011)a (0.024)c
f10 Nafta − − − − 0.507(0.017)a
l10 Nafta − − − − 0.155(0.025)a
hiiAv −0.382 −0.112 −0.136 − −(0.002)a (0.002)a (0.003)a
Constant 3.486 − − − −(0.002)a
Fixed Effects none sender-target sender sender-year sender-year
target target-year target-year
nObs 1,282,178 1,282,221 1,282,178 1,847,771 1,847,771
Linear (column 1) and fixed effects regression (columns 2-5) on the log of the historical trade index
with standard errors (between brackets) corrected for the uncertainty of the hti. a, b and c indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
The results are very similar over the different estimation procedures. While the coefficients
on the traditional gravity parameters have the expected sign, they are much smaller than
when trade flows are used. This is most likely due to a (non-linear) difference in scaling
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seeing that the relative differences of the parameters remains more or less the same. A
decrease in the distance of 1% raises the level of trade integration with 0.04%. Neighbor-
ing your trading partner (contiguity) further increases this with 100× (e0.119 −1)% ≈ 13%.
Larger partner countries attract more trade, but a rise in the GDP of the home country lowers
trade integration. This could be because larger countries tend to be more focused on their
internal markets.17
Interestingly, both the EU (8%) and Nafta (90%) raised the level of trade between their
partner countries. In the case of the EU, the agreement was closed between countries that
were slightly more likely to be integrated (1%). The agreement subsequently raised the level
of trade integration both in the short term (3.3%) and most importantly long term (8.6%).
Nafta on the other hand was closed between countries that were already highly integrated
(66%), but it still succeeded in further raising the level of trade integration most of which
happened in the long term (17%).
The Interbellum had a negative effect on trade integration, but the effect is rather small (1%).
As was expected, being at war significantly lowered integration (-4%), while the opposite
held true if the countries were allies in the same war (3%). Finally, we find evidence of
selection bias issues in the early values of the hti index. The negative parameter on hiiAv
means that the average index value goes down as the availability of the data increases. The
initial values of the hti indices (before 1948) are marked by many missing observations,
most likely between countries that did not or barely trade with each other. If left uncorrected,
this makes the world seem more integrated in the earliest years of our dataset.
5.5 Results
To capture how the distance affects the level of trade we re-estimate the gravity model (6)
with the distance variable split into 5 year blocks:
log(htii j,t) = n/5−1∑
τ=0 [ατ log(distancei j)1{5τ<t≤5(τ+1)}]+βXi j,t +µi,t +µ j,t +εi j,t (5.7)
17Since the index is already normalized for the size of the sender country, the GDP of the sender
country should actually be left out of the gravity model regressions. However, its inclusion did not
significantly affect the results.
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ατ is the distance elasticity of the hti values and 1{5τ<t≤5(τ+1)} is an indicator variable sep-
arating the (log of the) distance variable into five year blocks. Similar to the regressions in
columns four and five of table 5.2, the regression includes fixed effects to control for the
time-varying multilateral resistance terms (µi,t and µ j,t). Because of the inclusion of sender-
year and target-year fixed effects, many of the control variables drop out of the model, most
notably the GDP of sender and target.
Estimating the distance effect in each year (as opposed to five-year blocks) increased the
confidence intervals, but did not change the conclusion. Similarly, the strong increase in
data availability during the 1870’s significantly distorts the analysis for the first 10 years
but leaves the rest unaffected.18 For the sake of brevity these results are not shown but are
available upon request.
Panel a of figure 5.5 plots the distance elasticity (ατ) over time for the entire dataset. At
any time, an increase in the distance will lower the level of trade, explaining the negative
coefficients. Overall, the effect of distance on the trade has become smaller over time as the
elasticity parameter moves closer to zero. Starting in the 1880s, the importance of distance
decreases rapidly, but this process is stopped short by the first World War. While the initial
years of the Interbellum still show signs of an increase in geographic neutrality, this trend is
reversed in the 1930s. The second globalization wave starts with a very gradual decrease in
the importance of distance, but this tapers off by 1960, after which distance slowly becomes
more important again.
To ensure that the pattern of the distance elasticity is not caused by the increase in the num-
ber of countries covered by the dataset, the analysis is repeated while keeping the number of
countries constant. To that end, two subsets were defined in which the dataset was limited to
countries that persist throughout the entire considered period. One subset starts in 1880 and
the other in 1950. Figure 5.6 provides an overview of the countries included. In addition,
it also plots the significant trade links in the starting year of the subsets, showing the extent
of the dataset in the period with the lowest data availability. The list of countries in each
subset is included in appendix 5.E.
The biggest change of keeping the set of countries fixed is that the distance puzzle be-
comes more pronounced: in both subsets distance becomes more important from the 1960s
onwards. This increase in the distance elasticity in the 1880 subset is relative large and ef-
18The number of dyads covered increases more than sixfold between 1870 and 1880.
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Figure 5.5: The distance elasticity of the historical trade integration index (ατ) over time
fectively restores the distance elasticity to its pre-World War I levels. However, in the more
replete 1950 subset (panel c), the increase is much smaller, mimicking what happens in the
overall regression.
These results fall in line with the mechanisms described in O’Rourke (2009) and Jacks
et al. (2011), confirming the idea that the behavior of distance should be looked at from a
broader historical perspective. The increase in geographic neutrality during the first global-
ization wave can be explained by the political and technological developments significantly
lowering trade costs. The second globalization wave on the other hand was less driven
by changing trade costs, but instead by increases in productivity, economies of scale. The
geopolitical determinants supporting globalization were centered on Western Europe and
North America and counteracted by import-substitution policies in the developing world.
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(a) 1880
(b) 1950
Figure 5.6: The coverage of the 1880 and 1950 subsets
Countries included in the subsets are marked by a dot and significant trade links in the starting year
by an arrow. The higher the hti index the darker the arrow.
5.6 Conclusion
The theory of geographic neutrality predicts that as the world becomes more globalized, the
effect of distance on the choice of trading partners would become less important. However,
for the second half of the twentieth century, a period marked by ever increasing worldwide
trade, the opposite pattern emerges: distance is becoming more important. In this chapter,
we contribute to the discussion on the distance puzzle by looking at the behavior of distance
from a broader historical perspective.
Using an alternative index of trade integration, we expanded the gravity model analysis
of the worldwide trade network to the period 1880-2011, enabling a direct comparison of
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the distance effect during both globalization waves. A number of indicators measuring the
importance of bilateral trade were combined into the historical trade index using a Bayesian
state-space model. Because of the way it handles missing observations, the state-space
model uses differences in availability in an offsetting rather than a reductive way. Gaps in
one measure can be imputed automatically using information in the others without imposing
strict assumptions on or ad hoc manipulations to the data. This allowed us to more than
double data availability in the period before World War I.
Armed with this index, we analyzed the effect of distance on the trade pattern. While we
do find that the effect of distance on trade tends to increase from the sixties onwards, this
is overshadowed by the strong decrease that precedes it during the first globalization wave.
These results support the mechanisms described in O’Rourke (2009) and Jacks (2009) that
attribute the distance puzzle to differences in the driving factors of globalization of both
waves. During the first globalization wave technological advancements severely reduced
the cost of trade, helped along by political developments that broke down many barriers to
international trade. The net result of which was a substantial decrease in the importance of
distance in choosing trading partners. On the other hand, the second globalization wave was
driven by production factors, economies of scale and geopolitical determinants centered
on Western Europe and North America. This explains why the decrease in the effect of
distance tapers off after 1960. However, we would like to point out that the corroboration
of the economic history arguments does not entail that the other hypotheses are without
merit. Methodological aspects undoubtably play a role in the explaining part of the distance
puzzle.
The index of historical trade integration and plots of the trade network over time are avail-
able for download at http://www.sherppa.ugent.be/hti/hti.html.
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5.A Data sources and transformations
Table 5.3: Data sources and transformations
Trade flows - current USD, exchange rate
Source Original units Transformations
DoTS current USD, exchange rate
COW v3.0 current USD, exchange rate
RICardo current British pounds, exchange rate × pound-dollar rate(a)
GDP - current USD, PPP
Source Original units Transformations
Maddison per capita, constant 1990 USD, PPP × population(b,c)× 1990 US GDP deflator(a)
PWT8.0(b): rGDPo constant 2009 USD, PPP × 2009 US GDP deflator(a)(a)Williamson (2015)
(b)Penn World Tables 8.0
(c)COW National Material Capabilities v4.0
5.B Estimating the state-space model
To estimate the state-space model we need to solve for the structural parameters of
the state-space model (C, Z, Tt , H and Q) as well as the level of trade integration
(hti). While it is possible to maximize the combined distribution numerically for
small datasets, using a Gibbs sampler simplifies the estimation procedure consider-
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ably by splitting up the process into conditional probabilities.
For example, say we have to draw from the joint probability of two variables
p(A,B), when only the conditional probability of p(A∣B) and p(B∣A) are known.
Starting from a (random) value B(0), the Gibbs sampler will draw a first value of
A conditional on B(0): A(1) ∼ p(A∣B(0)). Conditional on this last draw, a value
of B is drawn (B(1) ∼ p(B∣A(1))) which is in turn used to draw a new value for A
(A(2) ∼ p(A∣B(1)). This process is repeated thousands of times, until the draws from
the conditional distributions have converged to those of the combined distribution
p(A,B). After discarding the unconverged draws (the burn-in), the remaining draws
of A and B can be used to reconstitute their respective (unconditional) distributions.
Because we are using a Bayesian analysis framework, we have to be explicit about
the prior distribution of the parameters. In other words, we have to state what we
know about their distribution before looking at the data. Because there is no prior
information, we imposed flat priors on Z, C and log(H), meaning that all values in
the real space (or real positive space for the variance H) are equally probable.
In the case of the state-space model, the Gibbs sampler consists of two main blocks
(Kim and Nelson, 1999):
1. If the level of trade integration (hti) were known, the parameters of the mea-
surement and state equations (equation 5.1 and 5.2) could be obtained us-
ing simple linear regressions. To ensure the model is identified, the vari-
ance of the error term of the state equation (Q) is typically set to 1. Taking
for example the situation were there is only one dyad to simplify notation:
hti = (hti1, ...,htin)′
p(T ∣hti) ∝ .5∗1∣T ∣≤1∗N(bT ,vT ) (5.8)
p(Zk,Ck∣hti,y,H) ∝ N(bkZ,C,vkZ,C) (5.9)
p(H(k,k)∣hti,y) ∝ iWish[ek′ek; n] (5.10)
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where iWish is the inverse Wishart distribution and
vT = (T ′t−1Tt−1)−1 (5.11)
bT = vT ∗T ′t−1Tt (5.12)
vkZ,C = (hti′hti)−1∗H(k,k) (5.13)
bkZ,C = (hti′hti)−1∗hti′yk (5.14)
ek = yk−Ck−Zk ∗hti (5.15)
2. Conditional on the parameters of the state and measurement equations, the
distribution of hti can be computed and drawn using the Carter and Kohn
(1994) simulation smoother.
• The Kalman filter: computes the distribution of hti conditional on the
information in all previous years. Starting from a wild guess, p(hti0) =
N(0,∞), the following equations are iteratively solved for t = 1 to t = n:
at∣t = E(htit ∣y1, ...,yt)= T ∗at−1∣t−1+κ(yt −C−ZTat−1∣t−1) (5.16)
pt∣t = V(htit ∣y1, ...,yt)= pt∣t−1+κZpt−1∣t−1 (5.17)
with κ = pt∣t−1Z′(Zpt∣t−1Z′+H)−1; and pt∣t−1 = T pt−1∣t−1T ′+Q.
• Simulation smoother: Draws from the distribution of hti conditional on
all information in the data and the previous draws. Starting from the last
iteration of the Kalman filter, draw hˆtin from N(an∣n; pn∣n) and iterate
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backwards from t = n−1 to t = 1:
at∣n = E(htit ∣y1, ...yn)= at∣t +ς(hˆtit+1−Tat∣t) (5.18)
pt∣n = V(htit ∣y1, ...yn)= pt∣t +ς(pt+1∣n−T pt∣tT ′−Q)ς′ (5.19)
with ς = pt∣tT ′p−1t+1∣t ; and hˆtit+1 a random draw from N(at+1∣n; pt+1∣n).
5.C The historical trade network
In order to combine the historical trade integration indices into a network, the index
values corresponding to countries that are integrated need to be separated from those
corresponding to countries that are not. A natural way of making this distinction
is to contrast countries that trade with each other (Xi j,t > 0) to those that do not
(Xi j,t = 0). The problem is that this approach is skewed by a large number of very
small non-zero trade flows.
Rather than choosing an arbitrary cut-off value, the hti allows us to use significant
differences to determine which countries are linked. To start, we used the estimates
of the structural parameters of the state-space model to generate index values for a
fictional dyad where trade was zero for the entire period. Labeling these observa-
tions as hti0,t , we defined significant levels of trade in the following way: An edge
e from country i to country j exists if, and only if, its level of trade in year t is
significantly higher than that of hti0,t : ei j,t = 1 ⇐⇒ hti0,t < htii j,t in at least 99% of
all iterations of the (converged) Gibbs sampler. Using the hti0,t definition, 115,911
edges were identified (6.3% of observations).
Panel a of figure 5.7 shows the overall network density (the fraction of dyads that
are connected) gradually decreasing throughout the first globalization wave. In con-
trast, the trade network becomes increasingly connected during the second global-
ization wave. As can be seen in panel b, the number of trade links (edges) more
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or less continuously grows over the entire time-period and is initially offset by the
rapid rise in the number of countries. This is especially noticeable when the So-
viet Block breaks up in the 1990s, causing a rapid downward shift in the network
density.
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Figure 5.7: Network density (panel a) and the number of nodes and edges (panel b) over
time.
Similar to the distance regressions, the density was also computed when the number
of countries was kept constant using the 1880 and 1950 subsets. This reveals that
the decrease in density during the first globalization wave was driven by the addition
of new countries. When this is kept constant, the network density almost doubles
during the first wave. In addition, it reinforces the effects of the 1930 and 2008
economic crises, both causing a substantial drop in the density. To ensure that these
results were not driven by the inclusion of the colonial trade data, the density was
also computed using only the official countries according to the COW state system
dataset. However, this did not significantly alter the conclusion (available upon
request). In other words, once the density is corrected for the increasing number of
countries, it conforms to the globalization pattern found in the literature.
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5.D Estimating models with high-dimensional fixed
effects
Following Guimarães and Portugal (2009), the number of fixed effects can be re-
duced by half by first demeaning both dependent and explanatory variables in the
sender-year dimension, leaving only the sender-target dummies. Using conditional
probabilities, the fixed effects (ci) can be separated from the explanatory variables
(Xi,t), which significantly reduces the size of the matrix that needs to be inverted.
yi,t = ci+Xi,tβ+εi,t with εi,t ∼N(0,σ2) (5.20)
Equation 5.20 can be estimated using a three-step Gibbs sampling procedure. For
example, when using flat (uninformative) priors, the conditional probabilities are:
1. β∣ci,σ2 ∼N(eβ,vβ)
eβ = (X ′X)−1(X ′(y−c)) with {X}i,t = Xi,t and {y−c}i,t = yi,t −ci
vβ = σ2(X ′X)−1
2. ci∣beta,σ2 ∼N(c¯i,σ2/n)
c¯i =∑nt (yi,t −Xi,tβ)/n with n the number of observations of country i
3. σ2∣beta,ci ∼ iWishart(e′e,N)
e = yi,t −ci−Xi,tβ
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5.E Country subsets
Table 5.4: Country Subsets
Group 1: included in 1880< and 1950<
Algeria Cuba Guatemala Malta Singapore
Argentina Denmark Guyana Mauritius South Africa
Ascension Dominican Rep. Haiti Mexico Spain
Australia Dutch Antilles Honduras Morocco Sri Lanka
Austria Ecuador Hong Kong Mozambique St. Pierre and Miquelon
Barbados Egypt Iceland Netherlands Suriname
Belgium El Salvador India New Zealand Sweden
Belize Falkland Isl. Indonesia Nicaragua Switzerland
Bermuda Fiji Iran Norway Thailand
Bolivia Finland Italy Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago
Brazil France Jamaica Peru Tunisia
Bulgaria French Guiana Japan Philippines Turkey
Canada Germany Liberia Portugal United Kingdom
Chile Ghana Luxembourg Romania United States
China Gibraltar Macau Russia Uruguay
Colombia Greece Madagascar Senegal Venezuela
Costa Rica Guadeloupe Maldives Sierra Leone Yugoslavia
Group 2: included in 1950<
Afghanistan Congo, Rep. Hungary Namibia Seychelles
Albania Congo, Dem. Rep. Iraq Nauru Solomon Islands
American Samoa Cote d’Ivoire Ireland Nepal Somalia
Angola Cyprus Israel New Caledonia South Korea
Antigua and Barbuda Czechoslovakia Jordan Niger St. Kitts and Nevis
Bahamas Djibouti Kenya Nigeria Sudan
Bahrain Dominica Kiribati North Korea Swaziland
Bangladesh Equatorial Guinea Kuwait Oman Syria
Benin Eritrea Laos Pakistan Tanzania
Bosnia Estonia Latvia Palestine Togo
Botswana Ethiopia Lebanon Panama Tonga
Brunei Faroe Islands Lesotho Papua New Guinea Tuvalu
Burkina Faso French Polynesia Libya Poland UAE
Burma Gabon Lithuania Qatar Uganda
Burundi Gambia Malawi Rwanda Vanuatu
Cambodia Greenland Malaysia Saint Lucia Vietnam
Cameroon Grenada Mali Saint Vincent Wallis and Futuna
Cape Verde Guam Mauritania Samoa Yemen
Central African Rep. Guinea Mongolia Sao Tome and Principe Zambia
Chad Guinea-Bissau N. Mariana Isl. Saudi Arabia Zimbabwe

6 | Trade integration and trade
agreements - resolving the
endogeneity problem through a
qualitative VAR1
Abstract
While the endogeneity of trade and regional integration agreements was established early
on, this issue has only been addressed explicitly in gravity models during the last decade
and a half. Initial attempts using instrumental variables proved unreliable, causing authors
to look for alternative solutions. This chapter brings together the literature on both gravity
equations explaining trade and probit regressions explaining the probability of an integra-
tion agreement. This is done by estimating them simultaneously in a qualitative vector
autoregression model. The qualitative VAR allows us to estimate their interdependence
without having to resort to instrumental variables. In addition, the endogenous nature of
other control variables like the GDP or the capital labor ratio can be taken into account. Our
preliminary findings confirm that an increase in trade raises the probability of an agreement
and vice versa, although the response can differ over specific continents. We find a rela-
tively small average treatment effect of RIAs: trade increases with 10% after one year and
40% after five years whereafter it slowly rises to 80% after 35 years.
Keywords: Endogenous trade agreements; Gravity equation; Qualitative choice models;
1This chapter is the result of joint work together with Prof. Dr. Glenn Rayp.
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Qualitative VAR.
JEL: C11; C25; F14; F15.
6.1 Introduction
Not long after Tinbergen (1962) introduced gravity models to study international trade
flows, dummies were added to control for, and measure the effects of regional integration
agreements (RIAs).2 However, the results from these studies have not been very encourag-
ing: depending on the methodology used, the sign and significance of the coefficients on
the RIA dummies could change by a wide margin.3
The gravity model has evolved strongly since the sixties as its theoretical underpinnings
were secured. Starting from a ‘naive’ log-linearized gravity model, the structural model has
been adjusted to take multilateral resistance terms, zero-trade flows and heteroskedasticity
into account. At the same time, it became clear that trade and trade agreements are highly
endogenous: trading blocs are likely to form along the lines of natural trading partners,
i.e. countries that already trade intensively (Krugman, 1995).
In contrast to the large literature on the effects of trade agreements on trade, the litera-
ture studying the endogeneity of both has remained limited. Initially, Baier and Bergstrand
(2002) and Magee (2003) used an instrumental variables approach, proving the existence of
the endogenous relationship. However, estimates of the effect of trade agreements remained
unstable and if anything argued against using instrumental variables in cross-sectional stud-
ies (Magee, 2003). Baier and Bergstrand (2007) proposed using panel data with either
country-year fixed effects or first differences to cope with endogeneity problems. Alterna-
tively, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) used non-parametric matching econometrics to find the
right counterfactual to countries that had signed an agreement. Finally, Egger et al. (2011)
returned to instrumental variables in a cross-sectional setting. Using a two-part Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator they controlled for general equilibrium effects and
zero-trade flows in addition to the endogenous nature of trade agreements. Overall, the dis-
tortion in the effect of RIAs on trade caused by ignoring the endogeneity has been found
2Throughout this chapter we will use the term regional integration agreements as a container term
for inter- and intra-regional free trade agreements, customs unions, common markets and economic
unions.
3See Frankel (1997) for an overview of the earlier literature.
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to be highly significant, ranging from a 75% increase (Egger et al., 2011) to a quintupling
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
An alternative approach to deal with endogeneity could be to use a natural experiment, i.e. a
completely exogenous event that led some countries to join while leaving others unaffected.
By studying the changes in trade following this event, the effect of this RIA can be analyzed.
The problem is that even if such an event can be found, it is not easy to argue that its
results can be generalized as the average treatment effect of RIAs worldwide. A vector
autoregression model (VAR) on the other hand would allows us to treat both trade and trade
agreements as endogenous without having to identify instrumental variables. Instead, the
focus lies on the dynamic behavior of both variables which is used to identify their long-
term interaction. The only problem is that a VAR model requires continuous variables.
The solution is proffered in the macro-economic literature, where Dueker (2005a) explains
how a binary indicator of recessions can be added to a VAR model of the (US) economy.
To estimate such a qualitative VAR, the indicator variable is first defined in terms of a la-
tent equivalent. In this case, the dummy trade agreements variable is said to depend on the
willingness to sign a trade agreement. This continuous latent variable can be modeled as
endogenous with trade using a normal VAR model. The long term relationship between the
variables identified in the VAR can subsequently be used to generate counterfactuals, al-
lowing us to determine the treatment effects of signing a RIA. While the model we present
initially ignores zero-trade flows, we show that it can be expanded to deal with both prob-
lems simultaneously.
To our knowledge, this is the first time a qualitative VAR has been used to analyze the
effect of trade agreements. However, it should be stressed that this chapter is intended as
an outline of how the qualitative VAR methodology can be used to study trade and trade
agreements, rather than a fully worked out analysis. Instead, our aim is to explain the
qualitative VAR, show its place in the trade literature and argue that the model produces
sensible results. As Baier and Bergstrand (2009, p. 64) note, there is no well-accepted
methodology to asses the impact of trade agreements on trade. Rather than a replacement of
the current methodology, the qual VAR should be seen as a way to determine the robustness
of earlier findings, specifically the average treatment effect of trade agreements on trade.
The next section continues with an overview of the literature on endogenous trade agree-
ments, after which we discuss the qual VAR methodology. Section 6.5 surveys the results
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and computes the average treatment effects of a trade agreement. This is followed by a
discussion of possible extensions to the model and a preliminary conclusion.
6.2 On the endogeneity of trade and trade agreements
Baier and Bergstrand (2002) and Magee (2003) were the first to the explicitly take the en-
dogeneity of trade agreements into account. The former focused on economic determinants
while the latter stressed the importance of political factors.
Using a review of the literature on trade and trade agreements Magee (2003) identified in-
struments for both. These were then used in two separate IV-regressions explaining either
trade agreements or trade. To asses the determinants of trade he used as instruments for
trade agreements: 1) the difference in log GDP, 2) the amount of intra-industry trade, 3) the
bilateral trade surplus, 4) difference in capital labor ratios and 5) the level of democracy.
The number of airports, manageable waterways and wether a country is landlocked were
used to instrument trade. The instrumented probit regression explaining trade agreement
formation confirmed the natural trading partners hypothesis, i.e. that trade agreements were
more likely to form between countries that traded intensively. On the other hand, the instru-
mented gravity model found a highly volatile coefficient on trade agreements. Depending
on the control variables, RIAs were even found to have a significant negative effect on trade.
Baier and Bergstrand (2002) on the other hand based their analysis on a general equilibrium
model explaining the economic determinants of trade agreement.4 They warned that (in a
cross-sectional framework) allowing a simultaneous effect of trade on RIAs and RIAs on
trade (cf. Magee, 2003) resulted in a logical inconsistency; one of the two has to be zero
for the probability of having an agreement and the probability of not having an agreement
to sum up to one –a necessary condition for a probability. While this ruled out the simul-
taneity as the cause of endogeneity, other factors (for example including a trade-imbalances
variable cf. Magee, 2003) could still cause endogeneity. Using the instrumented RIA vari-
able, the agreements’ effect on trade quadrupled. However, further research showed that
IV regressions of the treatment effect of RIAs were highly unstable (ranging from -92% to
+1100%) and that the instruments’s exogeneity was often rejected (Baier and Bergstrand,
4Their regressions also included a number of political variables taken from the literature.
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2004b).
In response, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) turned to panel data, using fixed effects and first
differencing to control for endogeneity caused by selection bias, measurement errors in the
explanatory variables and missing variable bias. To be consistent with trade theory, the esti-
mation of the gravity model required country-time fixed effects to control for time-varying
multilateral resistance terms5 in addition to the endogeneity issues mentioned. Furthermore,
they argued that using first differences also controls for simultaneity since the natural trad-
ing partner hypothesis captures a long term relationship and does not extend to variations in
the level of trade. Similar to their findings in the 2002 paper, signing a RIAs caused trade
flows to double.
To test the robustness of earlier results, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) turned to non-parametric
matching to estimate the average treatment effect of RIAs in cross-sectional data. By match-
ing country-couples with a RIA with a credible counterfactual without one, the effect of an
agreement could be computed regardless of self-selection issues or non-linearities. In con-
trast with the first differences approach, this enabled a computation of the long run treatment
effects. In line with their earlier papers, RIAs were found to have doubled trade flows on
average.
The latest attempt to model the endogeneity of integration agreements and trade flows ex-
plicitly was made by Egger et al. (2011), who returned to an instrumental variable approach
using cross-sectional data. Their estimations combined the endogeneity literature with gen-
eral equilibrium effects of trade agreements and a non-log-linear gravity equation that takes
zero-trade flows into account. As instruments for trade agreements they used three dummy
indicators indicating: 1) whether one of the countries used to be colony of the other; 2)
whether they have a common colonial history; and 3) whether the countries-pair used to be
one country. Their structural gravity model was estimated using a two-part Poisson pseudo
maximum likelihood estimator with an instrumented RIA variable. The average treatment
effect of trade agreements was subsequently computed by using the estimated parameters to
generate a counterfactual trade flow. They found that ignoring endogenous selection biased
the effect of RIAs downwards by as much 188%. Their average treatment effect of 235%
was more than twice as large as was identified in Baier and Bergstrand (2002, 2007, 2009),
but it concealed large differences between country couples.
5See also Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Head and Mayer (2013).
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6.3 The Qualitative VAR model
The foremost advantage of using a (qualitative) VAR is that it allows us to treat trade and
trade agreements as completely endogenous. In contrast to Baier and Bergstrand (2002,
2004b), Magee (2003) or Egger et al. (2011) there is no need to look for instruments that
explain trade while having no effect on trade agreements, or vice versa. Finding instruments
for trade or RIAs is difficult as it is hard to rule out that they have no effect on the other
variable and any that are found are unlikely to explain a large part of the variation in either
variable. Accordingly, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) found that the IV approach produced
too unstable estimates of the size of the effect of trade agreements on trade.
In addition, the qualitative VAR model allows us to take the endogeneity of other variables
into account. For example, GDP and capital-labor ratios have been shown to affect both
trade and integration agreements and are unlikely to remain unaffected by either. For this
reason, the qualitative VAR is more appropriate than the multivariate probit since the latter
"is set up to emphasize cross-sectional correlations among a set of qualitative variables
and the coefficients on exogenous covariates. VARs, in contrast, are better suited to a
small system of endogenous variables and a relatively large number of autoregressive lags"
(Dueker, 2005a, p.97). The VAR allows us to model the endogeneity as autoregressive
variables as opposed to autoregressive errors.
Finally, by modeling the interaction between trade and trade agreements dynamically, the
logical inconsistency identified in Baier and Bergstrand (2002) can be avoided. Both trade
and the willingness to form trade agreements depend on what happened in the past. By def-
inition, trade agreements have a unit root: unless some action is taken by both governments,
the existence of a trade agreement today will be the same as that of yesterday. Similarly,
shocks to the aggregate trade flows show a high degree of persistence even if particular
categories within those flows are more volatile. By modeling their interaction dynamically,
trade can depend on trade agreements and trade agreements can depend on trade without
creating the logical inconsistencies such dependency would cause in cross-sectional studies.
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6.3.1 Building a simple qualitative VAR
Assuming for simplicity’s sake that we have only two endogenous variables: trade (X) and
regional integration agreements (RIA). Ignoring the endogeneity of trade, a static probit
model explaining RIAs can be written down using a latent variable RIA⋆:
RIA⋆i j,t = φ1 Xi j,t +xi j,t b1+c1i j +ε1i j,t (6.1)
RIAi j,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if RIA⋆i j,t ≤ 0
1 otherwise.
Xi j,t denotes the (log of the) total trade between countries i and j at time t. RIAi j,t is a
dummy variable indicating whether the two countries are members of the same trade agree-
ment at time t and RIA⋆ is its latent continuous equivalent. c1i j holds a vector of constants/-
fixed effects, while xi j,t contains the remaining exogenous explanatory variables. In a probit
model, the error term ε1 is assumed to come from a normal distribution in which variance
is normalized to one on order to identify the model.
Baier and Bergstrand (2004a) interpret RIA⋆ as the minimal willingness of both countries
to sign an integration agreement. Since both countries have to agree, it is the country with
the smallest willingness that will ultimately decide whether or not an agreement is signed.
However, this interpretation runs into some problems especially when used in the dynamic
setting. Without additional assumptions, there is no guarantee that the minima of two linear
functions is itself linear. Moreover, a change in which of the two countries has the smallest
willingness would also alter the parameter values. An interpretation that would avoid both
problems is if RIA⋆ is the average willingness to sign. The underlying assumption is that
countries can compensate each other either monetarily or for example through concessions
in other parts of the agreement. A county with a lot to gain from the agreement could in this
way try to compensate an unwilling partner, making their average willingness the deciding
factor. This would avoid the problems associated with minima, at the cost of introducing
bartering to the RIA negotiations.
It should be pointed out that RIA⋆ is simply a mechanical feature that allows us to write
the probit model in a linear way. The meaning we ascribe to it does not alter the parame-
ters of the probit regression, although it does have repercussions for the way in which the
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theoretical model is translated to the empirical specification. However, as this discussion
would lead us too far from the main point of this chapter we will simply refer to RIA⋆ as
the willingness to sign, leaving out whether this is a minimum or an average.
Secondly, a static log-linear gravity model that ignores the endogeneity of trade agreements
is given by equation 6.2. The error term ε2i j,t also comes from a normal distribution and has
variance σ2. Using similar control variables x and fixed effects matrix c2,i j we get:
Xi j,t = φ2 RIAi j,t +xi j,t b2+c2i j +ε2i j,t (6.2)
To construct a qualitative VAR, the RIA dummy in the gravity equation is first replaced
by the latent RIA⋆ from the probit model. Equations 6.2 and 6.1 are then stacked and the
endogenous variables are modeled dynamically. Using p lags on each endogenous variable,
the reduced form can be written as:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
RIA⋆i j,t
Xi j,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
p∑
k=1Φ(k)
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
RIA⋆i j,t−k
Xi j,t−k
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+b x′i j,t +ci j +εi j,t (6.3)
RIAi j,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if RIA⋆i j,t ≤ 0
1 otherwise.
(6.4)
Φ(k) is an (m×m) matrix holding the parameters on the kth lag of the m endogenous vari-
ables. In this simple example m is equal to two, but Xi j,t could also be interpreted as a vec-
tor containing multiple continuous endogenous variables. The remaining parameters and
the error term can be obtained by stacking their counterparts: b = [b′1,b′2]′, ci j = [c1i j ,c2i j]′
and εi j,t = [ε1i j,t ,ε2i j,t ]′. The error term εi j,t is assumed to come from an independent and
identically normal distribution with zero mean and variance matrix Σ. Similar to the probit
regression with latent variables, identification of the model requires the assumption that the
first diagonal element of Σ is one:
Σ = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 σ12
σ21 σ2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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6.3.2 Estimation using Bayesian Gibbs sampling
Using a Bayesian Gibbs sampler allows us to split up the estimation of this system into
multiple parts. Instead of having to compute the entire (posterior) probability of all param-
eters at once, it is separated into various conditional probabilities that are much easier to
solve. The Gibbs sampler iteratively draws from those probabilities while conditioning on
the values from the previous draws: a1 ∼ p(a∣b1), b2 ∼ p(b∣a1), a2 ∼ p(a∣b2), etc. After a
certain number of draws, these draws will have converged to the unconditional posterior
and the remaining draws can be used to reconstruct the distribution of the parameters (Koop
and Korobilis, 2009).
To simplify the notation used in the remainder of this section, the parameters of the qual-
itative VAR are condensed to the variance Σ and the parameter coefficients Θ = {ci j,b,Φ}
where Φ = {Φ(1),⋯,Φ(p)}.
If the latent variable RIA⋆i j,t were known, equation 6.3 could be estimated using seemingly
unrelated regression techniques. However, computing and drawing values for the latent
variable conditional on the parameters in equation 6.3 (Θ and Σ) is less straightforward. The
mean and standard deviation of RIA⋆i j,t depend on past and future values of the endogenous
variables, as well as the current values of the exogenous variables. However, as Dueker
(2005b) noted, a simple rewrite of this model reveals a state-space model which can be
estimated and drawn from using a modified Kalman filter (cf. infra, section 6.3.2). In
addition to the computational convenience this offers, the multi-move sampling technique
also ensures a faster convergence.
By imposing an independent normal-Wishart prior on Θ and Σ, the conditional posterior
distributions remain relatively simple. Throughout this chapter, we used an uninformative
prior on Σ, combined with a Minisota prior on Θ. The Minisota prior allows for prior
shrinkage, exponentially decreasing the weight of the parameters on higher lags. This helps
ensure that the Gibbs sampler converges even when the number of endogenous variables
and lags increases (Koop and Korobilis, 2009).
The matrix ci j can be adjusted to estimate a wide range of models, including sender and
target fixed effects that control for (time-invariant) multilateral resistance terms. In a pro-
bit model, the incidental parameter problem cannot be circumvented by using demeaned
variables. As a result, the fixed effects can only be estimated by including a large number
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of dummy variables (Egger et al., 2011). Following Guimarães and Portugal (2009), the
estimation of the dummies is separated from the other variables in Θ, keeping the size of
the matrix that needs to be inverted under control.
Figure 6.1 summarizes the different loops in the Gibbs sampler. From left to right, it pro-
vides an overview of how the Gibbs sampler separates the posterior distribution of θ and Σ
into conditional probabilities. Step A shows how Dueker (2005a,b) first split up the poste-
rior by introducing the latent variable RIA⋆. The next section describes how RIA⋆ can be
computed and drawn from if we know what Θ and Σ are. Step B and C illustrate how those
parameters can be drawn conditional on RIA⋆. Appendix 6.A lists the probability distribu-
tions of each step, but for an exhaustive overview we refer the reader to Koop and Korobilis
(2009) and Guimarães and Portugal (2009).
Figure 6.1: Structure of the Gibbs sampler algorithm
θ,Σ∣RIA,X ,x ⇒
A
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
RIA⋆∣RIA,Θ,Σ,X ,x ∼N
Θ,Σ∣RIA⋆,X ,x ⇒
B
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Σ∣Θ,RIA⋆,X ,x ∼ iW
Θ∣Σ,RIA⋆,X ,x ⇒
C
{ b,Φ∣Σ,RIA⋆,X ,x,ci j ∼Nci j∣Σ,RIA⋆,X ,x,Φ,b ∼N
N : Normal distribution
iW : inverse Wishart distribution⇒
A
: Dueker (2005a,b)⇒
B
: Koop and Korobilis (2009)⇒
C
: Guimarães and Portugal (2009)
The conditional distribution of the latent variable RIA⋆
The final step of the Gibbs sampler computes and draws from the distribution of RIA⋆,
conditional on the parameters of the qualitative VAR. In a static probit model this can be
solved by drawing from a truncated normal distribution to ensure the values of RIA⋆ are
positive when an agreement is signed and vice versa. In the qualitative VAR on the other
hand, the dynamics make it so that the distribution of RIA⋆ at moment t will depend on
the previous values and will in turn influence future values. However, instead of having
to compute this dependence over p lags and estimate RIA⋆ for the entire time-period, the
qualitative VAR can be rewritten into a state-space model which can solved observation by
observation.
6.3. The Qualitative VAR model 195
A state-space model is built around two equations that define the behavior of an unknown,
to-be-estimated state vector. The state equation (equation 6.5) describes the change in the
state vector St over time: the way in which it depends on its previous values (µ and F)
and how big the changes in each period can be (ν1). Secondly, the measurement equation
(equation 6.6) specifies how this state-vector in turn is related to a number of observed
variables (Xt). Specifically, it states how the observed variables are scaled (H) and what
their reliability is (ν2). The error terms ν1 and ν2 are assumed to be normally distributed.
St = µ+FSt−1+ν1,t (6.5)
Xt = H St +ν2,t (6.6)
The Kalman filter and smoother algorithms can be used to compute the distribution of the
state vector at each point in time. The strength of these algorithms lies in the fact that
they do this iteratively which significantly reduces the computational burden. In each step
they use the state equation to predict the current value of St based on the past (Kalman
filter) or future (Kalman smoother) estimates of S. This prediction is then updated using the
information in Xt whose scaling and reliability is determined by the measurement equation
(Kim and Nelson, 1999).
Applying this logic to the qualitative VAR model, the willingness to sign (RIA⋆) is the un-
known state while the information in RIAi j,t and Xi j,t serves as the observed measurements.
To rewrite equation 6.3 as a state-space model, the vector of endogenous variables is first
summarized as a (m× 1) vector Yi j,t = [RIA⋆i j,t ,Xi j,t]′. The state variable is subsequently
obtained by stacking p lags of this vector, St = [Y ′i j,t ,⋯,Y ′i j,t−p+1]′, resulting in the following
model:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Yi j,t
Yi j,t−1⋮
Yi j,t−p+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ci j,t +b x′i j,t
0⋮
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Φ(1) Φ(2) ⋯ Φ(p)
I 0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 ⋯ I 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Yi j,t−1
Yi j,t−2⋮
Yi j,t−p
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
εi j,t
0⋮
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(6.7)
Xi j,t = [ 01×m−1 Im−1 0 ⋯ 0 ]
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Yi j,t
Yi j,t−1⋮
Yi j,t−p+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(6.8)
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The first row of the state equation (6.7) simply repeats the qualitative VAR model
(equation 6.3). ci j +b x′i j,t is a simple -albeit time-varying- scalar, since this step of
the Gibbs sampler algorithm is conditional on the parameter values Θ and Σ. The
measurement equation (6.8) establishes the relation between Yi j,t and the continuous
endogenous variable(s) Xi j,t . Without an error term in the measurement equation,
only the first element of the state variable can vary in each draw: RIA⋆i j,t . The values
of the other endogenous variables are kept fixed.
The main difference with a standard state-space model is that the error term is not
multivariate normally distributed. Similar to the probit model, the error term has
to be drawn from a truncated normal distribution to ensure that RIA⋆ is positive
when a RIA is signed. This means that the expected value and standard deviation
of εi j,t changes depending on whether or not a trade agreement has been signed.
Appendix 6.A gives an overview of how this affects the Kalman filter and smoother
algorithms.
6.3.3 Identifying the structural model
Because this chapter is intended more as a proof of concept of using a qualitative
VAR in the analysis of trade flows, the identification of the structural model has
purposefully been kept simple. A Cholesky decomposition is used to impose a
strict ordering in the timing of each variable. Other possible identification methods
are discussed in the extensions (section 6.6). It should be mentioned that the choice
of identification strategy will only affect the structural impulse response functions.
The average treatment effects on the other hand are computed using the reduced
model’s parameters.
While trade agreements are assumed to be able to immediately affect trade, the will-
ingness to close trade agreements adjusts more slowly.6 This reflects the fact that
the negotiation of trade agreements takes time. When added as an endogenous vari-
able, the remaining variables are ordered as: 1) RIA; 2) trade; 3) capital-labor ratio;
6This falls along the lines of the restriction used in Baier and Bergstrand (2002, section VII-A)
that ensures the logical consistency of the cross-sectional model.
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4) difference in GDP; 5) average GDP. The cholesky decomposition imposes that
each variable has no immediate effect on those preceding it, but can be contempo-
raneously affected by them.
6.4 Data
The baseline model uses a simple dummy indicator that captures whether or not
two countries are currently members of the same trade agreement (RIA). This
variable was composed using the information in the WTO’s Regional Integration
Agreements Information System and the United Nations University’s Comparative
Regional Integration Studies electronic platform: the Regional Integration Knowl-
edge System. Both databases combined provided information on 251 agreements
covering 205 countries from 1950 to 2015. Agreements between a customs union
and another country were ascribed to all members of the customs union at that time.
The complete list can be found in appendix 6.B.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2004a), the trade agreements variable was de-
fined per country-pair. This gave a total of 205×2042 ≈ 20,000 country couples and
850,000 observations. However, when combined with the availability in trade data
and discarding zero-trade flows about 275,000 observations are left. Trade flows
were measured as the sum of the logs of exports and imports.7 For now, zero trade
flows were ignored, but a solution to this problem in the line of Egger et al. (2011)
is discussed in the extensions (section 6.6). The other endogenous variables are the
GDPs of both countries and the difference in their capital-labor ratio (DKL). Bi-
lateral trade data was supplied by the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics while the
Penn world tables 8.0 provided information on GDP, population and capital (Feen-
stra et al., 2013).
Information on distance, population and capital was used to create variables ex-
pressing the remoteness of two countries relative to the other countries on their
7This avoids the silver medal mistake of gravity equations which is to take the log of the sum
(Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006).
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continent (remote) and the extent to which their capital-labor ratio differs from that
of the rest of the world (DROWKL). Both variables were computed as described in
Baier and Bergstrand (2004a). The availability of the capital-labor data was similar
to that of GDP allowing us to use both (unlike for example Egger et al., 2011).
Proxies for ice-berg type trade costs were also included as control variables, most
of which came from CEPII’s gravity dataset (Head et al., 2010; Head and Mayer,
2013). These include the log of (population-weighted) distance and a series of
dummies indicating whether two countries neighbor another (contiguity), whether
one country was once a colony of the other (colony), whether they were once col-
onized by the same country (common colony), whether they share an ethnographic
language and whether one of the countries is landlocked. Finally, following Egger
et al. (2011) a number of political variables from the polity IV project were included
(Marshall et al., 2014). Autocracy, political competition (pol. comp.) and durabil-
ity measure the absolute distance of the country-couple in terms of those political
characteristics. Appendix 6.C provides summary statistics.
6.5 Results
Similar to the identification of the structural model, the model specification is kept
simple. The starting point for the gravity equation is a log-linear version of the one
used in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), while the probit model’s specification
is based on Baier and Bergstrand (2004a). The gravity equation includes country-
fixed effects to control for multilateral resistance terms, but unlike Baldwin and
Taglioni (2006); Baier and Bergstrand (2007) or Head and Mayer (2013) they are
kept constant over time.8 A further simplification is that the same exogenous control
variables are used in both equation. The issue of making the model specification
more consistent with the trade theory is revisited in section 6.6.
Both equations are adjusted to the VAR framework by including the endogenous
8Egger and Nigai (2015) note that the country-year fixed effects are correlated with the error term
and as a result still produce biased results.
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variables (Yi j,t) dynamically. In other words, as opposed to static models that try to
estimate the long-term equilibrium relation, the focus is shifted to the adjustment
to the long-term equilibrium. This gives rise to two models: a limited model where
only trade and RIAs are endogenous and the full model where the GDP and capital
labor ratios are also modeled endogenously. In both cases, the reduced form of the
qualitative VAR can be written as:
Y⋆i j,t = p∑
k=1Φ(k) Yi j,t−k+b x′i j,t +ci+c j +εi j,t (6.9)
with xi j,t a vector of control variables, ci and c j country fixed effects and εi j,t the
normally distributed error term with variance-covariance matrix Σ.
6.5.1 Limited model
In the limited model Yi j,t is equal to [RIA⋆i j,t , Xi j,t]′. The exogenous variables xi j,t
control for the country size and relative factor endowments by including the log of
the GDPs of both countries and the difference in their capital labor ratios (DKL) in
addition to the other control variables listed in the previous section. The GDPs were
labeled such that country i is on average larger than country j throughout the period
of the study.9
The parameter values of the reduced model are listed in table 6.1, however these
cannot be used directly to study the effects of a change as this would ignore the
dynamics of the system. To take these into account, the Cholesky decomposition
is first used to transform the model into its structural equivalent as detailed in sec-
tion 6.3.3. The structural parameters are subsequently used to compute the impulse
response functions (irf) shown in figure 6.2. The irf show the change in the en-
dogenous variables in response to a temporary shock (or impulse) in each of the
endogenous variables. These shocks, indicated between brackets, happen at mo-
ment t = 0 and correspond to one standard deviation in the shocked variable. The
x-axis shows the number of years since the shock and the y-axis shows the resulting
9This only altered the labels on the variables without affecting the selection of country-pairs.
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change in the value of the variable in question. Finally, the 90% confidence inter-
vals are indicated by the blue dotted lines. We will use coordinates to refer to an
individual response function by counting the number of rows and columns starting
from the top left corner (cf. matrices).
Table 6.1: Reduced parameter values of the limited model - World
RIA⋆ st.e. X st.e.
L1.RIA⋆ 0.0456a (0.0051) 0.0051a (0.0010)
L2.RIA⋆ −0.0036a (0.0013) 0.0008 (0.0007)
L1.X 0.0788a (0.0077) 0.6015a (0.0023)
L2.X 0.0548a (0.0067) 0.2430a (0.0022)
GDPi 0.5394a (0.0206) 0.1825a (0.0039)
GDP j 0.0478a (0.0072) 0.1641a (0.0035)
DKL −0.1210a (0.0073) −0.0082a (0.0025)
DROWKL −0.7203a (0.0408) 0.0255c (0.0159)
Distance −1.0381a (0.0220) −0.1932a (0.0044)
Contiguous −0.4161a (0.0310) 0.1122a (0.0114)
Landlocked 0.0508 (0.0563) −0.0899a (0.0164)
Remote 0.0050b (0.0022) 0.0015b (0.0007)
Colony 0.061 (0.0489) 0.2466a (0.0162)
Common colony −0.2591a (0.0292) 0.1289a (0.0109)
Language 0.0708a (0.0161) 0.0748a (0.0069)
WTO 0.1973a (0.0271) −0.0018 (0.0074)
Autocracy 0.0416a (0.0034) 0.0012 (0.0012)
Pol. comp −0.0404a (0.0033) −0.0014 (0.0011)
Durability −0.0038a (0.0003) −0.0006a (0.0001)
nObs 167410 167410
Fixed effects sender & target sender & target
Reduced parameter estimates of the limited, worldwide qualitative VAR model with two lags.
Standard errors between brackets. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
For example, the top right panel has coordinates [1,2]. The title RIA⋆ (X) indicates
that it plots the change in the value of the latent variable RIA⋆ in response to a
shock in the log of trade of one standard deviation. It reveals that an increase in
trade will significantly raise the willingness to enter into a RIA, corroborating the
natural trading partner hypothesis of Krugman (1995). Secondly, panel [2,1] shows
that a shock to RIA⋆ will significantly raise bilateral trade. However, while the irf
can reveal the sign and significance of the effect of trade agreements on trade, they
cannot be used to measure the size of the effect. The reason is that it is not clear
whether a shock of one standard deviation in the willingness to sign an agreement
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Figure 6.2: Structural impulse response functions of the limited model - World
Responses in trade and the willingness to form a trade agreement following a shock of one standard
deviation in the impulse variable (between parentheses). The x-axis shows the number of years
since the shock (at t = 0). 90% confidence intervals are indicated by the blue interrupted lines.
would actually result in an agreement being signed (cf. section 6.5.3).10
With a few exceptions the behavior of most control variables falls within expec-
tations (table 6.1). The long-term parameter on GDP and distance in the gravity
equation are (slightly) higher than one, but lie within the bounds of what is found in
other studies (Head and Mayer, 2013): β¯GDPi = 0.1831−(0.602+0.243) ≈ 1.17; β¯GDPj ≈ 1.01
and β¯Distance ≈ −1.24. The negative coefficient on DKL in the RIA⋆ equation does
not match with the findings of Baier and Bergstrand (2004a), but for example Magee
(2003) and Márquez-Ramos et al. (2011) found similar signs in their probit regres-
sion.11 The negative coefficients on DROWKL and contiguity are unexpected, but
are counteracted through their effect on trade. Moreover, they disappear when DKL
10The sign and significance can nevertheless be identified because the values of RIA⋆ are deter-
mined by the actual value of the RIA dummy (equation 6.4).
11Magee (2003) connects the negative coefficient on DKL to the political economy argument
of Levy (1997) that agreements are more likely to form between homogenous countries. A small
difference in capital-labor ratios indicates a similar economic structure, which raises the likelihood
that an agreement can be reached.
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and GDP are considered endogenous (cf. infra). In contrast with the instruments
used in Egger et al. (2011), colonial history is an inconsistent predictor of trade
agreements once the level of trade is controlled for: colony is insignificant and
while common colonial history is significant it changes sign in the full model. This
lends further weight against the practice of estimating the effect of trade agreements
through an instrumental variable approach (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004b). The re-
maining political variables also perform inconsistently. Only the similarity in terms
of political competition will consistently positively affect the willingness to sign.
6.5.2 Full model
In contrast with the limited model, the full model uses the average and difference
in the log of the GDPs. This is done so that all endogenous variables vary on
three dimensions (sender-target-year), as opposed to two dimensions when the level
of GDP of both countries is entered separately (country-year). Combining data
in different dimensions would otherwise create problems when stacking data on
different countries/country-pairs.12 Using the averages and differences is how GDP
is typically modeled in the probit regression (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004a). The
implication for the gravity model is that the same coefficient is imposed on both
GDPs, an assumption that is consistent with the theory and can be found throughout
the literature (e.g. Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
When the difference in capital labor ratios is also considered endogenous, Yi j,t is
equal to [RIA⋆i j,t , Xi j,t , DKLi j,t , GDPdiff i j,t , GDPavi j,t]′ in the full model. The
control variables in xi j,t remain the same (except for those that are now treated as
endogenous) and country fixed effects are included in all equations.
The model was first run for the entire world (figure 6.3) after which the estimation
repeated for only European countries (figure 6.4) and African countries (figure 6.5).
The three figures paint a very similar picture overall, but the sign and significance
12The literature on global VARs deals with variables of different dimensions (e.g. Pesaran et al.,
2004), but in this framework this would imply estimating a model with more than 40,000 equations as
each country-couple’s trade and willingness to sign RIAs would have to be estimated simultaneously.
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of some irf can change depending on the region studied. Overall the interaction
between trade and trade agreements is not altered when GDP and DKL are consid-
ered endogenous. The effect of a shock to the willingness to sign on trade remains
positive when DKL and GDP are considered endogenous (panel [2,1]). The effect
of a shock to trade on RIA⋆ is also positive and while it is barely significant for
the world, it is strongly significant in both subsamples (panel [1,2]). Furthermore,
an increase in the willingness to sign will decreases the difference in GDP and in-
crease the average GDP in all samples (panels [4,1] and [5,1]). A shock to trade on
the other hand will increase average GDP (panel [5,2]), but its effect on DKL and
the GDPdi f f changes depending on the estimation sample (panels [3,2] and [4,2]).
As was the case in the limited model, an increase in DKL will lower the willingness
to sign (panel [1,3]). Worldwide it will also lower trade but the opposite is true in
the European and African subsamples (panel [2,3]). The effect of an increase in the
difference in GDP on RIA⋆ is ambiguous, but it will decrease trade (panels [1,4]
and [2,4]). Finally an increase in the average GDP will increase both trade and the
likelihood of signing an agreement, but this is not always significant (panels [1,5]
and [2,5]).
6.5.3 Assessing the effect of trade agreements on trade
The impulse response functions shown earlier help give an insight into the sign and
long run dynamics of the effect of trade on the willingness to join a regional integra-
tion agreement. However, there is a difference between the effect of "a rise in the
willingness to sign" on trade and the effect of "signing" a trade agreement. Similar
to the interpretation of the estimation results of a probit model, the parameter values
are not equal to the marginal effect on the dependent variable. While the impulse re-
sponse functions can show the importance of taking the dynamics and endogeneity
into account, they cannot be used to estimate the average treatment effect of signing
a trade agreement.
The average treatment effect of RIA on trade can be expressed as AT E =E(X ∣.,RIA=
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Figure 6.3: Structural impulse response functions of the full model - World
Responses in trade, the willingness to form a RIA, average and difference in GDP and the
capital-labor ratio to a shock of one standard deviation in the impulse variable (between
parentheses). The x-axis shows the number of years since the shock (at t = 0). 90% confidence
intervals are indicated by the blue interrupted lines. The variables are listed in the order of the
Cholesky decomposition.
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Figure 6.4: Structural impulse response functions of the full model - Europe
Responses in the willingness to form a RIA, trade, average and difference in GDP and the
capital-labor ratio to a shock of one standard deviation in the impulse variable (between
parentheses). The x-axis shows the number of years since the shock (at t = 0). 90% confidence
intervals are indicated by the blue interrupted lines. The variables are listed in the order of the
Cholesky decomposition.
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Figure 6.5: Structural impulse response functions of the full model - Africa
Responses in trade, the willingness to form a RIA, average and difference in GDP and the
capital-labor ratio to a shock in the impulse variable of one standard deviation (between
parentheses). The x-axis shows the number of years since the shock (at t = 0). 90% confidence
intervals are indicated by the blue interrupted lines. The variables are listed in the order of the
Cholesky decomposition.
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1)−E(X ∣.,RIA = 0). The difficulty assessing the treatment effect is identifying
the right counterfactual. Either a country-pair signed an agreement and what trade
would be without an agreement is unknown, or vice versa. The dummies that tra-
ditionally have been used in gravity equations have been shown to lead to severe
parameter instability, even when controlling for endogeneity. Their sign, size and
significance changes depending on the study, methodology and even the included
control variables (e.g. Magee, 2003). Instead, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) used
a non-parametric matching technique to find existing county-couples with similar
characteristics but without a trade agreement. Egger et al. (2011) used the estimated
parameters on trade and trade agreements to generate the appropriate counterfactual
for each country-couple.
The approach we suggest is similar to that of Egger et al. (2011). Using the business-
cycle filter from Dueker and Nelson (2006) it is possible to generate values of trade
conditional on any value of RIA⋆. By ensuring that the willingness to sign is never
greater than zero, we can impose that no trade agreement was signed. The coun-
terfactuals are generated by reversing the roles of the variables in the state-space
model described in section 6.3.2. RIA⋆ is fixed at r¯ while new values of the other en-
dogenous variables are computed and drawn (X˜). Substituting Y˜i j,t = [RIA⋆i j,t , X˜i j,t]′
results in a similar state equation, but changes the measurement equation.
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Y˜i j,t
Y˜i j,t−1⋮
Y˜i j,t−p+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ci j,t +b x′i j,t
0⋮
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Φ(1) Φ(2) ⋯ Φ(p)
I 0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 ⋯ I 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Y˜i j,t−1
Y˜i j,t−2⋮
Y˜i j,t−p
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
εi j,t
0⋮
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(6.10)
r¯ = [ 1 01×m−1 0 ⋯ 0 ]
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Y˜i j,t
Y˜i j,t−1⋮
Y˜i j,t−p+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(6.11)
The model specified in equations 6.10 and 6.11 treats the latent integration agree-
ment variable as the only observed data. However, this approach can be further
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augmented to also take historical data into account. In that case, the counterfactual
will try to follow historical data to the extent that it corresponds with an unchanged
willingness to sign a RIA. Incorporating the historical aspect becomes especially
interesting as more variables (for example GDPs and capital-labor ratios) are mod-
eled as endogenous. To generate values of trade that fall in between these two cases,
Dueker (2005a) proposes the following measurement equation:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
r¯
α Xi j,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 01×m−1 0 ⋯ 0
0m−1×1 α Im−1 0 ⋯ 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Y˜i j,t
Y˜i j,t−1⋮
Y˜i j,t−p+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
α ηi j,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (6.12)
If the smoothing parameter α is zero, equation 6.12 is the same as 6.11. However,
as α grows the counterfactual will increasingly reflect the historical data. The error
term ηi j,t = Xi j,t − X˜i j,t is normally distributed with mean zero and variance matrix
Ω. The latter can be drawn from an inverse Wishart distribution in the same way
as Σ (Dueker and Nelson, 2006). To further reduce the informational value of the
historical series, their values were set to missing whenever a trade agreement was
signed.
To illustrate, figure 6.6 plots both actual values and the computed counterfactual
for the bilateral trade between Mexico and the United States. The black lines show
the actual values of the endogenous variables, while the counterfactual and its 90%
confidence interval are indicated by the blue interrupted and dotted lines. In addition
to the dummy indicating whether or not a trade agreement was signed (RIA), the
top panel also shows the willingness to sign trade agreements (RIA⋆) and its 90%
confidence interval. This shows quite clearly that as an agreement is signed, RIA⋆
changes from negative to positive. Also plotted in the top panel is the value of RIA⋆
that was used to compute the counterfactual. r¯ follows RIA⋆ until a trade agreement
is signed after which is set to zero. This means that the counterfactuals are generated
under the highest possible willingness to sign that still corresponds to no agreement
being signed. In this way, they correspond to a lower bound on the effect of the
RIA.
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Figure 6.6: Counterfactual flows for Mexico-United States (full model)
Estimated treatment effect of trade agreements on the Mexico-United States willingness to form
trade agreements, log trade, difference in captial-labor ratio, difference in log GDP and average of
log GDP. Actual values are indicted by the full black line. The counterfactual and its 90%
confidence interval are indicated by the blue interrupted and blue dotted lines, respectively.
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The remaining panels of figure 6.6 show what trade, the difference in the capital
labor ratios and the difference in, and average of GDP would have been if Mexico’s
and the United States’ willingness to sign an agreement never rose above zero.
Almost immediately after signing the agreement, the counterfactual level of trade
(in logs) starts to diverge from the actual level and the estimated increase from
signing a trade agreement only becomes bigger over time. However, this difference
remains within the 90% confidence bounds. The counterfactual difference in the
capital labor ratios and the GDPs is lower than the actual values, indicating that
NAFTA led both countries to diverge. At the same time, the effect on the average
GDP is negligible.
The average treatment effect is computed from the individual counterfactual flows.
The percentage difference between real values and counterfactual was averaged
starting from the moment a trade agreement was signed. If ysi j year in which the
country-couple i j signed a trade agreement, the average treatment effect of an agree-
ment after τ years is:
AT Eτ =meani j (Xi j,t−ysi j+τ− X˜i j,t−ysi j+τ) (6.13)
where the mean is taken over all country couples that have signed a trade agreement
at least τ years ago, with the exception of those that entered the dataset with an
active trade agreement.
Figure 6.7 plots the worldwide average treatment effect of a trade agreement over
time for all endogenous variables. It shows that the average percentage increase
in trade is 10% in the first year, 40% after 5 years and 50% after 10 years. It
subsequently rises slowly to 80% after 35 years. However, this estimate is based
on fewer country-couples, causing the width of the confidence interval to increase
strongly. The bottom panel shows that the number of country couples decreases
steadily from around a thousand in the first five years to less than a hundred for the
last five years. Overall, integration agreements have lead to a convergence of the
capital labor ratios, but a divergence in terms of GDPs. The effect on the average
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Figure 6.7: Average treatment effects in percentage terms (full model)
Average treatment effect of trade agreements on trade, the difference in capital-labor ratios,
difference in GDP and average GDP. 90% onfidence interval indicated by the interrupted blue lines.
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GDP is small to zero in the first 20 years. It subsequently starts to increase to about
10% after 35 years. In combination with the increase in the difference in GDP, this
seems to indicate that the increase in GDP is one-sided and possibly even at the
expense of the growth of the partner country. However, the effects after 20 years
might simply be a characteristic of the smaller group of country-couples that have
had an agreement for this long.
6.6 Extensions
In contrast with the dynamic nature of the qualitative VAR, the theories underly-
ing the gravity model and the formation of trade agreements are essentially static.
The model estimated in equation 6.9 has naively translated the econometric spec-
ification to a dynamic setting, while ignoring the underlying theoretical models.
A first important extension would be to ensure that the the dynamic equations are
theoretically sound, especially if they are used to generate counterfactuals. A first
extension to the model would be to explicitly incorporate the time-varying multi-
lateral resistance terms as latent variables, allowing us to control for the indirect,
general-equilibrium effect of trade agreements (cf. Egger et al., 2011).
Secondly, in the current model the equations on the endogenous variables are treated
the same and include the same control variables. Moreover, the endogenous vari-
ables have all been allowed to directly influence one another. However, through a
simple change in the priors the direct influence of for example the average GDP on
the difference in capital labor ratio could be removed. These and other restrictions,
including the number of lags, could subsequently be tested using Bayesian model
selection techniques (Koop, 2003).
A third simplification concerns the way integration agreements have been incorpo-
rated. The RIAi j,t dummy considered all integration agreements equal, overlooking
the vast differences between them. The qualitative VAR model can be extended rel-
atively easily to incorporate agreements of different depth by extending the probit
model to an ordered probit model (Dueker, 2005b). The difficulty would lie in the
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categorization of the integration agreements.13 Wu (2006) for example constructed
a database dividing agreements into preferential trade agreements, customs unions,
common markets, and economic unions. Alternatively, Kohl et al. (2014) decon-
structed the depth of 296 trade agreements, checking whether they made any legally
enforceable restrictions in 17 trade-related policy domains. This dataset would al-
low the construction of a index of the depth of an agreement in a way that did not
depend so strongly on a one-track, EU-dominated view of regional integration.
Additionally, while the identification of the structural model does not affect the
average treatment effects, its influence on the impulse response functions should
be checked. A first robustness test would be to impose a different ordering of the
variables in the Cholesky decomposition. Other possible ways of identifying the
structural model include sign restrictions. The latter would also allow us to look at
the timing of the effects of trade agreements in addition to strengthening the link
between the qual VAR with the theory on trade and trade agreements.
Zero trade flows
Finally, the estimations presented thus far have ignored the issue of zero-trade flows.
Trade was simply log-transformed, removing any zero trade flows from the regres-
sions. Egger et al. (2011) have found that the resulting selection effects can bias the
estimate of the effect of trade agreements downwards by as much as 35%. However,
similar to the treatment of the binary trade agreement variable, it should be possible
to control for this selection bias using a latent variable.14
Equation 6.14 is the multiplicative version of the gravity model used in the qualita-
tive VAR model (equation 6.3).
Xi j = exp(φ2 RIAi j,t−1+xi j,t b2+c2i j) ζi j,t (6.14)
13Since the model is used to assess the impact of trade agreements, the initial categorization can
only be based on ex ante differences in scope and depth of the agreement. Any indicator of its
effectiveness should be left out.
14See for example Koop (2003) for the Bayesian estimation of a Tobit model using latent variables.
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where ζ is drawn from a log-normal distribution N (0,σ2).
By creating a new latent variable, X⋆, equation 6.14 can be log-transformed without
losing the zero-trade flows. This latent trade variable could be seen as the desired
trade given the present supply, demand and trade costs. If it is positive, trade will
be equal to its exponent while if it is negative, trade is simply zero (Li, 1998).
X⋆i j = φ2 Yi j,t−1+xi j,t b2+c2i j +ε2i j,t (6.15)
Xi j,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if X⋆i j,t ≤ 0
exp(X⋆i j,t) otherwise. (6.16)
Combining this with the determinants of trade agreements and adding p lags, the
qualitative gravity model becomes:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
RIA⋆i j,t
X⋆i j,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
p∑
k=1Φ(k)
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
RIA⋆i j,t−k
X⋆i j,t−k
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+b x′i j,t +ci j +εi j,t (6.17)
RIAi j,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if RIA⋆i j,t ≤ 0
1 otherwise
(6.18)
Xi j,t = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if X⋆i j,t ≤ 0
exp(X⋆i j,t) otherwise. (6.19)
Estimating the qualitative VAR model with the untruncated trade variable follows
the approach outlined in section 6.3.2. To that end the state-space model is adjusted
to draw values of both X⋆ and RIA⋆:
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⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Yi j,t
Yi j,t−1⋮
Yi j,t−p+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
b x′i j,t +ci j
0⋮
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Φ(1) Φ(2) ⋯ Φ(p)
I 0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 ⋯ I 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Yi j,t−1
Yi j,t−2⋮
Yi j,t−p
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
εi j,t
0⋮
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(6.20)
log(Xi j,t) = [ 01×m−1 Im−1 0 ⋯ 0 ]
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Yi j,t
Yi j,t−1⋮
Yi j,t−p+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
if Xi j,t > 0 (6.21)
0 = [ 01×m−1 0m−1 0 ⋯ 0 ]
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Yi j,t
Yi j,t−1⋮
Yi j,t−p+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
if Xi j,t = 0 (6.22)
6.7 Preliminary Conclusion
This chapter uses a qualitative VAR to bring together the literature explaining the
causes of regional integration agreements with gravity equations in which its effects
are measured. By taking the dynamic behavior of trade and RIAs into account, there
is no need to look for the elusive instruments that affect trade but not agreements
or vice versa. Furthermore, their endogenous relation can be identified without
running afoul of any logical inconsistencies that pose a problem in cross-sectional
studies.
Our preliminary findings confirm the usefulness of studying the behavior of trade
and RIAs dynamically. An increase in trade motivates countries to sign integration
agreements and an increase in the willingness to sign in turn raises trade. As could
be expected, these effects take a long time to fully play out. Overall, the effect
of trade agreements on trade and the average GDP are relatively small compared
to what is typically found in the literature. The former increases quickly in the
first 5 years, after which the growth slows down. Trade grows with 10% in the
first year, 40% after 5 years and with about 50% after 10 years, while the average
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GDP initially remains unaffected. After about 35 years, trade has risen 80% and
average GDP with 10%. However, the model needs to be extended further if we
want to compute reliable average treatment effects. The link between the qualitative
VAR model and the theory on trade and trade agreements in particular needs to be
strengthened before any final conclusions can be drawn.
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Appendices
6.A Estimating a Qual VAR
A. Drawing the paramater values
Let z(k)i j,t be the vector of all exogenous and lagged endogenous explanatory variables
in the kth equation and m the number of endogenous variables, we can write the
qualitative VAR model (6.3) as:
Yi j,t = ci j +Zi j,tβ+εi j,t (6.23)
with
Zi j,t =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
z(1)i j,t 0 ⋯ 0
0 z(2)i j,t ⋯ 0⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ z(m)i j,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Yi j,t = [Y (1)i j,t ,⋯,Y (m)i j,t ]′, β = [β(1),⋯,β(m)]′ and εi j,t = [ε(1)i j,t ,⋯,ε(m)i j,t ]′ ∼N(0,Σ).
The prior distribution of the parameters employed can be written as:
β ∼ N(b,V b) (6.24)
Σ ∼ iWish(S,ν) (6.25)
Using the the maximum likelihood estimates as a starting point, the Gibbs sam-
pler progresses through the following conditional posterior probabilities (Koop and
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Korobilis, 2009):
1. β∣ci j,Σ,RIA⋆,Z ∼N (β¯,V¯β)
with
V¯β = ⎛⎝V−1β +∑i j,t Z′i j,tΣ−1Zi j,t⎞⎠
−1
and
β¯ = V¯β⎛⎝V−1β β+∑i j,t Z′i j,tΣ−1(Yi j,t −ci j)⎞⎠ .
2. ci j∣β,Σ,RIA⋆,Z ∼N(c¯i j,V¯ci j)
with
c¯i j = ∑Ti jt=1(Yi j,t −Zi j,tβ)Ti j
and V¯ci j = diag(Σ)/Ti j. When controlling for sender-target fixed effects, Ti j
is the number of observations covering the country-couple i j. With separate
country fixed effects, it can be split up asci j = ci+c j. To estimate this step 2
is run twice: the first time grouping per sender and the second time per target
(Guimarães and Portugal, 2009).
3. Σ∣β,RIA⋆,Z ∼ iWish(S,T)
with
S =∑
i j,t
(Yi j,t −Zi j,tβ−ci j)(Yi j,t −Zi j,tβ−ci j)′.
and T the total number of observations. Σ is subsequently normalized such
that the first diagonal element is one while preserving the correlation coeffi-
cients (Dueker, 2005a).
After a new value for the variance-covariance matrix is drawn, the new parameter
values for Θ and Σ are used in the Kalman filter and Kalman smoother to draw new
values for RIA⋆. The process is then repeated from step 1 until convergence has
been achieved.
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B. The adjusted Kalman filter and smoother
Unlike the estimation of the parameters Θ, the latent variable can be generated
for each country-couple separately. Dropping the country indices and simplifying
equations 6.7 and 6.8 reveals the familiar state-space model structure.
St = µt +FSt−1+νt (6.26)
Xt = HSt (6.27)
with var(ε) =Q.
Instead of having to estimate the entire model at once, the Kalman filter and smoother
allows us to iteratively estimate and draw from the probability of the latent variable.
Starting from t = 0, the Kalman filter iterates forward through time, computing the
mean and variance of RIA⋆ at time t, conditional on all information up until that
moment. After completing the Kalman filter, a standard simulation smoother al-
gorithm can be used to draw values of RIA⋆ starting at the final observation and
iterating backward. The end result is a new draw of the latent variable which con-
tain all information in the dataset. These can subsequently be used to re-estimate
the parameters of the qualitative VAR model. More information on the Kalman fil-
ter and simulation smoother can be found in Kim and Nelson (1999) and Durbin
and Koopman (2012).
The difference with a normal Kalman filter is that the value of RIA has to be taken
into account. The expected value and variance of the latent variable changes de-
pending on whether the countries have signed an agreement or not. First, the dis-
tribution of St is predicted using the outcome of the previous iteration (Dueker,
2005b):
St∣t−1 = E(St ∣St−1) = µt +F St−1∣t−1+E(νt ∣RIAt) (6.28)
Pt∣t−1 = var(St ∣St−1) = F Pt−1∣t−1 F ′+var(νt ∣RIAt) (6.29)
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Let F1 and µt1 be the first row of matrix F and the first element of the vector µt . If
we define τ = µt1 +F1 St∣t and using φ and Φ to denote the normal pdf and cdf, the
conditional distribution of νt can be written as:
E(νt ∣RIAt) = a = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
− φ(τ)Φ(−τ) if RIAt = 0
φ(τ)
1−Φ(−τ) if RIAt = 1 (6.30)
var(νt ∣RIAt) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1−a2+ τ φ(τ)Φ(−τ) if RIAt = 0
1−a2− τ φ(τ)1−Φ(−τ) if RIAt = 1 (6.31)
After prediction, RIA⋆ is subsequently updated using the information contained in
the measurement equation. The difference between the two is called the Data Fore-
cast Error, while the weight the new information receives, κ, is the Kalman gain.
DFE = Xt −H St∣t−1 (6.32)
κt = Pt+1∣t H′(H Pt∣t−1 H′)−1 (6.33)
St∣t = St∣t−1+κt DFE (6.34)
Pt∣t = Pt∣t−1−κt H Pt∣t−1 (6.35)
After the Kalman filter has completed, a normal Kalman smoother can be used
to compute the distribution of RIA⋆ using all available information, which can be
drawn from using a truncated normal distribution (Dueker, 2005b).
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6.B List of the regional integration agreements
Table 6.2: List of the regional integration agreements
Andean Community of Nations Georgia - Azerbaijan
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) Georgia - Kazakhstan
Armenia - Kazakhstan Georgia - Russian Federation
Armenia - Moldova Georgia - Turkmenistan
Armenia - Russian Federation Georgia - Ukraine
Armenia - Turkmenistan Guatemala - Chinese Taipei
Armenia - Ukraine Hong Kong, China - Chile
ASEAN - Australia - New Zealand Hong Kong, China - New Zealand
ASEAN - China Iceland - China
ASEAN - India Iceland - Faroe Islands
ASEAN - Japan India - Bhutan
ASEAN - Korea, Republic of India - Japan
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) India - Malaysia
Australia - Chile India - Singapore
Australia - New Zealand (ANZCERTA) India - Sri Lanka
Australia - Papua New Guinea (PATCRA) Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)
Brunei Darussalam - Japan Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Canada - Chile Israel - Mexico
Canada - Colombia Japan - Australia
Canada - Costa Rica Japan - Indonesia
Canada - Israel Japan - Malaysia
Canada - Jordan Japan - Mexico
Canada - Panama Japan - Peru
Canada - Peru Japan - Philippines
Canada - Rep. of Korea Japan - Singapore
Caribbean community CARICOM / CARIFORUM Japan - Switzerland
Caribbean free trade association (CARIFTA) Japan - Thailand
Caribbean single market and economy (CSME) Japan - Viet Nam
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) Jordan - Singapore
Chile - China Korea, Republic of - Australia
Chile - Colombia Korea, Republic of - Chile
Chile - Costa Rica (Chile - Central America) Korea, Republic of - India
Chile - El Salvador (Chile - Central America) Korea, Republic of - Singapore
Chile - Guatemala (Chile - Central America) Korea, Republic of - Turkey
Chile - Honduras (Chile - Central America) Korea, Republic of - US
Chile - Japan Kyrgyz Republic - Armenia
Chile - Malaysia Kyrgyz Republic - Kazakhstan
Chile - Mexico Kyrgyz Republic - Moldova
Chile - Nicaragua (Chile - Central America) Kyrgyz Republic - Russian Federation
China - Costa Rica Kyrgyz Republic - Ukraine
China - Hong Kong, China Kyrgyz Republic - Uzbekistan
China - Macao, China Latin America Free Trade Association LAFTA / LAIA
China - New Zealand Malaysia - Australia
China - Singapore Mano River Union (MRU)
Colombia - Mexico Melanisian spearhead group (MSG) trade agreement
Colombia - Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras)
Mexico - Central America
Common Economic Zone (CEZ) Mexico - Uruguay
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)
New Zealand - Chinese Taipei
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Common market of the South (MERCUSOR) New Zealand - Malaysia
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) New Zealand - Singapore
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) Nicaragua - Chinese Taipei
Costa Rica - Peru North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Costa Rica - Singapore Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA)
Dominican Republic - Central America Pakistan - China
Dominican Republic - Central America - United States
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)
Pakistan - Malaysia
East African Community (EAC) Pakistan - Sri Lanka
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
(CEMAC)
Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA)
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Panama - Chile
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
(CEPGL)
Panama - Chinese Taipei
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Panama - Costa Rica (Panama - Central America)
EFTA Panama - El Salvador (Panama - Central America)
EFTA - Albania Panama - Guatemala (Panama - Central America)
EFTA - Bosnia and Herzegovina Panama - Honduras (Panama - Central America )
EFTA - Canada Panama - Nicaragua (Panama - Central America)
EFTA - Central America (Costa Rica and Panama) Panama - Peru
EFTA - Chile Panama - Singapore
EFTA - Colombia Peru - Chile
EFTA - Egypt Peru - China
EFTA - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Peru - Korea, Republic of
EFTA - Hong Kong, China Peru - Mexico
EFTA - Israel Peru - Singapore
EFTA - Jordan Russian Federation - Azerbaijan
EFTA - Korea, Republic of Russian Federation - Belarus
EFTA - Lebanon Russian Federation - Kazakhstan
EFTA - Mexico Russian Federation - Republic of Moldova
EFTA - Montenegro Russian Federation - Serbia
EFTA - Morocco Russian Federation - Tajikistan
EFTA - Palestinian Authority Russian Federation - Turkmenistan
EFTA - Peru Russian Federation - Uzbekistan
EFTA - SACU Singapore - Australia
EFTA - Serbia Singapore - Chinese Taipei
EFTA - Singapore South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA)
EFTA - Tunisia Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)
EFTA - Turkey Southern African Development Community (SADC)
EFTA - Ukraine Switzerland - China
Egypt - Turkey Thailand - Australia
El Salvador- Honduras - Chinese Taipei Thailand - New Zealand
EU - Albania Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
EU - Algeria Treaty on a Free Trade Area between members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
EU - Bosnia and Herzegovina Turkey - Albania
EU - Cameroon Turkey - Bosnia and Herzegovina
EU - CARIFORUM States EPA Turkey - Chile
EU - Central America Turkey - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EU - Chile Turkey - Georgia
EU - Colombia and Peru Turkey - Israel
EU - CÃ´te d’Ivoire Turkey - Jordan
EU - Eastern and Southern Africa States Interim EPA Turkey - Mauritius
EU - Egypt Turkey - Montenegro
EU - Faroe Islands Turkey - Morocco
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EU - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Turkey - Palestinian Authority
EU - Georgia Turkey - Serbia
EU - Iceland Turkey - Syria
EU - Israel Turkey - Tunisia
EU - Jordan Ukraine - Azerbaijan
EU - Korea, Republic of Ukraine - Belarus
EU - Lebanon Ukraine - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EU - Mexico Ukraine - Kazakhstan
EU - Montenegro Ukraine - Moldova
EU - Morocco Ukraine - Montenegro
EU - Norway Ukraine - Russian Federation
EU - Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) Ukraine - Tajikistan
EU - Palestinian Authority Ukraine - Uzbekistan
EU - Papua New Guinea / Fiji Ukraine -Turkmenistan
EU - Rep. of Moldova US - Australia
EU - Serbia US - Bahrain
EU - South Africa US - Chile
EU - Switzerland - Liechtenstein US - Colombia
EU - Syria US - Israel
EU - Tunisia US - Jordan
EU - Ukraine US - Morocco
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) US - Oman
European Union (EU) US - Panama
Faroe Islands - Norway US - Peru
Faroe Islands - Switzerland US - Singapore
Georgia - Armenia West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
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Table 6.3: Summary statistics
Variable Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RIA WTO 854,959 0.046 0.209 0 1
Trade DoTS 455,521 15.029 3.602 −27.457 27.2
GDPav pwt 8.0 485,112 10.344 1.473 4.925 16.277
GDPdi f f pwt 8.0 485,112 2.488 1.837 1.40e−6 11.231
DKL pwt 8.0 480,457 1.663 1.186 3.59e−6 6.184
DROWKL pwt 8.0 480,452 1.287 0.644 0.001 4.231
Distance CEPII 854,959 8.733 0.772 4.107 9.892
Remote CEPII 854,959 2.179 3.835 0 9.517
Landlocked CEPII 854,959 0.276 0.447 0 1
Contiguity CEPII 854,959 0.019 0.137 0 1
Common language CEPII 816,181 0.170 0.376 0 1
Colony CEPII 816,181 0.015 0.122 0 1
Common colony CEPII 816,181 0.115 0.319 0 1
WTO WTO 854,959 0.341 0.474 0 1
Pol. comp Polity IV 516188 9.900 21.810 0 98
Durability Polity IV 514757 27.089 31.865 0 204
Autocracy Polity IV 516188 9.391 21.120 0 98
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6.D Reduced parameter values of the full model - World
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7 | Conclusion
Except for the second chapter, the bulk of this thesis is concerned with the creation
of tools that will be used in later analyses. For example, the penultimate chap-
ter introduces the qualitative VAR methodology to the literature on the effect of
trade agreements on trade flows, but this work is far from completed. The third
chapter in particular only discusses the construction of the Bayesian index of cor-
ruption, but does not use it to answer a specific research question. Similarly, we
have barely scratched the surface of the uses of the indexes of actual economic in-
tegration (chapter 4) and historical trade integration (chapter 5). For this reason,
instead of simply repeating the conclusions of each chapter, this final chapter dis-
cusses ongoing and planned future research that is based on the work presented in
the preceding chapters.
The Bayesian Corruption Index
A significant portion of the third chapter is devoted to the comparison of the newly
constructed Bayesian Corruption Index with the corruption estimate of the World-
wide Governance Indicators. In this chapter, we show that the BCI has an increased
coverage, makes estimates with greater certainty and enables us to completely take
its uncertainty into account in any subsequent analysis. However, to be useful from
a research and policy perspective, the construction of the BCI still requires quite
some work. To start with, the corruption index should be updated as its current
estimates end in 2013. Secondly, the chapter lacks many of the robustness checks
that were performed on the WGI. For example, it remains to be checked to what
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extent the index changes when each indicator receives the same weight (cf. Kauf-
mann et al., 2007a). Most importantly, the interpretability and ease of use should
be vastly improved, if the BCI has any hopes of becoming an accepted measure of
corruption.
The specification of the state-space model could also be further refined. For exam-
ple, as it is defined in chapter 3, the model ignores the exact nature of the underlying
variables. Particularly in the case of limited dependent variables, the assumptions
of the state-space model might be incompatible with the nature of the observed in-
dicators. Following Høyland et al. (2012), this issue can be solved by imposing a
Poisson distribution (in stead of a normal distribution) on some of the underlying
indicators.
In terms of the applications of the BCI index, one possible research idea would be to
look at the relationship between the perception of corruption, the actual experience
with corruption and the presence of anti-corruption measures (cf. Roca, 2011). To
that end, the methodology of the BCI (an index of corruption perception) was used
to construct indicators that capture anti-corruption measures and experience with
corruption.1 Like the BCI, a high value of the experience index means that there
has been little experience with corruption. In contrast, a high value of the measures
index means that many anti-corruption measures are in effect.
Clearly, the relationship between these three indexes is not straightforward as each
will in some way affect the other two. Limiting this preliminary examination to
a simple scatterplot, figure 7.1 reveals a number of striking patterns. Without im-
plying any causal relationship, it seems that when corruption is perceived to be
rampant, large changes in the experience with corruption do not change the per-
ceived level much (panel a). However, if the country is perceived to be less corrupt,
a small increase in experience can be strongly detrimental to the perceived level
of corruption. In addition, while an increase in the anti-corruption measures has a
beneficial effect on the perceived level of corruption (panel b), its correlation with
1The indicators of experience with corruption and anti-corruption measures come from the same
sources as the perception indicators listed in chapter 3, but were not used in the construction of the
BCI.
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the experience with corruption is much lower (panel c). A full analysis of the inter-
play between these three indices could potentially shed more light on the behavior
of corruption over time, the usefulness of anti-corruption measures, as well as the
value of indexes of corruption perception.
Experience
-30 -20 -10 0 10
P
e
rc
e
p
ti
o
n
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
(a) Experience - Perception
Measures
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
P
e
rc
e
p
ti
o
n
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
(b) Measures - Perception
Experience
-30 -20 -10 0 10
M
e
a
su
re
s
-5
0
5
10
15
(c) Experience - Measures
Figure 7.1: Scatter plots of the index values of the perception of corruption, experience
with corruption and anti-corruption measures in 2010
The historical trade index
The analysis of the distance puzzle in the worldwide trade network in the fifth chap-
ter is only the first step in a broader research project that is centered around the
historical trade index. Benjamin Vandermarliere, Stijn Ronsse and I are currently
using the hierarchical stochastic block model method described in Peixoto (2015)
to reveal the structure of the historical trade network over time.2 A stochastic block
model describes the underlying probability model of a network. Simply put, it di-
vides the different countries (nodes) into blocks based on the similarity of their
behavior in the network (i.e. the countries that they form edges to). It then describes
for each block what the probability is that a member will trade with members of
its own block, as well as each of the other blocks. Hierarchical block models also
look for higher-level structures in the network: i.e. a group of blocks that behave
2The construction of this network and some simple network statistics are described in the ap-
pendix C of chapter 5.
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similarly. The method of Peixoto is particularly interesting in that it uses Bayesian
selection techniques to look for the most parsimonious model that accurately de-
scribes the network.
As an example, figure 7.2 plots the structure of the trade network in the period 1880-
1914. In this graph, countries are represented by the dots on a circle. The bigger
the dot, the larger its weighted indegree (the sum of all incoming edges). The nodes
are sorted and colored according their membership to the lowest level block, as are
their outgoing edges (indicating countries they are integrated into). The higher level
groupings are represented by a thin red line connected to the center of the circle. To
aid the interpretation of the graph, the groupings are also plotted on a world map.
Among other things, figure 7.2 shows that the world trade pattern over the period
1880-1914 corresponds to a core-periphery model. The core is defined as a group of
countries that have mostly formed intra-block edges (to other countries in the core),
while remaining relatively unconnected to the rest of the network: the periphery.
The periphery in turn is strongly connected to the core, but its intra-block edges are
sparse. The highest level grouping identifies the purple group (e.g. Great Britain
and the USA) as the core and the rest of the world as the periphery. The periphery
can be further subdivided into three groups. The yellow group is firmly in the
periphery (e.g. Afghanistan and Peru), while the gray (e.g. Italy and Russia) and
green (e.g. China and India) groups lie somewhere in between. The latter two have
more intra-groups edges as well as a higher chance of receiving an edge from the
core.
We are currently in the process of analyzing the world trade network on a yearly ba-
sis and tracking the evolution of the different groups from 1880 to 2010. In addition
to revealing the changing structure of the network over time, we want to gauge the
effect of strong shocks (e.g. the World Wars, oil crises, the great depression, etc.)
on the network, paying particular attention to possible anticipatory changes.
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Figure 7.2: Structure of the historical trade network in the period 1880-1914
Nodes are sorted and colored according to the lowest level grouping of the block model, as are their
outgoing edges. The bigger the node, the larger the weighted indegree. The higher level groupings
are represented by a thin red line connected to the center of the circle.
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State-space models
Needless to say, the idea of using a state-space model to create ‘mashup’ indicators
can be applied to more than just integration and corruption.3 The only require-
ment for this model to have a strong added advantage over more simple methods of
aggregation (e.g. a principal components analysis) is that there is some level of per-
sistence in the state variable. If this is combined with a complex pattern of missing
variables, the advantage of using a state-space model rises even further.
One application Ilse Ruyssen, Glenn Rayp and I are currently working on is the
creation of an index that captures the openness of migration policy. Persistence is
likely to be high, as a change in policy requires some type of governmental decision.
We have collected information on more than 250 indicators of the restrictiveness
of migration policy, but the overabundance of missing values makes more simple
aggregation methods impossible to use. However, as we explained in chapter 3, the
state-space model can easily solve this problem of non-overlapping missing values.
In order to correctly include some of the indicators, the model had to be adjusted
to deal with binary indicators as well as indicators that can only be compared over
time (but not over countries).
Other ‘mashup’ indexes we are currently working on are an index of the level of
social protection on the labour market and an index of the level of competitiveness
of the economy.
The qualitative vector autoregression model
As the extensions section in the previous chapter (section 6.6) makes clear, the
work on the qualitative VAR is far from finished. Besides to the changes listed in
this section, there are a number of other additions worth following up on. The first
pertains the different theories on the interplay between corruption and integration
highlighted in the first chapter. As stated in the introduction of this thesis, our
3‘They’ve done studies, you know. 60% of the time, it works every time.’ (Brian Fontana,
Anchorman, 2004)
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initial motivation for looking at the qualitative VAR was as a way to correct for the
endogenous relation between corruption and trade agreements.
To get a first glimpse of the results, I reran the full model regression for the en-
tire world from section 6.5.2 with average corruption (as measured by the BCI) as
an additional endogenous variable. The average treatment effect of a trade agree-
ment on the average BCI is positive, meaning that the level of corruption decreases
after an agreement is signed. Over time, this positive effect slowly increases, but
the confidence bounds indicate that it is borderline (in)significant. While it is im-
possible to gauge the intentions of policy makers in closing the agreements, these
results do indicate that the rent-destruction and rent-shielding effects dominate in
trade agreements worldwide.
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Figure 7.3: Average treatment effect of RIAs on corruption - World
A second addition to this model would be include the index of Actual Economic
Integration of chapter 4 to study the effects of trade agreements on economic inte-
gration as a whole.
In conclusion, the chapters presented in this thesis have laid the groundwork for a
large number of future research projects.
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